Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Ringraziamenti -- Indice -- Introduzione -- Capitolo I - I caratteri distintivi della legalità sovranazionale -- Capitolo II - Le articolazioni del principio di legalità alla luce del rapporto tra ordinamenti giuridici -- Capitolo III - Legalità sovranazionale e legalità costituzionale -- Conclusioni -- INDICE DEI NOMI.

The article starts with an analysis of the Magna Carta to reflect on recent trends in constitutional law related to the so-called Common Law Constitutionalism, enshrining an empowerment of the judicial power in many constitutional orders, including the UK. Here, such an empowerment—triggered by the interactions of the domestic legal orderwith supranational ones—would seem to be in contrast with the Dicey's legal tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, usually supporting judicial self-restraint vis-à-vis legislative power. By way of contrast, it is submitted that the empowerment of the judicial power seems consistent with the medieval tradition of the Magna Carta—endorsing the general principle according to which any kind of power shall be submitted to, and limited by, law. In particular, the revival of this medieval tradition during the seventeenth century, namely during the constitutional conflicts between the Crown and the Parliament, brought some authors—such as Sir Edward Coke—to endow the judge with the power to scrutiny the sovereign prerogatives in light of ancient law and general principles of equality and fairness. ; L'articolo muove da un'analisi della Magna Carta per analizzare recenti mutamenti della funzione giurisdizionale, ascrivibili al filone del cosiddetto Common Law Constitutionalism. L'espansione del potere dei giudici nell'ordinamento del Regno Unito, trainata principalmente dall'incontro/scontro con gli ordinamenti sovranazionali e volta a vincolare l'operato del Parlamento attraverso un sindacato giurisdizionale più stringente, sembrerebbe quasi "eretica" rispetto all'ortodossia della teoria della sovranità parlamentare elaborata da Dicey, ed avallata da diversi anni di self-restraint da parte del potere giudiziario. Se guardata però alla luce della cornice storico istituzionale che ha dato vita alla Magna Carta, madre del principio secondo cui una qualunque forma di autorità deve soggiacere al diritto, tale espansione sembrerebbe ancorare le proprie radici più profonde proprio nella tradizione medievale dello stesso ordinamento del Regno Unito. Difatti, la rivisitazione seicentesca di tale tradizione ad opera di Sir Edward Coke, proprio nel cuore del conflitto costituzionale tra Corona e Parlamento, affidava in modo assolutamente inedito al giudice il compito di sindacare la conformità del diritto sovrano agli antichi principi di equità e giustizia.

This article builds on the assumption that both the concept of subsidiarity and the concept of respect for national identities were introduced by the Maastricht Treaty to carry out the constitutional accommodation of national values and interests in the European legal order, permeating the parliamentary debates related to the ratification processes. Against this backdrop, this article analyses the use of Article 4(2) TEU – requiring the EU to respect Member States' national identities – in some national parliaments' reasoned opinions scrutinizing the compliance of EU legislative proposals with the principle of subsidiarity. The aim is to assess if – and to what extent – national parliaments, as national actors exercising their monitoring functions, could reframe the subsidiarity inquiry from a 'comparative efficiency test' to a sort of 'non-encroachment (upon Member States) test' referring to the concept of respect for national identities.

The principle of subsidiarity was introduced within European Treaties to prevent EU's increasing competences from encroaching upon the power of lower levels of government. Nevertheless, the way in which the principle of subsidiarity has been operationalized (through so called "comparative efficiency test") has decisively favored EU action, which is usually deemed to be the most suitable to achieve European objectives. This paper aims at assessing: first, if and to what extent national Parliaments, as national actors exercising their monitoring functions in the context of the early warning system, could reframe subsidiarity inquiry from a "comparative efficiency test" to a sort of "non encroachment (upon Member States) test"; second, if and to what extent Art. 4.2 TEU, aimed at protecting Member States national identities and essential State functions, could help in this respect. To this purpose, several national Parliament's reasoned opinions mentioning the concept of national identities will be analysed. ; The principle of subsidiarity was introduced within European Treaties to prevent EU's increasing competences from encroaching upon the power of lower levels of government. Nevertheless, the way in which the principle of subsidiarity has been operationalized (through so called "comparative efficiency test") has decisively favored EU action, which is usually deemed to be the most suitable to achieve European objectives. This paper aims at assessing: first, if and to what extent national Parliaments, as national actors exercising their monitoring functions in the context of the early warning system, could reframe subsidiarity inquiry from a "comparative efficiency test" to a sort of "non encroachment (upon Member States) test"; second, if and to what extent Art. 4.2 TEU, aimed at protecting Member States national identities and essential State functions, could help in this respect. To this purpose, several national Parliament's reasoned opinions mentioning the concept of national identities will be analysed. ; Refereed Working Papers / of international relevance

Abstract:  Over time, international organizations have adopted different strategies to redress their legitimacy deficits. Among them, two strategies stand out: expanding participation of relevant stakeholders and improving output. By analyzing the application of these strategies in the European Union (EU) and in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that these efforts at legitimization have not been satisfying because they have been implemented as supplements, rather than complements, of representation. Interestingly, then, the most recent efforts at legitimizing the two international bodies have started emphasizing the issue of representation. We illustrate our argument by reviewing and comparing the legitimacy‐enhancing strategies that have been adopted in the EU and the IMF.