Suchergebnisse

Abstract We consider a game of strategic experimentation where agents are restricted to an all‐or‐nothing sampling strategy. The strategic interaction between agents due to informational externalities is affected by the sizes of the experimentation samples and the sensitivity of information to changes in sample sizes. There is experimentation only if the overall sample is large enough. Equilibrium may involve optimal, insufficient or excessive experimentation relative to a second‐best welfare benchmark. This unusual over‐experimentation result is associated not necessarily with large samples but with a low elasticity of the value of information with respect to the sample size.

Given recent regulatory changes under Basel III, we empirically examine the impact of leverage ratio and risk-based capital requirements on bank risk taking and lending, allowing for different degrees of supervisory strength. Using data for 66 countries covering the period 2000-2014, we find that banks in countries with a leverage ratio restriction grant fewer loans and have higher credit risk compared to banks facing no leverage ratio requirement, independently of the strength of the supervisory regime. We further find that those negative side-effects of leverage ratio requirements on bank lending and credit risk are not offset by higher capital stringency. ; Suite aux récentes réformes de la réglementation bancaire, nous analysons empiriquement l'impact d'un ratio de levier couplé à un ratio de capital pondéré du risque sur l'offre de crédit et la prise de risque des banques. Cette analyse prend en considération les différents degrés d'implication des superviseurs nationaux. Avec une base de données sur 66 pays couvrant la période 2000-2014, nous trouvons que les banques octroient moins de crédit et optent pour davantage de risque dans les pays où un ratio de levier est appliqué, indépendamment de la qualité de la supervision locale. De plus, un meilleur contrôle des fonds propres ne compense pas ces effets négatifs du ratio de levier.

Given recent regulatory changes under Basel III, we empirically examine the impact of leverage ratio and risk-based capital requirements on bank risk taking and lending, allowing for different degrees of supervisory strength. Using data for 66 countries covering the period 2000-2014, we find that banks in countries with a leverage ratio restriction grant fewer loans and have higher credit risk compared to banks facing no leverage ratio requirement, independently of the strength of the supervisory regime. We further find that those negative side-effects of leverage ratio requirements on bank lending and credit risk are not offset by higher capital stringency. ; Suite aux récentes réformes de la réglementation bancaire, nous analysons empiriquement l'impact d'un ratio de levier couplé à un ratio de capital pondéré du risque sur l'offre de crédit et la prise de risque des banques. Cette analyse prend en considération les différents degrés d'implication des superviseurs nationaux. Avec une base de données sur 66 pays couvrant la période 2000-2014, nous trouvons que les banques octroient moins de crédit et optent pour davantage de risque dans les pays où un ratio de levier est appliqué, indépendamment de la qualité de la supervision locale. De plus, un meilleur contrôle des fonds propres ne compense pas ces effets négatifs du ratio de levier.

Given recent regulatory changes under Basel III, we empirically examine the impact of leverage ratio and risk-based capital requirements on bank risk taking and lending, allowing for different degrees of supervisory strength. Using data for 66 countries covering the period 2000-2014, we find that banks in countries with a leverage ratio restriction grant fewer loans and have higher credit risk compared to banks facing no leverage ratio requirement, independently of the strength of the supervisory regime. We further find that those negative side-effects of leverage ratio requirements on bank lending and credit risk are not offset by higher capital stringency. ; Suite aux récentes réformes de la réglementation bancaire, nous analysons empiriquement l'impact d'un ratio de levier couplé à un ratio de capital pondéré du risque sur l'offre de crédit et la prise de risque des banques. Cette analyse prend en considération les différents degrés d'implication des superviseurs nationaux. Avec une base de données sur 66 pays couvrant la période 2000-2014, nous trouvons que les banques octroient moins de crédit et optent pour davantage de risque dans les pays où un ratio de levier est appliqué, indépendamment de la qualité de la supervision locale. De plus, un meilleur contrôle des fonds propres ne compense pas ces effets négatifs du ratio de levier.

