NPS NRP Executive Summary ; Chinese Security Cooperation with Southeast Asian Countries: Implications for U.S. Naval Operations ; N3/N5 - Information, Plans & Strategy ; This research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrp ; Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) ; Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
Drawing mostly on Chinese‐language sources, this article examines Chinese assessments of the effectiveness of China's earlier "charm offensive" in increasing China's regional influence and reshaping the regional order according to its preferences. The main argument is that China achieved mixed success. China was successful in preventing others from adopting hostile anti‐China balancing postures, and especially before 2005, successful in attaining support and momentum for its preferred vision of East Asian regional cooperation and regional trade liberalization. China was less successful, however, in shaping the regional security order, although experts recognized the incremental improvements in what would be a gradual process in minimizing the dominance of U.S. alliances. Around 2005, however, Chinese experts noted increased resistance to China's preferred vision for regionalism and regional economic cooperation. The article concludes by examining analytical themes that enabled China to successfully exert regional influence or represented challenges to its efforts to reshape the region.
Key Points: Deeper rapprochement across the Taiwan Strait would remove a longstanding source of regional tension and the most likely source of war between the United States and China. Cross-strait rapprochement would also lead to new frictions and new worries among regional countries and the United States that a China no longer focused on Taiwan will use its increased power to challenge their interests elsewhere in Asia. Stabilizing the cross-strait political situation will free up resources previously devoted to military preparations for Taiwan contingencies and allow the People's Liberation army (PLa) to undertake new missions and reassess priorities. The direction of PLA modernization can help alleviate or further exacerbate the concerns about a rising China that will become more powerful but also less constrained by Taiwan.
The fifth annual session of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue was held in Honolulu, HI from May 2 through 4, 2010. The Dialogue is a track 1.5 conference; thus, it is formally unofficial, but includes a mix of government and academic participants. The Dialogue is organized by the Naval Postgraduate School and Pacific Forum-CSIS and is funded and guided by the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The goal of this series of annual meetings has been to identify important misperceptions regarding each side's nuclear strategy and doctrine and highlight potential areas of cooperation or confidence building measures that might reduce such dangers. Beyond that, the conference aims to deepen American understandings of the way China views nuclear weapons, the domestic debates that shape those views, and the degree to which there is change in strategy, doctrine, and force posture in Beijing. The previous four meetings have focused their discussions on general perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons, the nature of current nuclear strategy and operational concepts of each side, regional issues pertaining to nuclear weapons issues, and prospects for cooperation with regard to specific policy areas. This year, the meeting was organized around six panels (see the attached agenda) centering on the key strategic threat perceptions of each side--general and proliferation related--and the various sorts of security policies each undertakes to address these threats--unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This report is the product of collaboration between the Naval Postgraduate School, Center on Contemporary Conflict and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency ; The eighth annual session of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue on strategic nuclear issues was held in Oahu, Hawaii, from June 8 to 10, 2014. The dialogue is a Track 1.5 meeting; it is formally unofficial but includes a mix of government and academic participants. The dialogue is organized by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) and funded by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA) Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) at NPS. For the third time, this meeting was also supported by a Chinese co-host, the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA). This "non-governmental" association, with close ties to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and People's Liberation Army (PLA), helped improve the level and quality of participants and secure support for discussing certain topics.
PASCC Report Number: 2017-001 ; The ninth annual session of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue was held in Oahu, Hawaii, from September 8-10, 2015. The dialogue is a Track 1.5 meeting; it is formally unofficial but includes a mix of government and academic participants. The dialogue is organized by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) and funded by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA) Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) at NPS. For the fourth time, this meeting was also supported by a Chinese co-host, the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA). This "non-governmental" association, with close ties to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and People's Liberation Army (PLA), helped improve the level and quality of participants and secure support for discussing certain topics. ; Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Performer: Pacific Forum CSIS and Naval Postgraduate School Project Leads: Ralph Cossa, Christopher Twomey, and Michael Glosny Project Cost: $400,000 FY15-16 ; Objective: China is currently modernizing its military capabilities, including its nuclear arsenal, and there remains a lack of official discussions on these issues. This communications gap increases the risks to strategic stability and the potential for inadvertent escalation. This project's goal is to build greater understanding between the United States and China on strategic issues to prepare for or support official discussions. This dialogue project will build upon previous PASCC-sponsored U.S.-China Track 1.5s to achieve a deeper understanding of the issues. Less-official dialogues such as this one, while not a substitution for official dialogues, can be used to help identify and clarify agenda items for official talks as well as delve more deeply into sensitive issues. Expected topics to be addressed include nuclear postures, nonproliferation policy, no first use, mutual vulnerability, missile defense, strategic stability, long-range conventional weapons, and confidence-building measures. ; PASCC