Suchergebnisse

This book traces the successes and failures of a generation of German political leaders as the Bonn Republic emerged as a substantial force in European, Atlantic, and world affairs. Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, West Germans relinquished many trappings of hard power, most notably nuclear weapons, and learned to leverage their economic power instead. Obsessed with stability and growth, Bonn governments battled inflation in ways that enhanced the international position of the Deutsche Mark while upending the international monetary system. Germany's remarkable export achievements exerted a strong hold on the Soviet bloc, forming the basis for a new Ostpolitik under Willy Brandt. Through much trial and error, the Federal Republic learned how to find a balance among key Western allies, and in the mid-1970s Helmut Schmidt ensured Germany's centrality to institutions such as the European Council and the G-7 – the newly emergent leadership structures of the West.

Using newly available material from both sides of the Iron Curtain, William Glenn Gray explores West Germany's efforts to prevent international acceptance of East Germany as a legitimate state following World War II. Unwilling to accept the division of their country, West German leaders regarded the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as an illegitimate upstart--a puppet of the occupying Soviet forces. Together with France, Britain, and the United States, West Germany applied political and financial pressure around the globe to ensure that the GDR remain unrecognized by all countries outside the communist camp. Proclamations of ideological solidarity and narrowly targeted bursts of aid gave the GDR momentary leverage in such diverse countries as Egypt, Iraq, Ghana, and Indonesia yet West Germany's intimidation tactics, coupled with its vastly superior economic resources, blocked any decisive East German breakthrough. Gray argues that Bonn's isolation campaign was dropped not for want of success, but as a result of changes in West German priorities as the struggle against East Germany came to hamper efforts at reconciliation with Israel, Poland, and Yugoslavia--all countries of special relevance to Germany's recent past. Interest in a morally grounded diplomacy, together with the growing conviction that the GDR could no longer be ignored, led to the abandonment of Bonn's effective but outdated efforts to hinder worldwide recognition of the East German regime.

This article examines human rights activism in West Germany on behalf of political prisoners and torture victims in Brazil under the military dictatorship (1964–85). It shows that Amnesty International's model of engagement on behalf of individual prisoners faced significant hurdles, forcing it to rely on support from Bonn's Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, German diplomats interpreted their purview narrowly and construed inquiries on behalf of imprisoned Brazilians as interference in Brazil's national sovereignty. As AI improved the quality of its own information gathering, West German officials came to be more supportive of the organization starting in the mid-1970s – without, however, conceding influence over German policy, which remained dominated by economic considerations. This article highlights the importance of the Brazil case for AI's evolving campaign strategies in the early 1970s as well as the reluctance of both Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt's governments to question the state repression in Brazil.

By now there is not much resistance to the notion that historians of modern Germany should pay heed to events outside the borders of theReichor nation-state (though, even now, Austria and Switzerland often remain an afterthought). At the 2006 annual conference of the German Studies Association in Pittsburgh, Michael Geyer spoke of transnational history as "the new consensus." His keynote address bore the title "Where Germans Dwell"—a clear indication that the subject matter of German history must include transplants such as Jürgen Klinsmann and Arnold Schwarzenegger, as well as the German diaspora of prior centuries. In keeping with this agenda, H. Glenn Penny has played a significant role in organizing scholarship on Germans abroad, whereas Kira Thurman is exploring how African Americans experienced German musical culture. The scope of transnational German history remains vast.

AbstractThis article reexamines the diplomacy of Willy Brandt'sOstpolitik, focusing on two landmark achievements in 1970: the Moscow Treaty in August, and the Warsaw Treaty in December. On the basis of declassified US and German documentation, it argues that envoy Egon Bahr's unconventional approach resulted in a poorly negotiated treaty with the Soviet Union that failed to address vital problems such as the status of Berlin. The outcome deepened political polarization at home and proved disconcerting to many West German allies; it also forced the four World War II victors—Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union—to save Brandt'sOstpolitikby grinding out an agreement on access to Berlin. By contrast, West German negotiations in Warsaw yielded a treaty more in line with West German expectations, though the results proved sorely disappointing to the Polish leadership. Disagreements over restitution payments (repacked as government credits) and the emigration of ethnic Germans would bedevil German-Polish relations for years to come. Bonn'sOstpolitikthus had a harder edge than the famous image of Brandt kneeling in Warsaw would suggest.

Vorspann
Heute gehört die Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu den größten Waffenexporteuren der Welt, wobei über die Genehmigung dieser Exporte grundsätzlich hinter verschlossenen Türen entschieden wird. Dennoch kommt es Jahr für Jahr zu einem politischen Tauziehen zwischen Bundesregierung, Bundestag, Parteien, Medien und Lobbyisten; außen- oder bündnispolitische Erwägungen und ökonomische Interessen stehen gegen Fragen der Moral und der Menschenrechte. William Glenn Gray kann zeigen, dass die Ursprünge dieser Debatten weit zurückreichen und fast so alt sind wie die Streitkräfte der Bundesrepublik. Der Autor zeichnet die Anfänge der parlamentarischen Kontrolle des Exports von Kriegswaffen nach, skizziert die fast vergessene Militärhilfe Westdeutschlands für Staaten in aller Welt unter den Auspizien des Kalten Kriegs und kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Grundlagen für die bis heute wirksamen institutionellen Entscheidungsmechanismen schon überraschend früh gelegt wurden.

"Heute gehört die Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu den größten Waffenexporteuren der Welt, wobei über die Genehmigung dieser Exporte grundsätzlich hinter verschlossenen Türen entschieden wird. Dennoch kommt es Jahr für Jahr zu einem politischen Tauziehen zwischen Bundesregierung, Bundestag, Parteien, Medien und Lobbyisten; außen- oder bündnispolitische Erwägungen und ökonomische Interessen stehen gegen Fragen der Moral und der Menschenrechte. William Glenn Gray kann zeigen, dass die Ursprünge dieser Debatten weit zurückreichen und fast so alt sind wie die Streitkräfte der Bundesrepublik. Der Autor zeichnet die Anfänge der parlamentarischen Kontrolle des Exports von Kriegswaffen nach, skizziert die fast vergessene Militärhilfe Westdeutschlands für Staaten in aller Welt unter den Auspizien des Kalten Kriegs und kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Grundlagen für die bis heute wirksamen institutionellen Entscheidungsmechanismen schon überraschend früh gelegt wurden." (Autorenreferat)