Given recent regulatory changes under Basel III, we empirically examine the impact of leverage ratio and risk-based capital requirements on bank risk taking and lending, allowing for different degrees of supervisory strength. Using data for 66 countries covering the period 2000-2014, we find that banks in countries with a leverage ratio restriction grant fewer loans and have higher credit risk compared to banks facing no leverage ratio requirement, independently of the strength of the supervisory regime. We further find that those negative side-effects of leverage ratio requirements on bank lending and credit risk are not offset by higher capital stringency. ; Suite aux récentes réformes de la réglementation bancaire, nous analysons empiriquement l'impact d'un ratio de levier couplé à un ratio de capital pondéré du risque sur l'offre de crédit et la prise de risque des banques. Cette analyse prend en considération les différents degrés d'implication des superviseurs nationaux. Avec une base de données sur 66 pays couvrant la période 2000-2014, nous trouvons que les banques octroient moins de crédit et optent pour davantage de risque dans les pays où un ratio de levier est appliqué, indépendamment de la qualité de la supervision locale. De plus, un meilleur contrôle des fonds propres ne compense pas ces effets négatifs du ratio de levier.

Using a simple two-region model where local or central regulators set bank capital requirements as risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios, we demonstrate the importance of capital requirements being set centrally when cross-region spillovers are large and local regulators suffer from substantial regulatory capture. We show that local regulators may want to surrender regulatory power only when spillover effects are large but the degree of supervisory capture is relatively small, and that bank capital regulation at central rather than local levels is more beneficial the larger the impact of systemic risk and the more asymmetric is regulatory capture at the local level.

Using a simple two-region model where local or central regulators set bank capital requirements as risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios, we demonstrate the importance of capital requirements being set centrally when cross-region spillovers are large and local regulators suffer from substantial regulatory capture. We show that local regulators may want to surrender regulatory power only when spillover effects are large but the degree of supervisory capture is relatively small, and that bank capital regulation at central rather than local levels is more beneficial the larger the impact of systemic risk and the more asymmetric is regulatory capture at the local level.

Using a simple two-region model where local or central regulators set bank capital requirements as risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios, we demonstrate the importance of capital requirements being set centrally when cross-region spillovers are large and local regulators suffer from substantial regulatory capture. We show that local regulators may want to surrender regulatory power only when spillover effects are large but the degree of supervisory capture is relatively small, and that bank capital regulation at central rather than local levels is more beneficial the larger the impact of systemic risk and the more asymmetric is regulatory capture at the local level.

International audience ; Using a simple two-country model where national or supranational regulators can set capital requirements as either risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios, we examine which of these arrangements is best. Our results demonstrate the importance of capital requirements being set at a supranational level particularly when cross-country spillovers are large and national regulators su¤er from substantial degrees of regulatory capture. We further highlight the im-portance of llowing for supervisory "remoteness" in this context, and show that national regulators may want to surrender regulatory power only when spillover e¤ects are large but the degree of supervisory capture is relatively small.

International audience ; Using a simple two-region model where local or central regulators set capital requirements as risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios, we demonstrate the importance of capital requirements being set centrally when cross-region spillovers are arge and local regulators suffer from substantial regulatory capture. We show that local regulators may want to surrender regulatory power only when spillover effects are large but the degree of supervisory capture is relatively small, and that capital regulation at central rather than local levels is more benefcial the larger the impact of systemic risk and the more asymmetric is regulatory capture at the local level.

International audience ; Using a simple two-country model where national or supranational regulators can set capital requirements as either risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios, we examine which of these arrangements is best. Our results demonstrate the importance of capital requirements being set at a supranational level particularly when crosscountry spillovers are large and national regulators suffer from substantial degrees of regulatory capture. We further highlight the importance of allowing for supervisory "remoteness" in this context, and show that national regulators may want to surrender regulatory power only when spillover effects are large but the degree of supervisory capture is relatively small.