Suchergebnisse

The implementation and enforcement of international maritime safety standards by Member States has always represented a key objective for both the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the European Commission (EC). In spite of a strong global legal framework for safety at sea, harmonisation has always been a challenge. Two points are relevant here: firstly, the level of implementation and enforcement with international regulations varies significantly among countries; secondly, it is a challenge to determine and/or quantify this level of compliance. Several attempts have been made by the maritime industry, academic studies and policy-makers to develop an appropriate set of criteria and/or measurements to benchmark the performance of Flag States. Currently, the White, Grey and Black list (WGB) list of the Tokyo and Paris Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) on Port State Control are the most widely used indicators. While the list was initially developed solely for targeting purposes, it has been recently criticised in recent academic publications and by the industry for being unsuitable to benchmarking Flag States with a small fleet and to be susceptible to a lack of harmonisation. Moreover, the author argues that, given the way the list has been used, it reduces the overall concept of Flag State Performance (FSP) to an overly simplified detention/inspection ratio. This dissertation begins with an investigation and examination of Flag State Performance by looking into its underlying concept and connected components. The main aim is to contribute to the general knowledge on the performance of complex systems according to policymakers. Subsequently, this dissertation makes an assessment of an inspection's results as a tool to evaluate the performance, shortcomings and benefits of the complex system under examination. Four research questions have therefore been formulated: (1) What is Flag State Performance? (2) What are the contemporary issues of Port State Control (PSC)? (3) How do discrepancies in the Port State Control regime affect the inspection output? (4) To what extent is Port State Control a suitable instrument to measure Flag State Performance? The dissertation is divided into two main parts. Part I presents the main research questions, the methodological and theoretical discussion, the main findings; and a round-up discussion. Part II contains the four research papers based on data gathered throughout the study.

Port State Control (PSC) is the major global strategy for fighting substandard shipping since the signature of The Hague Memorandum in 1978. In the last years, the increased volume of trade, the enlarged number of main international conventions and the highlighted differences among the various Regimes have posed new challenges to the modern system of PSC, which may need to find its new course. This paper examines the point of view of key maritime stakeholders with regard to the EU PSC regime. Elite interviews (n = 14) were conducted with subject matter experts ranging from policy makers, to industry and seafarers' representatives. The study aims to determine factors leading to difference in treatment among EU Member States. The study concludes that PSC in Europe seems to be the most efficient and reliable of the regional agreement on PSC. However, some discrepancies during the inspection process and outcome can be highlighted due to differences at the inspector and Member State level.

As a response to the strong political and public outcry for more stringent regulations regarding safety of ships in the wake of a series of maritime disasters in the 1980s and 1990s, the European Commission adopted a number of Directives on Ports State Control (PSC) that has made the provisions of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on PSC binding on all EU Member States (MSs). Directive 2009/16/EC, as amended, which entered into force on January 2011, is the latest version of those Directives. Aside from specifying targeting, inspection, and detention procedures, this piece of legislation establishes that each Member State (MS) shall be inspected every five years by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to monitor the level of implementation and enforcement of the Directive. We analysed 25 inspection reports prepared by the Agency in connection with MSs inspections, to determine levels of implementation, compliance, and harmonisation with the provisions of the Directive 2009/16/EC. This article summarizes the main shortcomings and observations as identified in the inspection reports and concludes that while the Directive has been properly implemented by the MSs, there remain areas where harmonisation is yet to be achieved. In detail, this article detects gaps between policy and practice for EU policy makers which aim at ensuring a level playing field in Europe and avoid safety competition among countries.

The succession of maritime accidents in the last decades of the 20th Century caused a strong political and public outcry for more stringent maritime safety regulations and measures. One of the most significant developments in this regard was the establishment of several regional agreements on Port State Control (PSC) with the specific objective of fighting substandard shipping through coordinated and harmonised inspection procedures. This article is based on results from 32,206 PSC inspections carried out by the European Union and European Free Trade Association Member States within the Paris MoU region from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2015 to assess whether discrepancies among Member States exist after the entry into force of Directive 2009/16/EC and the introduction of the New Inspection Regime. Further, the study proceeds by investigating whether PSC team composition and inspector's background influence inspection outcomes. The study has identified that differences in detecting at least one deficiency and/or detaining a vessel are significant among Member States. With regard to team composition and background, it appears that the former correlates to the number of deficiencies and detentions and the latter, though the significance is not always consistent, to detecting a certain type of deficiencies according to the specific inspector's backgrounds.

The succession of maritime accidents in the last decades of the 20th Century caused a strong political and public outcry for more stringent maritime safety regulations and measures. One of the most significant developments in this regard was the establishment of several regional agreements on Port State Control (PSC) with the specific objective of fighting substandard shipping through coordinated and harmonised inspection procedures. This article is based on results from 32,206 PSC inspections carried out by the European Union and European Free Trade Association Member States within the Paris MoU region from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2015 to assess whether discrepancies among Member States exist after the entry into force of Directive 2009/16/EC and the introduction of the New Inspection Regime. Further, the study proceeds by investigating whether PSC team composition and inspector's background influence inspection outcomes. The study has identified that differences in detecting at least one deficiency and/or detaining a vessel are significant among Member States. With regard to team composition and background, it appears that the former correlates to the number of deficiencies and detentions and the latter, though the significance is not always consistent, to detecting a certain type of deficiencies according to the specific inspector's backgrounds.

The succession of maritime accidents in the last decades of the 20th Century caused a strong political and public outcry for more stringent maritime safety regulations and measures. One of the most significant developments in this regard was the establishment of several regional agreements on Port State Control (PSC) with the specific objective of fighting substandard shipping through coordinated and harmonised inspection procedures. This article is based on results from 32,206 PSC inspections carried out by the European Union and European Free Trade Association Member States within the Paris MoU region from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2015 to assess whether discrepancies among Member States exist after the entry into force of Directive 2009/16/EC and the introduction of the New Inspection Regime. Further, the study proceeds by investigating whether PSC team composition and inspector's background influence inspection outcomes. The study has identified that differences in detecting at least one deficiency and/or detaining a vessel are significant among Member States. With regard to team composition and background, it appears that the former correlates to the number of deficiencies and detentions and the latter, though the significance is not always consistent, to detecting a certain type of deficiencies according to the specific inspector's backgrounds.

The succession of maritime accidents in the last decades of the 20th Century caused a strong political and public outcry for more stringent maritime safety regulations and measures. One of the most significant developments in this regard was the establishment of several regional agreements on Port State Control (PSC) with the specific objective of fighting substandard shipping through coordinated and harmonised inspection procedures. This article is based on results from 32,206 PSC inspections carried out by the European Union and European Free Trade Association Member States within the Paris MoU region from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2015 to assess whether discrepancies among Member States exist after the entry into force of Directive 2009/16/EC and the introduction of the New Inspection Regime. Further, the study proceeds by investigating whether PSC team composition and inspector's background influence inspection outcomes. The study has identified that differences in detecting at least one deficiency and/or detaining a vessel are significant among Member States. With regard to team composition and background, it appears that the former correlates to the number of deficiencies and detentions and the latter, though the significance is not always consistent, to detecting a certain type of deficiencies according to the specific inspector's backgrounds.