Suchergebnisse

This study has assessed the evolution of regulatory regimes in European gas markets on the basis of panel data from the old member states (EU15) for the period between 2000 and 2005. The methodology used enabled us to assess whether regulatory regimes are converging. In this context, an index has been developed to measure the extent to which member states are closing the gap between their regulatory regime and a best-practice model. Due to the discretion allowed within the framework regulations of the Gas Directives, member states can choose which regulatory instruments to apply. As a consequence, the reforms have resulted in diverging regulatory regimes within the framework for gas market organisation in the European Union. Our analysis suggests that the old member states have only achieved 54% of best practice in terms of European regulation for competition. During the final two years of our study period, member states became increasingly reluctant to apply best practice. In fact, no country followed the UK example and achieved what could be categorised as best practice. The majority of countries did, however, improve their regulatory regimes. At the end of 2005, Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Austria, Ireland and France could be put in a group that were moving towards best practice. Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden appeared less enthusiastic, with minimal convergence throughout the entire period.

Die vorliegende Untersuchung analysiert die Verhandlungsprozesse um die Routen der trans-nationalen Ölexportwege im Zeitraum von 1993 bis 2003, die auf eine Verbindung der land-umschlossenen Kaspischen Region mit dem Weltmarkt zielen. Im Zentrum der Arbeit steht die unterschiedliche Verteilung von Kosten und Gewinnen innerhalb von Pipelineprojekten auf die beteiligten Staaten und Ölfirmen. Anhand der Ölpipeline Baku-Ceyhan (BTC-Projekt) und der Ölleitung des Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC-Projekt) wird gezeigt, dass die Einflussfakto-ren "Ölpreis" und "Struktur des Produktionskonsortiums" verantwortlich sind für eine stärkere Durchsetzung privatwirtschaftlicher Präferenzen gegenüber den Präferenzen der staatlichen Akteure. Zum einen stärken demnach Multinationale Konsortien die Durchsetzungskraft der Ölfirmen als Gruppe. Zum anderen wirkt der Ölpreis gleichermaßen als Einflussgröße auf das Verhalten staatlicher wie privat-wirtschaftlicher Akteure, wenn die Staatsbudgets der staatli-chen Akteure stark von der Ölrente abhängig sind. Den theoretischen Hintergrund der Unter-suchung bildet die Internationale Politische Ökonomie in der Interpretation von Susan Stran-ge. ; This study analyses the negotiations of transnational oil export routes between 1993 and 2003 which aim to connect the Caspian region with the world oil market. The focus of this thesis is on the different distribution of costs and profits between involved states and oil companies with regard to various pipeline projects. By analysing two oil pipeline projects, the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline and the export route of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, it is demonstrated methodologically that the independent variables "oil price" and "structure of the production consortium" are responsible for a stronger enforcement of private vis-à-vis state preferences. The following two major findings have been generated: Firstly, multinational consortia strengthen the oil companies as a group to enforce their preferences. Secondly, the oil price influences the behaviour ...

This study analyses the negotiations of transnational oil export routes between 1993 and 2003 which aim to connect the Caspian region with the world oil market. The focus of this thesis is on the different distribution of costs and profits between involved states and oil companies with regard to various pipeline projects. By analysing two oil pipeline projects, the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline and the export route of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, it is demonstrated methodologically that the independent variables "oil price" and "structure of the production consortium" are responsible for a stronger enforcement of private vis-à-vis state preferences. The following two major findings have been generated: Firstly, multinational consortia strengthen the oil companies as a group to enforce their preferences. Secondly, the oil price influences the behaviour of state actors to a similar extent than private actors in case their state budgets are heavily dependent on oil rents. The theoretical background of this study refers to the International Political Economy approach by Susan Strange.

The European gas market reform triggered new market designs which aimed to achieve competitive natural gas prices, efficiency gains, and security of gas supply. The paper analyses to what extent the effects of regulation-for-competition on eco-nomic performance in the form of natural gas prices, network tariffs, efficiency gains, and investments in gas infrastructure can be empirically studied in a European wide comparative analysis. We demonstrate that conceptual and data constraints hinder the verification of the impact of regulation-for-competition on those performance indica-tors. Natural gas prices remain oil-indexed and new investment projects are in practice exempted from competition measures. Assuming that a positive impact is a matter of fact is thus premature. A hold-up problem (where industry is reluctant to invest due to regulatory uncertainty and a lack of incentives) is difficult to quantify empirically. However, the industry's strong opposition to ownership unbundling coupled with the popularity of exemptions from third party access while still allowing long-term con-tracts does indicate that the general argument in favour of a hold-up problem has em-pirical relevance.

The liberalisation of the European gas market is becalmed. Meanwhile regulatory uncertainty looms on the investment horizon. During the last ten years, European gas markets have gone through profound restructuring processes. Initially ambitious, regulatory targets from the European Commission (EC) boiled down to a very basic introduction of competition and liberalisation in the form of the first Gas Directive. Since then, the EC has accelerated the reforms and deepened competition by progressively releasing new directives, regulations and guidelines, while at the same time remaining resolute during the energy sector inquiry. Since the beginning, attempts to liberalise European gas markets have faced strong opposition and resistance from the gas industry and industry-oriented governments, aiming to maintain the status quo of the market organisation, while leaving energy policy as a national issue.