Decision making in real estate development projects has generally undergone a number of important changes over the last decades. This transition represented a shift from governmentally dominated top-down spatial planning to bottom-up, public-private engagement schemes in real estate development (Tam et al. 2009). The new policy implies pluricentric network steering – in which several public and private parties play a role – instead of traditional hierarchical top-down governmental steering.
This paper deals with stakeholders' decisions within energy neutral urban redevelopment processes. The decisions of these stakeholders during the process will make or break energy neutral ambitions. An extensive form of game theory model gave insight in the behavioral differences of stakeholders regarding energy neutral ambitions and the effects of the changing legislation. The results show that new legislation regarding spatial planning slightly influences the behavior of stakeholders. An active behavior of the municipality will still result in the best outcome. Nevertheless, the municipality becomes more powerful when acting passively and can make the use of planning tools to provide governance towards energy neutral urban redevelopment. Moreover, organizational support, recognizing the necessity for energy neutrality, keeping focused and collaboration among stakeholders are crucial elements to achieve the objective of an energy neutral urban (re)development.
Redevelopment of brownfields is placed high on the political agendas in many countries. However, brownfield redevelopment projects are often problematic, and the frequent occurrence of conflicts between involved and interdependent stakeholders is directly related to this. To date, there is no insight in the underlying interaction structure of brownfield redevelopment projects and tools are lacking to support the complex decision-making between stakeholders. The aim of this article is to theoretically analyze the underlying interaction structures in brownfield redevelopment projects, modeling the process as an interdependent situation and applying game theoretical arguments. The explicit interaction between involved stakeholders is modeled as an interdependent process, using an approach in which conjoint analysis and game theory are combined. Our results show that there is one major source of conflicts; stakeholders choosing not to cooperate based upon the presented game-setting. Other possible sources of conflict, like difficulties in reaching a stable outcome or incomprehensibility of the game-setting, proved to have a limited contribution to the occurrence of conflicts. A more in-depth analysis of game-settings ending up in mutual cooperation showed that the appraisal of both stakeholders for the proposed development plan is the most influential factor, together with an eventual absolute difference between both players' appraisals. Furthermore, stakeholders having a relatively weak power position within projects tend to prefer a non-cooperative attitude, and having some 'change' can be beneficial for achieving mutual cooperation. If stakeholders have the prospect of achieving extra value through mutual plan optimization, they tend to be more willing to act cooperatively.
The redevelopment of a brownfield can provide a range of societal, environmental but also economic benefits for a number of entities. In the Netherlands (and elsewhere), public–private partnerships are common practice for such projects, because of two main reasons. First, limitations to public funding have led governments to invite the private sector into various long-term arrangements for capital-intensive projects. Second, a comprehensive approach for the whole brownfield area may be more efficient and profitable, compared to piecemeal development via interventions by individual owners. This article investigates, with respect to brownfield redevelopment, the interaction behavior of two key parties in forming partnerships: the municipality and a private developer. It is assumed that, apart from their mutual interest to redevelop the brownfield area, they will have different interests as well. In order to indicate their specific interest and the negotiation outcome regarding the forming of a public private partnership, this paper makes use of an experimental game theory approach. Three specific negotiation issues were analyzed in our research: a building claim, future land use and reparcelling of the land. In addition, this paper suggests an eight-step procedure to conduct a game theoretical experiment. A survey was conducted in order to gather the required data for the experiment. The data have been used to estimate the payoffs variations between the two key parties in the mentioned negotiation games. Finally, by comparing sub game perfect Nash equilibrium generated game outcomes and direct expected outcomes of respondents, this paper experimentally proves that the game theoretical analysis provides a valid representation of a real world brownfield redevelopment negotiation within the Dutch institutional-economic context. The outcome of the experiment confirms the Dutch tradition of public private partnerships in urban development practice, with public and private bodies willing to share financial risks and returns in these projects.