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Sohaila Abdulali: What We Talk About When We Talk About Rape. New York: The New Press 2018. 978-1-62097-474-2

Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- The Philosophical Debate -- Structure of the Book -- Chapter 1: Contested Rape -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Contestation and Conceptual Problems -- 1.3 Essentially Contested Concepts -- Chapter 2: Rape as a Cluster Concept -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Cluster Theory -- 2.3 Reconsidering Family Resemblances and Clusters -- 2.4 Problems -- Chapter 3: Emancipatory Amelioration -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Conceptual Amelioration -- 3.3 Developing Emancipatory Amelioration -- 3.4 Possible Objections -- Chapter 4: Rape and Ideology -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Locating Rape -- 4.3 Rape and Sexist Ideology -- 4.4 The Injustice of Rape -- Chapter 5: Ameliorating the Concept of Rape -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2 Emancipatory Amelioration and Rape -- 5.3 A Cluster Model of Rape -- Chapter 6: Accountability and Solidarity -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Hermeneutical Injustice -- 6.3 Questions of Accountability -- 6.4 Emancipatory Solidarity -- Final Remarks: What to Do? -- Bibliography

What exactly is rape? And how is it embedded in society?Hilkje Charlotte Hänel offers a philosophical exploration of the often misrepresented concept of rape in everyday life, systematically mapping out and elucidating this atrocious phenomenon. Hänel proposes a theory of rape as a social practice facilitated by ubiquitous sexist ideologies. Arguing for a normative cluster model for the concept of rape, this timely intervention improves our understanding of lived experiences of sexual violence and social relations within sexist ideologies.

1. Einleitung -- 2. Wieso ist es wichtig, sich mit Moral und Sex zu befassen? Eine Argumentation am Beispiel von #MeToo -- 3. Sex im Kontext von Geschlechterungleichheit -- 4. Zustimmung in der Sexualethik: Legitimer Sex und problematischer Sex -- 5. Sexuelle Kommunikation -- 6. …und guter Sex? -- 7. Fazit: Ein Plädoyer für mehr Respekt im Bett.-Zitierte Literatur -- Weiterführende Literatur.

What exactly is rape? And how is it embedded in society? Hilkje Charlotte Hänel offers a philosophical exploration of the often misrepresented concept of rape in everyday life, systematically mapping out and elucidating this atrocious phenomenon. Hänel proposes a theory of rape as a social practice facilitated by ubiquitous sexist ideologies. Arguing for a normative cluster model for the concept of rape, this timely intervention improves our understanding of lived experiences of sexual violence and social relations within sexist ideologies.

What exactly is rape? And how is it embedded in society? Hilkje Charlotte Hänel offers a philosophical exploration of the often misrepresented concept of rape in everyday life, systematically mapping out and elucidating this atrocious phenomenon. Hänel proposes a theory of rape as a social practice facilitated by ubiquitous sexist ideologies. Arguing for a normative cluster model for the concept of rape, this timely intervention improves our understanding of lived experiences of sexual violence and social relations within sexist ideologies.

AbstractMiranda Fricker's account of hermeneutical injustice and remedies for this injustice are widely debated. This article adds to the existing debate by arguing that theories of recognition can fruitfully contribute to Fricker's account of hermeneutical injustice and can provide a framework for structural remedy. By pairing Fricker's theory of hermeneutical injustice with theories of recognition, I bring forward a modest claim and a more radical claim. The first concerns a shift in our vocabulary; recognition theory can give a name to the seriousness of the long-term effects of hermeneutical injustice. The second claim is more radical: thinking of hermeneutical injustice as preventing what I call "self-recognition" provides a structural remedy to the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice. Because hermeneutical injustice is first and foremost a structural injustice, I contend that every virtue theory of hermeneutical justice should be complemented by structural remedies in terms of recognition. Finally, what I argue sheds light on the seriousness of cases of exclusion of and discrimination against women in academia and helps to draw our attention to new ways to combat such problems.