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THIS PAPER EXAMINES HOW THE AEC HAS DEVELOPED A FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION MAKING IN RESPONSE TO THE NEPA MANDATE. SUCH A FRAMEWORK WOULD ALLOW A UTILITY TO BUILD THE PLANT OF ITS CHOICE, SUBJECT TO SATISFACTION OF EXISTING REGULATIONS, AFTER IT IS DETERMINED THAT SUFFICIENT DEMAND EXISTS.

Hahn begins by developing a definition of sickness that is based on the patient's perception of suffering and disturbance rather than on the physician's assessment of biomedical signs. After reviewing the principal theories that account for the forms of sickness and healing found in different historical and cultural contexts, he explores the relevance of both anthropological and epidemiological approaches to sickness, focusing on the persistent gap between white and black infant mortality in the United States. Hahn then describes contemporary Western medicine as it might be seen by a visiting foreign anthropologist

AbstractBenefit-cost analysis is required for many regulatory decisions in the United States and in other countries. In this paper, I examine a standard textbook model that is used in benefit-cost analysis as it is actually applied to environmental policy and other areas of regulation. My primary objective is to suggest how including some key factors in the analysis could promote the development of smarter regulation.I begin by presenting a standard economic model for government intervention in markets, which balances benefits and a narrow definition of costs. I then introduce a richer normative theory that considers several political and economic costs that are frequently not considered in analyzing real-world applications. Examples include costs associated with rent seeking, design and implementation, and raising revenues. The richer theory suggests that the government should supply less of a good, or ask the private sector to provide less of that good, than the standard economic model suggests. The reason is that intervening in markets is often more costly than the standard model assumes. In special cases, the theory provides guidance on the setting of socially optimal taxes and subsidies. I then explore how the theory needs to be modified in the presence of biased estimates of benefits and costs. I conclude with a discussion of how the theoretical framework can be applied to the actual design of regulatory policy.

Examines pros and cons of disclosure by academic public intellectuals of potential conflicts of interest, shortcomings of the current system, and frequent use by reporters and the public of partial disclosure as a substitute for critical thinking; recommendations; US.