Suchergebnisse

International investment agreements : flexibilty for development / United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. - New York [u.a.] : United Nations, 2000(= UNCTAD series on issues in international investment agreements)

This article examines policy options that are co-produced by both states and firms, with the purpose of regulating an area of public policy and the practice of corporate social responsibility (CSR) by companies. The contributions of this article are twofold. First, it creates a typology of the co-production of corporate social responsibility, adding "delegated," "brokered," and "partnership" as intermediate categories between the natural end points of "voluntary" and "regulated." Second, it proposes a framework for understanding why governments opt for a particular version of co-produced regulation, by focusing on the interaction between two key variables, the "net enforcement cost" and the "political salience of the demand for regulation." The framework is tested on examples of the co-production of CSR from Argentina and Peru, where I identify pathways of change from one category of co-production to another.

The article shows that the ability of activists to achieve outcomes that they value is fundamentally conditioned by how bureaucracies implement policies and regulations. Relatively minor changes to bureaucratic policies, regulatory enforcement, or judicial oversight – in a context of rule of law and institutional capacity to implement – can generate new opportunities and feedback loops that increase the influence of social movements over extractive sector governance, even when other political and legislative opportunities are closed. In this regard, despite the failure of glacier legislation in Chile, increased bureaucratic and judicial responsiveness enhanced the ability of social activists to attain their goals via direct access to regulatory agencies. In Argentina, the fragmented federal system allowed the passage of legislation to conserve glaciers, yet prevented effective implementation of the law. Resumen: Los dos lados de Pascua Lama: protesta social, respuesta institucional y circuitos de retroalimentaciónEl artículo muestra que la capacidad de los activistas de alcanzar resultados que valoran está fundamentalmente condicionado por la manera en la que la burocracia aplica las políticas y las regulaciones. Cambios relativamente menores de políticas burocráticas, aplicación regulatoria, o la supervisión judicial, en un contexto de estado de derecho y capacidad institucional, puede generar nuevas oportunidades y circuitos de retroalimentación que aumentan la influencia de los movimientos sociales sobre la gobernanza del sector extractivo, incluso cuando se encuentran cerradas otras oportunidades políticas y legislativas. En este sentido, a pesar del fracaso de la legislación sobre glaciares en Chile, el aumento de la capacidad de respuesta burocrática y judicial mejoró la capacidad de los activistas socio-ambientales sociales para alcanzar sus objetivos a través del acceso directo a las agencias reguladoras. En Argentina, el sistema federal fragmentado permitió la aprobación de leyes para conservar los glaciares, pero impidió la implementación efectiva de la ley.

ABSTRACTThis article examines the possibility of overcoming the resource curse through case studies of the appropriation and use of mining rents derived from public–private joint ventures in Argentina and Chile in the period 1973–2000. In particular, it examines how two similar cases of sectoral liberalization resulted in divergent outcomes: the deployment of rent‐appropriation strategies around multinational corporations in Argentina and an innovative and productivist approach based on joint ventures with foreign capital in Chile. The article argues that while the liberalization of the sector created similar opportunities for appropriating rents in both countries, the existence of strong civil society pressures in Chile constrained rent‐appropriation and waste by the state, in comparison to the absence of such pressures in Argentina.