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How do ordinary people come to know or believe what they do? We need an account of this process to help explain why people act as they do. You might think I am acting irrationally--against my interest or my purpose--until you realize that what you know and what I know differ significantly. My actions, given my knowledge, might make eminently good sense. Of course, this pushes our problem back one stage to assess why someone knows or believes what they do. That is the focus of this book. Russell Hardin supposes that people are not usually going to act knowingly against their interests or other
In simple action theory, when people choose between courses of action, they know what the outcome will be. When an individual is making a choice ""against nature,"" such as switching on a light, that assumption may hold true. But in strategic interaction outcomes, indeterminacy is pervasive and often intractable. Whether one is choosing for oneself or making a choice about a policy matter, it is usually possible only to make a guess about the outcome, one based on anticipating what other actors will do. In this book Russell Hardin asserts, in his characteristically clear and uncompromising
By placing Hume in the developing tradition of social science as a strong forerunner of his younger friend Adam Smith, Hardin shows Hume's strong strategic sense, his powerful theory of convention as a main source of social and political order, and his recognition of moral and political theory as a single enterprise
In: Russell Sage Foundation series on trust volume 8
Contents -- Contributors -- Part I. Theorizing Distrust -- Chapter 1. Distrust: Manifestations and Management / Russell Hardin -- Chapter 2. Distrust: Prudent, If Not Always Wise / Deborah Welch Larson -- Chapter 3. Trust, Distrust, and In Between / Edna Ullmann-Margalit -- Part II. Power and Distrust -- Chapter 4. Trust, Distrust, and Power / Henry Farrell -- Chapter 5. The Transaction Costs of Distrust: Labor and Management at the National Labor Relations Board / Margaret Levi, Matthew Moe, and Theresa Buckley
In: The Russell Sage Foundation series on trust volume 4
"Trust and Trustworthiness represents the culmination of important new research into the roles of trust in our society; it offers a challenging new voice in the current discourse about the origins of cooperative behavior and its consequences for social and civic life."--Jacket
In: The Russell Sage Foundation series on trust, volume 4
"Trust and Trustworthiness represents the culmination of important new research into the roles of trust in our society; it offers a challenging new voice in the current discourse about the origins of cooperative behavior and its consequences for social and civic life."--Jacket.
In a book that challenges the most widely held ideas of why individuals engage in collective conflict, Russell Hardin offers a timely, crucial explanation of group action in its most destructive forms. Contrary to those observers who attribute group violence to irrationality, primordial instinct, or complex psychology, Hardin uncovers a systematic exploitation of self-interest in the underpinnings of group identification and collective violence. Using examples from Mafia vendettas to ethnic violence in places such as Bosnia and Rwanda, he describes the social and economic circumstances that se
World Affairs Online
In: Rationality and society, Band 25, Heft 4, S. 407-421
ISSN: 1461-7358
If we are to have political, legal, and constitutional order, we must first have a substantial degree of general social order to enable us to create and organize these grander orders. In short, such general order is causally prior to these other broad social orders. General social order historically has been built up spontaneously, perhaps through creation of norms that are enforced within the society whose more general order we wish to explain. It seems likely that many of the members of our society need not recognize many of the norms that govern our actions. Moreover, unlike pristine theory, the societal problem is subject to instrumentalist arguments, at least in a theoretical sense, for many of our social norms. Among the most important of these norms are those that coordinate our actions in manifold repetitive contexts.