Suchergebnisse

Verdict provides important example of how the courts and Parliament play different roles in Singapore's legal system. The Court of Appeal last week upheld the reduced sentences passed in the City Harvest Church (CHC) case. Six former church leaders were charged with having conspired to commit the aggravated offence of criminal breach of trust (CBT) as an "agent" under Section 409 of the Penal Code. Departing from the earlier interpretation that had stood for the past 40 years, the court decided that Section 409 applied only to professional agents, which the former church leaders were not. The charges were reduced to Section 406, which provided for shorter terms of imprisonment. This decision has triggered a review of our CBT laws. It is clear that Section 409, which was enacted some 150 years ago, is no longer adequate to deal with the CBT cases in the 21st century.

This article is concerned with the resolution of legislative gaps in Singapore. Legislative gaps can arise obviously, such as when the draftsman mistakenly omitted an obvious word in a legislative provision. Gaps can also arise more ambiguously, such as where an old statute has not kept pace with modern development, thereby leaving a gap between the statute's broad objects and particular application. Beyond the presence of gaps, the courts also have to consider how much weight, if at all, is to be placed on the absence of gaps. This article will propose a framework for dealing with legislative gaps (and non-gaps) in the local context.

Some statutes in operation today were passed a long time ago. Inevitably, through the passage of time, social norms at the time of enactment may now be unrecognizable. Two recent cases show contrasting approaches towards the interpretation of outdated statutory provisions. The first approach is seen in the Singapore High Court case of WX v.WW. That case concerned the interpretation of section 114 of the Evidence Act, a decidedly ancient statutory provision. The second approach was adopted by the Singapore Court of Appeal in AAG v. Estate of AAH, deceased. In that case, the Court of Appeal had to interpret sections 2 and 3(1) of the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, which was enacted some 45 years ago. All things considered, legislative reform of section 114 of the EA is the best way to minimize the trouble here. But for now, when faced with an outdated statutory provision, the Court of Appeal's approach in AAG, while reaching a regretful result, is the preferable one to take.

In Imbree v. McNeilly, the High Court of Australia ruled that a learner driver is no longer to be held to the standard of a reasonable but unqualified (and inexperienced) driver in negligence claims. It is the modest aim of this case note to show that Imbree, while a decision on a narrow point, in fact hints at a larger difficulty in the ascertainment of the standard of care in individual cases. It is in this context that it will be suggested that, when the time comes for Singapore courts to consider the applicability of Imbree, this difficulty should be borne in mind. At first instance in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Studdert J. found in favor of the appellant, finding that first respondent had "behaved with carelessness over and above what could be attributed merely to inexperience" and awarded the appellant damages of more than A$9.5 million, although there was a deduction of 30% for contributory negligence.

In 1993, the Singapore Parliament enacted legislative provisions adapted from Australian legislation directing, inter alia, that the courts apply the purposive approach in statutory interpretation. Those provisions also allowed for the extended use of extrinsic materials in the interpretative process. Fifteen years on, there is now a considerable body of Singapore case law to which a meaningful analysis may be undertaken. Indeed, from an initially cautious application of the enacted legislation, the courts began to read the enactments expansively, eventually providing for a statutory interpretation regime that is largely free of the confines of old. Nonetheless, the Singapore position does lend itself to some unique problems, as there are signs that the courts have in a limited number of cases evinced an intention to reverse the hitherto rather expansive approach. This article provides a brief overview of the evolution of the Singapore position to its present form, before making a brief comparison with parallel developments in Australia, from which Singapore's provisions originated. It will then attempt to explain the present Singapore position in relation to statutory interpretation as distinguished from that taken in Australia. It is hoped that the account provided in this article will be of comparative interest to jurisdictions which have adopted similar legislative reform and, more broadly, to the enduring problem of the proper approach towards statutory interpretation.

English law on the rule against penalty clauses ("penalty rule") has had a stable if unsatisfactory formulation for a while. The courts have long distinguished between liquidated damages and a penalty, on the basis that the former is a genuine pre-estimate of loss and that the latter is an unjustifiable tool used to coerce the performance of a contract. These long-standing principles have now to be re-evaluated in the light of the much-anticipated joint appeals of Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi and ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis (collectively "Cavendish"). The purpose of this case note is to discuss Cavendish and evaluate the impact it might have on Singapore law. The immediate task for English law is to fully work out the basis and principles of the new rule in Cavendish. The impact on Singapore law will depend on how that pans out.

Change is here. If this was not evident from the speech of Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon at his welcome ceremony three years ago, it is now. In three short years, Singapore is leading Asia - possibly the world - in the provision of not only legal services but also intellectual capital and resources. The speed of these developments should not be surprising. As Attorney-General V.K. Rajah observed at the Opening of the Legal Year this month, Singapore's law and legal system has come a long way in a short time. The story of the Singapore legal system thus far can be told in three phases: consolidation (1965-1990), refinement (1990s-2000s) and internationalisation (today).

The Protection from Harassment Act 2014 ("Act") was passed by Parliament on 13 March 2014 following its Second Reading. The Act is a culmination of a concerted ministerial effort to bring about legislative change to the laws governing harassment. Bringing together the background to the Act, its general structure and its specific provisions, this article aims to add to the undoubted long list of commentaries on the Act and, it is hoped, contribute to the understanding and enforcement of the Act.