ABSTRACTPublic‒private partnerships (PPPs) are often promoted as a means to lower the costs and increase the quality and value for money (VfM) of public construction and infrastructure projects. While the increasing capital stock of PPPs warrants evaluation of their performance there has until now been limited systematic assessment of PPP versus conventional public procurement. This article contributes to the literature by presenting the findings of a systematic review of empirical peer‐reviewed studies comparing the costs, quality, and/or VfM of infrastructure PPP projects with conventional public procurement. The international literature suggests that PPPs are on average more costly and provide approximately similar VfM as conventional procurement. The number of empirical evaluations is limited, however, and evidence on the quality of infrastructure facilities is particularly scarce. While infrastructure PPPs continue to proliferate, systematic assessment of their performance is warranted to assist policy‐makers in choosing the procurement method that offers best value for taxpayers, users and society.
This PhD dissertation studies national similarities and differences in policy and regulation of public-private partnerships (PPPs), with an empirical focus on Denmark and Ireland. The starting point and motivation for the study is the observation that whereas PPPs are often depicted in the academic literature and in policy practice as a globally disseminated governance scheme, in reality, a closer examination of the PPP reform landscape reveals significant differences in national governments' PPP policy and regulation and in the amount of actually implemented PPP projects. By comparing the initiatives taken by the Irish government, which has embraced PPPs, with those of the Danish government, which has been a PPP sceptic, this study inquires into the fundamental questions as to how, why and to what consequences some governments have developed widespread policy and regulation frameworks to support the implementation of PPPs, whereas others have been much more reluctant. The dissertation addressed four research questions: (i) what are the key actors, strategies and institutions that create policies and regulations for the formation of PPPs?; (ii) how did governments' PPP policies and regulations develop over time, and how can their similarities and differences be explained?; (iii) how do differing national policy and regulation frameworks serve to facilitate or hinder the formation of PPPs, exemplified by four case studies from the schools sector?; (iv) what framework conditions does the EU set for PPP initiatives at national and sub-national levels? The main aim of the dissertation is to study how and why national PPP policy and regulation frameworks developed over time. At the national government level, the study thus contains both diachronic and synchronic analysis. Furthermore, in line with previous research within what has been called the governance approach within PPP studies, policy and regulation are also seen as constitutive elements that tap into and set the general framework conditions and institutional 'rules of the game' for the realisation of concrete PPP projects. The comparative interest at the central government level is thus supplemented by an analysis (a) of the interplay between decisions about policy and regulation at the national level and the formation of concrete PPP projects, and (b) of the EU's role in regulating decisions about PPPs at national level and in relation to the formation of concrete PPP schemes. A main finding is that whereas academic PPP literature often portrays governments' rationales for resorting to PPPs in terms of achieving innovation, collaborative advantage, value-for-money, new market possibilities, improved risk sharing etc., the findings brought to the fore in this dissertation suggest that a primary objective indeed was to remove major public infrastructure investments from governments' balance sheets, and thereby reduce the pressure on public capital budgets and provide more infrastructure than would otherwise be possible. However, as the off balance sheet rationale has been shown to be largely false, because there is always a bill to pay in the long term, this raise a number of broader legitimacy and accountability issues, which the present PPP policy and regulation frameworks of governments do not seem to adequately address.
Abstract While the public and private labor markets are marked by significant differences in the institutions of wage formation, very few studies have examined workers' wages and employment in the public and private sectors when solving the same tasks. Focusing on government contracting out, we examine the changes in work income, employment, and government income benefits when public workers are transferred from a public to a private employer due to contracting out. Drawing on theories on wage gaps between the public and private sectors and the property rights literature, we develop novel hypotheses about how individual characteristics of workers moderate the impact of contracting out on workers. Using high-quality individual-level Danish register data, we establish a worker treatment group who experienced contracting out and match them with a similar group of public workers who did not. Difference-in-difference estimation with coarsened exact matching suggests that workers overall experience a significant decline in work income and employment, albeit with major intergroup differences across gender, skills, and age. Our sub-group findings show that female, low-skilled, and younger workers pay the highest price for government contracting out, both in terms of salaries and employment. We discuss how economic theories of public‒private gaps in wage setting can be combined with public administration theories of contract design and monitoring to develop improved—and possibly more equitable—conditions for workers when governments contract out.