Suchergebnisse

"The paper tests a simple model of vote choice in a mixed electoral system when voters have two
votes with survey data collected at the time of the 2010 North Rhine Westphalia election. We
show that local candidate preferences and local chances affect only the local vote while party
and leader ratings influence both votes though more strongly the list vote. Contrary to
expectations, coalition preferences influence the local vote as well as the list vote. There is
clearer evidence of the local vote being contaminated by the list vote than the other way
around." (author's abstract)

Looking more closely at the way people form expectations about the possible outcome of the election in their electoral district I will provide evidence for the first time that strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems with large districts magnitudes, such as
in Portugal. Employing district-level data from 19752002 I estimate that a party, who is expected to win no seat, will be strategically deserted on average by about 3 per cent of the voters. This number does systematically vary with the district magnitude of each district. Nevertheless even
in Portugal's largest electoral district, Lisbon, strategic voting can be observed to have a systematic impact on parties vote shares. Moreover there is evidence that strategic voting can partly account for the majoritarian trend that can be observed within the Portuguese party system.

Voters can use sub-national elections to punish or reward the federal government. This can be analyzed by looking at their evaluation of the federal government. Here, it is argued that it is easier for voters to assign responsibility if the same parties hold office on both the federal and state level. It is more difficult to assign responsibility if these governments are composed of different parties. Based on survey data for state elections in Berlin (1979 to 2001), it can be shown that the federal arena only influences the sub-national arena if the same parties hold both governments. However, the size of this effect is small when contrasted to other individual vote-choice determinates like party and candidate preferences at the state level. (Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen / FUB)

There is more to strategic voting than simply avoiding wasting one's vote if one is liberated from the corset of studying voting behavior in plurality systems. Mixed electoral systems provide different voters with diverse incentives to cast a strategic vote. They not only determine the degree of strategic voting, but also the kind of strategies voters employ. Strategic voters employ either a wasted-vote or a coalition insurance strategy, but do not automatically cast their vote for large parties as the current literature suggest. This has important implications for the consolidation of party systems. Moreover, even when facing the same institutional incentives, voters vary in their proclivity to vote strategically. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

Die Verfasser definieren die wissenschaftliche Forschung als Dialog zwischen Theorie und Daten: Wissenschaftlerinnen formulieren eine Theorie, analysieren Daten, um die Theorie zu testen, und modifizieren die Theorie anhand der neugewonnen empirischen Befunde. Der gleiche Prozess kann auch bei den Daten beginnen: Wissenschaftler machen Beobachtungen, entwickeln Theorien, um diese Beobachtungen zu erklären, und sammeln dann zusätzliche Daten, um ihre Theorien zu testen. Nicht jedes Forschungsprojekt muss alle Schritte innerhalb dieses Zyklus durchlaufen, denn Forschung ist ein kollektives Unterfangen. Während sich einige Projekte auf das Testen bestehender Hypothesen konzentrieren, erklären andere einzelne Beobachtungen und generieren neue Hypothesen. Es wird die These vertreten, dass alle Forschungsprojekte, die Teil des Dialogs zwischen Theorie und Daten sind, die gleichen Kernprobleme des Forschungsdesigns bearbeiten und lösen müssen: die Definition der Forschungsfrage, die Spezifikation von Konzepten und Theorien, Operationalisierung und Messung, die Auswahl der Fälle und Beobachtungen, die Kontrolle von alternativen Erklärungen und theoretische Schlussfolgerungen. Diese Fragen stellen einzelne Schwerpunkte der Studie dar. Abschließend werden die einzelnen Beiträge des Bandes präsentiert. (ICF2)

"There is more to strategic voting than simply avoiding wasting one's vote if one is
liberated from the corset of studying voting behavior in plurality systems. Mixed electoral
systems provide different voters with diverse incentives to cast a strategic vote.They not only
determine the degree of strategic voting, but also the kind of strategies voters employ.
Strategic voters employ either a wasted-vote or a coalition insurance strategy, but do not
automatically cast their vote for large parties as the current literature suggest. This has
important implications for the consolidation of party systems. Moreover, even when facing
the same institutional incentives, voters vary in their proclivity to vote strategically." (author's abstract)

