Suchergebnisse

Son preference in South Korea is stronger than anywhere else in the world, yet little is known about such preference in North Korea. Simple indicators of son preference in North Korea are constructed from its 1993 population census and a 1998 survey of child nutrition (conducted in the wake of the recent famine). These indicators include sex ratio at birth, sex ratios of infant and child mortality, and sex ratios of child malnutrition. North Koreans do not evince prenatal discrimination against daughters, a finding that may indicate a lack of prenatal sex‐testing technologies. Neither is evidence found of excess female mortality or malnutrition in the postnatal period, during which discrimination requires no special technology. The discrepancy in son preference across the Korean peninsula seems due largely to the socialist agenda pursued in the north following political partition after World War II. An important aspect of that agenda challenged the ancient Confucian ideology presumed to underlie son preference. Apparently, this challenge was more successful in North Korea than in other Asian societies instituting similar political changes, because son preference was not eliminated in China or in Vietnam.

Among migrants in China, one of the most difficult groups to define and measure is that referred to as the floating population ( liudong renkou ), a rapidly growing population concentrated largely in urban areas. But who belongs to this floating population? Although this term conjures up images of unsettled persons lacking permanent residence, it is often used ambiguously or denotes distinctly different groups of people. This paper discusses these ambiguities and identifies a variety of definitions that we think are pertinent. The clarification of these definitions leads to a discussion of major sources of data (censuses, migration surveys and household registration lists). Along the way, we review some key empirical findings on China's floating population. We also discuss factors that have affected recent trends and are likely to affect future trends in migration and the floating population.

The North Korean famine began in 1995 and its ill effects, while peaking in the late 1990s,undoubtedly linger. Recent conjectures on excess deaths caused by the famine range widely from about 200,000 to 3 million or more. This article assesses the demographic impact of the famine with greater rigor than has previously been attempted and describes the unique setting in which the famine occurred. The analysis begins with a pair of population projections based on mortality statistics from two sources. Given their contradictory implications, the analysis turns to less direct evidence of famine‐related mortality. That evidence includes China's demographic experience during the Great Leap Forward and recent measurements of child malnutrition in North Korea. Crosscountry comparisons translate this malnutrition into corresponding levels of infant mortality. The article concludes that famine‐related deaths in North Korea from 1995 to 2000 most likely numbered between 600,000 and 1 million.