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The article examines the relationship between local government size and satisfaction with the input side and output side of local government. The literature on the relationship between size and satisfaction is extensive, but studies typically focus on structural differences rather than structural change, using traditional cross-sectional methods. The article seeks to remedy this by studying recent municipal mergers in Denmark as a quasi-experiment, using a unique data set consisting of a repeated and a cross-sectional survey of Danish citizens (combined with register data on the municipalities). The article finds that increases in population size have a negative, small to moderately sized effect on citizen satisfaction on both the input and the output side of local government. This implies that although local government consolidations are often motivated on economic grounds, they also have consequences for citizen satisfaction with local government. Adapted from the source document.

The article examines the relationship between local government size and satisfaction with the input side and output side of local government. The literature on the relationship between size and satisfaction is extensive, but studies typically focus on structural differences rather than structural change, using traditional cross-sectional methods. The article seeks to remedy this by studying recent municipal mergers in Denmark as a quasi-experiment, using a unique data set consisting of a repeated and a cross-sectional survey of Danish citizens (combined with register data on the municipalities). The article finds that increases in population size have a negative, small to moderately sized effect on citizen satisfaction on both the input and the output side of local government. This implies that although local government consolidations are often motivated on economic grounds, they also have consequences for citizen satisfaction with local government.

The paper examines the proposition from the law of 1 over n (Weingast et al. 1981) that project size tends to increase with common pool size. Comparable studies have tended, firstly, to focus on assets and debt rather than on expenditures and, secondly, on district population rather than on the number of districts as in the original formulation of the law. Both issues are sought to be remedied in this paper. The proposition is examined on Danish municipal expenditures from 1996 to 2006, using municipal mergers towards the end of this period as a quasi-experiment. A difference-in-difference identification strategy and a subsample strategy are used to identify the effect of the availability and size of a common pool on municipal expenditures. The paper finds positive, statistically and economically significant effects of the availability and size of a common pool in the final year of the treatment period. The importance of the number of districts over district population suggests a reappraisal of the law of 1 over n as originally formulated. Adapted from the source document.

This article examines the relationship between polity size and political trust in local government for which two schools of thought offer opposing expectations. The theoretical disagreement has received considerable attention and this article contributes with a dynamic perspective of how changes in polity size affect changes in citizens' political trust on the input-side of local government. The case examined is the recent municipal mergers in Denmark which were implemented on 1 January 2007. The article reports an analysis of a panel based on a repeated survey of Danish citizens using an untreated control group design with pre-test and post-test. A quasi-experimental difference-in-difference identification strategy is used to obtain the effect of municipal size on local political trust. The results show that changes in municipal size negatively affect local political trust, which is consistent with the expectation from the political economy theory that political trust tends to decrease with the size of the polity. Adapted from the source document.

The paper outlines a theoretical framework for understanding reform-related opportunism in connection with current local government mergers in Denmark. The chain of reasoning is based on a local government version of the political business cycle. Where this model predicts cyclical financial patterns on reversible financial expenditures within each election period, the developed argument on local government mergers posits a pattern on non-reversible expenditures in the immediate years preceding them. The paper utilizes a theory-testing design with explanatory factors on two levels (individual and group level). This is achieved with the aid of insights from collective action theory.

The paper outlines a theoretical framework for understanding reform-related opportunism in connection with current local government mergers in Denmark. The chain of reasoning is based on a local government version of the political business cycle. Where this model predicts cyclical financial patterns on reversible financial expenditures within each election period, the developed argument on local government mergers posits a pattern on non-reversible expenditures in the immediate years preceding them. The paper utilizes a theory-testing design with explanatory factors on two levels (individual and group level). This is achieved with the aid of insights from collective action theory.

The subject matter of my Ph.D. thesis is the local government reform currently underway in Denmark, and I will be presenting a draft paper on one of the problematiques in my Ph.D. dissertation. Like its predecessor some four decades ago, the current local government reform has had communal amalgamation at its centre, this time with 236 of the current 270 municipalities merging into 64 new ones, leaving 34 unaffected and giving a total of 98 new ones per 01.01.2007; furthermore, the 14 current counties are merged into 5 new regions. So what happens when political authorities cease to exist? There is a very large literature on endgames and this is what my thesis will be contributing to theoretically. I argue that there is an economics of going out of business, an economics that was all too evident in the years up to the last local government reform. The argument is that heading for the dustbin of has-beens can lead to decidedly myopic and short-sighted behavior in spite of its longer-term consequences. So much for actor incentives! On the institutional side, the incumbent government has, in contrast to its forty-year-old likewise bourgeois predecessor, been all too aware of these 'perverse' incentives; it has therefore instigated various countermeasures to circumscribe any such financial wholesale in 'the locals'. Regardless of the effects of these considerations, I forward the following problematique for theoretical deliberation and empirical investigation: does the municipalities' and counties' financial behavior stand out in the period leading up to the second local government reform - and if so then why? As will be explicated in later chapters, the measuring rod for 'standing out' will be both temporal (compared to the authorities' financial dispositions in previous years) and spatial (compared to the authorities that remain unaffected by mergers). The problematique thus focuses on the new municipalities' and counties' financial standing at their moment of (re-)birth; and this thesis will try to answer how sound that foundation will be in addition to why. I intend to operationalize the authorities' financial dispositions as liquidity, near-liquid assets (sales of buildings, land and so forth), expenditures on buildings and probably also operations, borrowing, public utilities and expenditures on personnel.

Trust in government and in politicians is a very crucial prerequisite for democratic processes. This goes not only for the national level of government but also for the regional and local level. We make use of a large-scale survey among citizens in Denmark to evaluate trust in politicians at different levels of government. And we find that trust in local politicians is a somewhat higher than trust in MPs – especially among citizens who are well satisfied with the municipal service delivery. By introducing several municipal level variables in an MLA analysis, it is also found, that very chaotic government formation processes can negatively influence trust in the mayor and the councilors. Reaching out for the local power by being disloyal to one's own party or by breaking deals already made can sometimes secure the mayoralty but it comes with a prize: lower trust among the electorate.