Suchergebnisse

VTT Technology 295 ; This final report summarises the main results of the research project on Sociotechnical Safety Assessment within three regulatory regimes (SAFERA STARS). The objectives of the project were the following: 1) Explore what the shift towards a sociotechnical approach entails from a scientific viewpoint and how it affects safety management, 2) Compare practices in risk regulatory regimes - Norwegian oil and gas, hazardous use of chemicals in Finland and France - with sociotechnical approaches, 3) Clarify the regulation (limits and possibilities) in ensuring sociotechnical safety 4) Develop an evidence-based guide on how to develop regulatory practices towards taking better into account the sociotechnical safety. It's a question of pioneer study in the sense that there is no comparison between these regimes made before, and not in terms of sociotechnical safety. Findings show strengths and vulnerabilities of all three regimes. Norway appears to be the most advanced with regard to sociotechnical aspects. The strength of Norwegian regime is large stakeholder involvement and adopted capability building among the industry and the regulatory body. However, vulnerabilities in the Norwegian regime relate to political and economic issues, which can easily weaken the existing trust between the parties and undermine the climate of cooperation. The strength of the Finnish regime is in its emphasis on proactively preventive communication, meaning providing information, guidelines and training to the operators. However, the heterogeneity and large number of supervised plants and the small number of inspectors is a clear challenge with regard to the development of sociotechnical safety assessment. The strength of the French regime is in the development of a dialogue-based approach with civil society, operators and other stakeholders. Weak points are the command and control type of regulation and the fact that inspectors need to change their position every second or third year. Development of sociotechnical safety assessment would require a broad discussion about the role of regulation in society.

VTT Technology 293 ; Aimed at policy makers, regulators, industry managers and other stakeholders, this white paper makes explicit some key issues for regulating safety and major accident risk within industries. Based on a sociotechnical system approach, we recommend that safety regulators shall be oriented towards operational variability and the optimisation of technical-human interactions in industrial systems, including a micro-macro scale for describing system influences on accident risks and safety outcomes. In the paper, we discuss how and why current regulatory approaches to safety lack focus on the dynamics of safety within industries and the relationships between safety outcomes and systemic factors, such as regulatory culture, labour relations and evolving modes of production. For example, globalisation processes are increasing in frequency and speed across industries, shaping new operational constraints on high-risk systems. New interconnected systems following the digitalisation of information and communication technology, the liberalisation of trade and finance, deregulation and privatisation agendas are other examples of supranational processes creating new environments for high-risk companies, responsible states and civil society. The implications for major accident risk following such wide-scoped transformations are not straightforward and have to be understood in relation to their industrial contexts. In order to address changes in society, accident models and regulatory practices have to be broadened and developed beyond today's focus of monitoring compliance. This paper gives an overview of how sociotechnical system ideas have developed in association with industrial safety and maps the conceptual foundations for current regulatory methods and practices. Sociotechnical system models are also described, demonstrating different ways of representing major accident risks and safety from sociotechnical system perspectives. Safety is explained as a dynamic property of systems determined in relation to industrial contexts. Safety is situational and a property in continuous development, on the one side relying on a systems structured processes and formalised situations such as accident investigations, audits, inspection and meetings while on the other side being symbolic and related to a systems culture, power relations, trust and human emotions. Consequently, several domains of knowledge interact, and we present a framework for knowledge about safety that includes 1) engineering and technology, 2) human and organisational factors, 3) strategy and management and 4) politics and governance. The implications of such a framework for proactive approaches to regulation are discussed in the paper, focusing on possible regulatory strategies for moving forward. Our approach raises regulatory implications that connect to the potential safety benefit of increasing proactive investigations as well as strategies focusing on the strengthening of safety structures and risk awareness processes within companies. In addition, we highlight the importance of systemic issues for regulation. Among other areas, the increasing pace of developments within information technology and automation as well as the extensive organisational changes within many industries following globalisation suggests the need to improve strategies for monitoring systemic trends and finding appropriate ways to regulate safety when systems become globalised. We suggest that it may also be possible to improve industries' management of major accident risks by encouraging strategies for 1) auditing the regulatory systems, 2) supporting networks of safety and reliability professionals and 3) monitoring precursor conditions in relation to change. ; White paper tarkastelee sosioteknistä turvallisuuden arviointia historiallisista, teoreettisista ja turvallisuustutkimuksen lähtökohdista. Turvallisuuskriittisten organisaatioiden, kuten ilmailun, öljy- ja kaasuteollisuuden, kemianteollisuuden ja ydinvoimateollisuuden, onnettomuudet ovat seurausta useiden toisiinsa kytkeytyneiden systeemien - niin teknisten kuin sosiaalistenkin - keskinäisvuorovaikutuksesta. Onnettomuuksien sosiotekninen luonne edellyttää myös turvallisuuden näkemistä sosioteknisenä, jännitteisenä ja alati syntyvänä ominaisuutena. Raportissa todetaan, että sosioteknisyys on mukana onnettomuuksien hahmottamisessa, mutta sitä ei ole vielä riittävästi sisällytetty turvallisuuskriittisten organisaatioiden valvontaan. Perinteisesti teollisuuden valvonta on perustunut riskien analyysiin ja sääntöjen noudattamisen valvontaan. Sääntöjen noudattaminen ei kuitenkaan yksin riitä takaamaan turvallisuutta.Monimutkaisessa sosioteknisessä tilanteessa tarvittaisiin kykyä tarkastella turvallisuutta kokonaisvaltaisesti. Sosioteknisyyden huomioiminen valvonnassa edellyttäisi organisaation toimintaan vaikuttavan todellisuuden ymmärtämistä tarkkailemalla muutostekijöitä, kuten toimintojen ulkoistamisia ja niiden vaikutuksia turvallisuuden kannalta tärkeisiin toimintoihin.Muutostekijöihin lukeutuvat teknologiset, yhteiskunnalliset, taloudelliset ja poliittiset tekijät. Sosioteknistä ymmärrystä voivat edistää teollisuuden kokeneet, useammassa tehtävässä olleet asiantuntijat, joilla on laaja ymmärrys oman organisaationsa toiminnasta. Valvontajärjestelmän auditointiakin on ehdotettu keinoksi edistää sosioteknistä lähestymistapaa. Sosioteknisyyden sisällyttäminen valvontaan edellyttää paitsi osaamista, henkilö- ja taloudellisia resursseja myös valvojan ja valvottavan suhteen uudelleen pohdintaa. Raportti ei ole lopullinen vastaus sosioteknisyyden haasteeseen valvonnalle vaan paremminkin lähtökohta keskustelulle valvonnan sosioteknisyydestä.