Suchergebnisse

Between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, after decades of trying to limit short-term international capital movements, advanced industrial states moved decisively in the direction of decontrol. What has driven this remarkable policy convergence? The answer lies not in ideological change or shifts in relative political power, but in the prior development of international financial markets and in the increasing globalization of business. In a policy environment fundamentally reshaped by these factors, financial institutions and multinational firms were able to threaten or implement strategies of evasion and exit. Thus, the usefulness of controls declined as their effective costs rose sharply. In this light, the cases of Japan, Germany, Italy, and France are examined. The analysis points to the tightening link between short-term capital movements and foreign direct investment, issues that have long been treated as conceptually distinct. It also underlines the intricate connection between national policies governing capital movements and those aimed at managing international financial markets.

in den 80er und zu beginn der 90er jahre hat der umfang von direktinvestitionen in den vereinigten staaten erheblich zugenommen, so daß eine veränderung der struktur einzelner industriezweige festzustellen, und eine damit im zusammenhang stehende einflußnahme auf außenwirtschaftspolitische maßnahmen zu beobachten ist. in diesem artikel wird insbesondere auf den zusammenhang zwischen direktinvestitionen und der forderung der heimischen industrie nach protektionistischen maßnahmen eingegangen. untersucht wird dabei auch, inwieweit die höhe der auslandinvestitionen zu dem bestehenden importniveau beiträgt, bzw dieses ersetzt. der einfluß der auslandsinvestitionen auf protektionistische maßnahmen seitens der vereinigten staaten wird anhand der entwicklung in verschiedenen industriezweigen deutlich gemacht. (SWP-Clv)

Over the past decade, foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States has grown dramatically, changing the composition of many U.S. industries and bringing foreignowned firms into the domestic political process. Presumably, FDI also has affected the politics of protection, by both altering the domestic coalitions around protectionist demands and shifting the potential benefits that protectionism is likely to bring. To understand this process, we create and test a model that examines the level of inward investment and the extent to which this investment either complements or substitutes for existing import levels. Import-complementing investment, we suggest, will cause a split in protectionist demands, with local producers favoring protectionism and foreign investors pushing for free trade. Import-substituting investment, by contrast, will create convergent interests between local and foreign producers. In both cases, inward FDI reshuffles traditional alliances and demands for protection, challenging many prevailing views about protectionism in the United States.