Suchergebnisse

Electoral manipulation is committed both during hotly contested elections as well as quite predictable ones. Comparative scholarship has sought to understand this variation, acknowledging that electoral manipulation can serve an informational as well as an instrumental role, but has not distinguished when, if ever, electoral manipulation is more likely to serve one role over another. This paper examines these issues, asking if and how strategies of manipulation differ depending on the conditions of the election. Using a newly developed measure of contestation and original data on elections from ten post-Soviet states, this paper quantitatively analyzes the types of strategies used depending on election-level factors. The results reveal that incumbents are likely to select some, but not all, types of manipulation depending on contestation of the election, the level of incumbent dominance, and the type of election being held. This paper concludes that while electoral manipulation can be used for instrumental and informational purposes, they are likely to be pursued in different elections, and that this depends on the conditions of the elections.

Extant work on status attribution has largely focused on major powers or state capabilities as key explanatory factors driving these social processes and suggests that status considerations increase conflicts between states. We argue for a more comprehensive approach to status attribution that considers international norms as another major factor that is weighed in the attribution process. We contend that states (policymakers) evaluate one another not only on the basis of economic and military capabilities but also on the extent to which there is behavioral conformance with normative expectations and reward one another dependent upon whether these expectations are met. However, this attribution of status is dependent upon the level of contestation pertaining to that norm. Using a data set that assesses consistency with six different norms (resource transference, multilateralism, economic liberalism, democratic governance, respect for human rights, and peaceful dispute resolution), we find that status attribution is associated with norm-consistent behavior but only when these norms are uncontested at the global level. (International Interactions (London)/ FUB)