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Questions about climate change elicit some of the widest political divisions of any items on recent U.S. surveys. Severe polarization affects even basic questions about the reality of anthropogenic climate change (ACC), or whether most scientists agree that humans are changing the Earth's climate. Statements about scientific consensus have been contentious among social scientists, with some arguing for consensus awareness as a "gateway cognition" that leads to greater public acceptance of ACC, but others characterizing consensus messaging (deliberate communication about the level of scientific agreement) as a counterproductive tactic that exacerbates polarization. A series of statewide surveys, with nationwide benchmarks, repeated questions about the reality of ACC and scientific consensus many times over 2010 to 2016. These data permit tests for change in beliefs and polarization. ACC and consensus beliefs have similar trends and individual background predictors. Both rose gradually by about 10 points over 2010 to 2016, showing no abrupt shifts that might correspond to events such as scientific reports, leadership statements, or weather. Growing awareness of the scientific consensus, whether from deliberate messaging or the cumulative impact of many studies and publicly engaged scientists, provides the most plausible explanation for this rise in both series. In state-level data, the gap between liberal and conservative views on the reality of ACC did not widen over this period, whereas the liberal–conservative gap regarding existence of a scientific consensus narrowed.

Questions about climate change elicit some of the widest political divisions of any items on recent U.S. surveys. Severe polarization affects even basic questions about the reality of anthropogenic climate change (ACC), or whether most scientists agree that humans are changing the Earth's climate. Statements about scientific consensus have been contentious among social scientists, with some arguing for consensus awareness as a "gateway cognition" that leads to greater public acceptance of ACC, but others characterizing consensus messaging (deliberate communication about the level of scientific agreement) as a counterproductive tactic that exacerbates polarization. A series of statewide surveys, with nationwide benchmarks, repeated questions about the reality of ACC and scientific consensus many times over 2010 to 2016. These data permit tests for change in beliefs and polarization. ACC and consensus beliefs have similar trends and individual background predictors. Both rose gradually by about 10 points over 2010 to 2016, showing no abrupt shifts that might correspond to events such as scientific reports, leadership statements, or weather. Growing awareness of the scientific consensus, whether from deliberate messaging or the cumulative impact of many studies and publicly engaged scientists, provides the most plausible explanation for this rise in both series. In state-level data, the gap between liberal and conservative views on the reality of ACC did not widen over this period, whereas the liberal–conservative gap regarding existence of a scientific consensus narrowed.

Abstract
Beliefs about climate change divide the U.S. public along party lines more distinctly than hot social issues. Research finds that better-educated or informed respondents are more likely to align with their parties on climate change. This information–elite polarization resembles a process of biased assimilation first described in psychological experiments. In nonexperimental settings, college graduates could be prone to biased assimilation if they more effectively acquire information that supports their beliefs. Recent national and statewide survey data show response patterns consistent with biased assimilation (and biased guessing) contributing to the correlation observed between climate beliefs and knowledge. The survey knowledge questions involve key, uncontroversial observations such as whether the area of late-summer Arctic sea ice has declined, increased, or declined and then recovered to what it was 30 years ago. Correct answers are predicted by education, and some wrong answers (e.g., more ice) have predictors that suggest lack of knowledge. Other wrong answers (e.g., ice recovered) are predicted by political and belief factors instead. Response patterns suggest causality in both directions: science information affecting climate beliefs, but also beliefs affecting the assimilation of science information.

Campaigns against toxic waste problems are emerging as a grass-roots social movement in hundreds of American communities. This article examines survey data from two such communities (Acton, Massachusetts, and Williamstown, Vermont), which have recently experienced problems with toxic waste contamination. Multivariate log-linear analyses indicate that concern about contamination problems is highest among younger respondents, among women, and among those who have children under 18. These basic conclusions are found to be robust across different model specifications, different estimation strategies, and across a wide variety of specific issues and measures for toxic-waste concern in three different communities. The findings provide insight into the intensity of opposition to toxic wastes, differences between toxic wastes and many other environmental issues, and the difference in perspective between local citizens' groups and the corporate and government officals with whom they must deal.

Data from a survey questionnaire and from water utility billing records are used to compare self-reported and actual water savings for 471 households during a conservation campaign. Self-reports are only weakly related to actual changes in water consumption. Errors are widespread, and not wholly random: The accuracy of self-reports increases with household socioeconomic status and with the extent of conservation behavior. The large and nonrandom error component makes self-reports questionable as a proxy for objective measures of overall water savings in conservation research. Because knowledge about water use is both generally low and related to conservation behavior, informational feedback may be a particularly effective strategy for increasing conservation. The effectiveness of this feedback may increase with social class, however.

A survey was conducted in a small New England town following the discovery that the town's water supply had become contaminated by industrial chemicals. Principal findings include: (1) respondents from more affluent households were more concerned about the pollution problem; (2) long‐term or older residents tended to be less concerned; and (3) women with young children viewed the problem as particularly serious. The first two findings are consistent with previous research on similar "technological catastrophes" and on environmental protection in general. The third finding has not appeared in environmental protection research, but it is consistent with reports from Three Mile Island. Such technological catastrophes transform environmental issues into safety issues, thereby raising parents'anxieties about the safety of their children–perhaps more so for women than for men. These safety concerns may eventually be generalized to broader environmental issues, as toxic waste and other disasters continue to occur.