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In: Publius: the journal of federalism, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 139-139
ISSN: 0048-5950
In: Economics of education review, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 73-84
ISSN: 0272-7757
In: Journal of economics and business, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 271-282
ISSN: 0148-6195
In: Social science quarterly, Band 69, S. 646-659
ISSN: 0038-4941
Prospects for continued monetary autonomy. Whether the Fed's autonomy is at risk because long-standing support for its independence has eroded.
In: Social science quarterly, Band 69, Heft 3, S. 646
ISSN: 0038-4941
In: Journal of sport and social issues: the official journal of Northeastern University's Center for the Study of Sport in Society, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 53-54
ISSN: 1552-7638
In: The American journal of economics and sociology, Band 40, Heft 3, S. 317-320
ISSN: 1536-7150
Abstract. As a Congressman from Texas from 1929 to 1976, Wright Patman supported Populist‐type legislation which aided farmers, small businessmen and consumers. His perennial target in the postwar era was the Federal Reserve System. He resented the central bank's political independence and believed that "high"interest rates brought about by monetary policy actions benefited banks and harmed ordinary citizens. Rather than attacking the Fed's control of monetary policy directly, Patman tried to improve Fed accountability to Congress by subjecting the Fed's budgetary process and expenditures to government audit and/or the Congressional appropriations process. Despite numerous investigations, reports, and pieces of legislation, Patman's crusade failed to achieve its objectives. Nevertheless, his persistent criticism over 25 years undoubtedly created an atmosphere for change. Eschewing the indirect approach, Patman's political heirs in Congress demanded and received more accountability (and less secrecy) from the Fed regarding monetary policy objectives. Ironically Patman's abortive crusade may have paved the way for their later success.
In: The journal of economic history, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 749-749
ISSN: 1471-6372
In: Social science quarterly, Band 59, Heft 2, S. 362-370
ISSN: 0038-4941
The Federal Reserve System should maintain absolute independence from government supervision in the matter of monetary policy. At present, the formation of monetary policy is but one of five functions fulfilled by the System. These functions & the expenses incurred for each of them are examined, as are the expenses of the Board of of Governors, based on expense & employee data collected for the 22 years from 1952 to 1973. It is probable that some functions could be handled less expensively by other government agencies, but the Reserve System is reluctant to give them up. This reluctance could jeopardize its control of all functions, including formation of monetary policy, for which independence is crucial. S. Stanton.
In: The journal of economic history, Band 35, Heft 3, S. 667-668
ISSN: 1471-6372
Appendix: A. The character of political unions. B. Constitutional documents relating to commonwealth, p. [362]-382. ; "Principal works referred to": p. [xx] ; "List of statutes cited": p. [xvi]-xix. ; Mode of access: Internet.
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