"Looking more closely at the way people form expectations about the possible outcome of the election in their electoral district I will provide an evidence for the first time that strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems with large districts magnitudes, such as in Portugal. Employing district-level data from 1975-2002 I estimate that a party, who is expected to win no seat, will be strategically deserted on average by about 3 per cent of the voters. This number does systematically vary with the district magnitude of each district. Nevertheless even in Portugal's largest electoral district, Lisbon, strategic voting can be observed to have a systematic impact on parties vote shares. Moreover there is evidence that strategic voting can partly account for the majoritarian trend that can be observed within the Portuguese party system." (author's abstract)

"Voters can use sub-national elections to punish or reward the federal government. This can be analyzed by looking at their evaluation of the federal government. Here, it is argued that it is easier for voters to assign responsibility if the same parties hold office on both the federal and state level. It is more difficult to assign responsibility if these governments are composed of different parties. Based on survey data for state elections in Berlin (1979 to 2001), it can be shown that the federal arena only influences the sub-national arena if the same parties hold both governments. However, the size of this effect is small when contrasted to other individual vote-choice determinates like party and candidate preferences at the state level." (author's abstract)

Abstract.  There is more to strategic voting than simply avoiding wasting one's vote if one is liberated from the corset of studying voting behavior in plurality systems. Mixed electoral systems provide different voters with diverse incentives to cast a strategic vote. They not only determine the degree of strategic voting, but also the kind of strategies voters employ. Strategic voters employ either a wasted‐vote or a coalition insurance strategy, but do not automatically cast their vote for large parties as the current literature suggest. This has important implications for the consolidation of party systems. Moreover, even when facing the same institutional incentives, voters vary in their proclivity to vote strategically.

"Als ökologische Inferenz wird der Versuch bezeichnet, mit Daten eines höheren Aggregationsniveaus (im Folgenden verkürzend als 'Aggregatebene' bezeichnet) Rückschlüsse auf Prozesse einer niedrigeren Ebene (im Folgenden 'Individualebene') zu ziehen. Angewendet wird diese Strategie dann, wenn nur Daten auf der Aggregatebene verfügbar sind, aber Prozesse auf der Individualebene im Mittelpunkt des Analyseinteresses stehen. Das zentrale forschungslogische Problem dieser Strategie ist, dass viele unterschiedliche Datenkonstellationen auf der Individualebene das auf der Aggregatebene beobachtete Muster erzeugen können. So passen zu einem amtlichen Endergebnis der Erst- und Zweitstimmen einer Partei bei einer Bundestagswahl sehr unterschiedliche Verteilungen des individuellen Wahlverhaltens. Aus der Information über die Verteilung der Erst- und Zweitstimmen kann daher im Allgemeinen nicht geschlossen werden, wie die einzelnen Wähler ihre Erst- und Zweitstimme vergeben haben. Mit dieser Uneindeutigkeit auf der Individual- also der analytisch interessierenden Ebene haben alle Methoden der ökologischen Inferenz zu kämpfen. Sie versuchen diesen Nachteil mit geballter Technologie und zahlreichen Annahmen über den datengenerierenden Prozess und die Aggregationslogik zu kompensieren." (Autorenreferat)

"What is the impact of electoral rules on the way people make decisions in the voting booth? Institutional incentives moderate a voter's expectation formation process and, therefore, make the frequency of strategic voters predictable across a wide range of electoral systems. I provide evidence that there is a latent dimension of propensity to cast a strategic vote following the wasted-vote logic on which various seat-allocation systems can be placed even controlling for district magnitude. Thus the variance of vote-to-seat conversion mechanisms is far more important in determining the level of strategic voting across electoral systems than previously thought." (author's abstract)