Intro -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I: The Setting -- 1. A World of Empires -- 2. Destiny and Dollars -- 3. Evolution of the New Imperialism: The Philippines -- 4. James Harrison Wilson: A Transitional Expansionist -- Part II: The Matrices -- 5. The Tone of Society -- 6. Theodore Roosevelt and the Sturdy Virtues -- 7. Civilization, Barbarism, and Christianity -- 8. Elihu Root: A World of Order and Progress -- 9. Commercial Domination -- 10. Charles Denby: The China Market -- 11. Charles A. Conant: The Implications of Commercial Struggle -- Part III: The Issues -- 12. The Anti-Imperialist Movement -- 13. Conflict and Consensus -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.
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Intro -- CONTENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- Who Was James G. Blaine? -- Guatemala and Mexico -- The Isthmian Canal -- The War of the Pacific, I -- The War of the Pacific, II -- Blaine at Bay -- Seven Years Out of Office -- The Inter-American Conference -- Tariff Reciprocity -- Caribbean Naval Bases -- The Chilean Crisis, I -- The Chilean Crisis, II -- Conclusion -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX.
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This article considers the dominance that randomized controlled trials (RCTs) of psychotropic agents currently have in relation to the practice of psychiatry in mental health and primary care settings. In contemporary psychiatry, data of marginal significance based on rating scale measures are privileged as evidence that treatments are effective, while judgments of drug effects based on clinical practice are downgraded. The dominance of RCTs has also led to an increasing promotion of rating scales in clinical practice, described here as `rating scale mongering.' The logical consequence of current interpretations of RCT data is that clinicians should adhere to guidelines which are based on a systematic assembly of such data, but the selective publication of trial data and ghostwriting of publications, lays the basis for guideline capture, and a corresponding capture of evidence-based clinical practice by pharmaceutical companies.
Before 1980, most people experiencing common nervous problems and who sought medical help complained of anxiety and were treated for anxiety. Similar experiences increasingly led to complaints of or treatment for panic attacks in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and to complaints of or treatment for mood disorders by the mid-1990s. Today, such patients seem once again increasingly likely to complain of and be treated for anxiety. This paper reviews a series of mechanisms whereby company marketing can both transform the perceptions of physicians and shape the experiences of those seeking treatment and the self-understanding of those not in treatment. These include the standard ploys of company sales departments to increase demand for products, including celebrity endorsements, the sponsoring of educational events and a host of reminders. The portfolio of marketing manoeuvres has grown, though, by translating educational events and celebrity events into the arena of scientific research: clinical trials have increasingly become part of the marketing of disorders and their treatments; ghost-written scientific papers are authored by celebrity researchers. The portfolio of marketing manoeuvres has also grown to encompass new ways of creating fashion through medical activism, by setting up patient groups and disease awareness campaigns. The result is a transformation and growth in disorders tailor-made to fit ever more visible drugs.
In May 1917, the United States Navy dispatched a South Atlantic patrol squadron to Brazil under the command of Admiral William B. Caperton, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Caperton, who soon saw his mission as more diplomatic than military, became the United States' best-known representative in South America and worked closely with civilian diplomats to maximize United States influence in the area. His two-year tour of duty from 1917 to 1919, therefore, constitutes a little-known case study in the attempted use of naval forces for diplomatic purposes, and in the development of some aspects of United States policy in South America.
