Suchergebnisse

In a recent paper we presented a linear programming model of a three-riparian, two-time-period, joint river-basin development scheme by using cooperative game theory. The objective of the model was to develop 'fair' and equitable divisions of the benefits and costs of cooperation. In this paper the analysis is extended by including linear constraints which satisfy the well-known Shapley-value imputation scheme.

River-basin developments inevitably require participation by numerous entities (for example, riparians and external funding agencies). The division of the costs and benefits consequent to the scheme is further complicated by time schedules for implementation. In this paper the extension of cooperative game theory to temporal allocations is explored. The approach is illustrated with an example problem involving three riparians and two time periods. Propensities to disrupt are incorporated in the cooperative game in a form that permits the use of linear programming techniques. The results suggest that a considerable range of choices for decisions can be generated by systematic and random investigation near to optimal solutions.

Two models of the village firewood-gathering economy are developed: one where the firewood is treated by households as a common-property resource and one where it is treated as a private asset. Under both models, rebound of consumption occurs as a result of distributing more-efficient wood-burning stoves into households. It follows that policies premised on the assumption that the use of scarce resources can be curtailed simply by raising the energy efficiency of appliances used in the household are flawed. The same policies, however, when judged according to their contribution to the utility of the household appear to be better.

The shrinking forest in many parts of the world is a problem often blamed on the patterns of ownership and harvesting by the resource owners. We develop a model which demonstrates that holding a resource in common where there is competition among individuals leads to inefficient harvesting of the resource but cannot lead to the destruction of forests. The same model is used to demonstrate that climatic conditions, low wage rates, and increases in the number of people entitled to harvest the resource are more-likely candidates for variables explaining the destruction of the forest. Examples taken from the Sudan and from China provide evidence that communities alter their pattern of ownership and migration so that they do not exhaust the resource. The main conclusion of the paper is that the behavior of the owners of the resource is not the underlying cause of the destruction of the forest.