Suchergebnisse

Cet article présente un modèle dans lequel une autorité réglementaire choisit un instrument de politique environnementale sous l'influence d'un groupe d'intérêt représentant les pollueurs. Trois instruments sont étudiés: une norme réglementaire, une taxe et un système de Permis d'Emissions Négociables (PEN) dont l'allocation initiale est gratuite. Dans ce monde sous contraintes politiques, nous montrons que les PEN sont toujours plus proches de l'optimum de premier rang que la norme. Le classement entre la taxe et les PEN est, en revanche, ambigu et dépend de la valeur des paramètres. Par ailleurs, le modèle prédit l'adoption systématique de PEN quand aucune politique environnementale n'est en place au départ. En revanche, si une norme est déjà en place – ce qui est la règle dans les domaines traditionnels de la politique environnementale – elle n'est pas toujours substituée par des PEN. Ce dernier résultat peut justifier un certain pessimisme sur les possibilités de diffusion des instruments économiques dans les domaines où préexistent des normes.

This paper presents a model where an interest group gathering the polluters lobby an environmental regulator in charge of selecting an environmental policy instrument. Three policy instruments are analyzed: an emission standard, an emission tax & an Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). We show that the ETS emerging in the lobbying equilibrium always yields a higher welfare than the standard. The welfare ranking between the tax & the ETS depends on parameters' value. Moreover, the model predicts that the regulator always adopt an ETS when the status quo does not involve any policy. But, in the case where a regulatory standard is already in place, no policy change occurs. This result suggests that a difficult diffusion of economic instruments in contexts where a traditional Command & Control policy is already developed. Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

I am grateful to the publisher, Elsevier, for letting the manuscript being archived in this Open Access repository. ; International audience ; In reality, most voluntary agreements with polluters (VAs) are not enforceable in the sense that no legal tools are available to enforce Örmsí commitments. We examine whether such VAs are able to achieve an e¢ cient level of environmental protection when they are obtained under the legislative threat of a pollution quota. We show that they can improve social welfare relative to legislative intervention when lobbying Congress is very e§ective and when the polluter and the regulator do not discount future costs and beneÖts heavily. These Öndings suggest that VAs should be used selectively, taking into account sector characteristics and the degree of ináuence of lobbying on Congress.

I am grateful to the publisher, Elsevier, for letting the manuscript being archived in this Open Access repository. ; International audience ; In reality, most voluntary agreements with polluters (VAs) are not enforceable in the sense that no legal tools are available to enforce Örmsí commitments. We examine whether such VAs are able to achieve an e¢ cient level of environmental protection when they are obtained under the legislative threat of a pollution quota. We show that they can improve social welfare relative to legislative intervention when lobbying Congress is very e§ective and when the polluter and the regulator do not discount future costs and beneÖts heavily. These Öndings suggest that VAs should be used selectively, taking into account sector characteristics and the degree of ináuence of lobbying on Congress.

The paper analyzes the welfare properties of voluntary agreements (VA) with polluters, when they are obtained under the legislative threat of an alternative stricter policy option. In the model, the threat is an abatement quota. Both the threat and its probability of implementation are endogenous. The latter is the outcome of a rent-seeking contest between a green and a polluter lobby group influencing the legislature. We show that a welfare-improving VA systematically emerges in equilibrium and that it is more efficient than the pollution quota. We also discuss various VA design aspects.

In actual environmental policy, the design of actual pollution emission taxes differs significantly with the optimal Pigovian tax. In particular, earmarking prevails and actual taxes are usually combined with regulation. Furthermore tax rates are generally too low to significantly influence polluters' behavior. The paper develops a political economy model to explain these design parameters: the tax rate, earmarking pattern and whether the tax is combined with a regulation. An incumbent government selects these parameters under the influence of a green and a polluters' lobby groups. An earmarked tax is introduced in equilibrium which rate is lower than the regulatory shadow price when the status quo regulation is imperfectly enforced and if the green lobby is sufficiently weak.

This paper analyses the interplay between technology diffusion and patent law. We develop a dynamic model where initial adoptions generate learning spillovers that reduce the cost of subsequent adoptions. In this setting, we contrast technology diffusion paths under competitive supply, subsidized adoption and patent protection. Competitive supply entails various coordination failures that cannot be fully fixed by public subsidy. We show that a patent holder can internalize externalities more efficiently, insofar as patent protection is fully effective. In contrast, fully competitive supply may be more efficient when patent enforcement is imperfect.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a key role in creating incentives for firms to develop a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy by disclosing publicly self-regulatory corporate efforts. Their informational behavior is heterogeneous: Some NGOs mostly disclose information on firms that do not behave responsibly (e.g., Greenpeace). Others are specialized in revealing firms that are socially or environmentally responsible (e.g., the Marine Stewardship Council). We develop a model describing the interactions between a NGO, a continuum of firms and a representative stakeholder to explain what drives the NGO communication choice and its impact on the level of self-regulation. We show that the NGO specializes in equilibrium: depending on the size of its budget, it either chooses to cheer the leaders or to boo the laggards. We extend the model to the case with multiple NGOs. We also introduce the possibility of NGO corporate partnerships and derive policy implications.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a key role in creating incentives for firms to develop a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy by disclosing publicly self-regulatory corporate efforts. Their informational behavior is heterogeneous: Some NGOs mostly disclose information on firms that do not behave responsibly (e.g., Greenpeace). Others are specialized in revealing firms that are socially or environmentally responsible (e.g., the Marine Stewardship Council). We develop a model describing the interactions between a NGO, a continuum of firms and a representative stakeholder to explain what drives the NGO communication choice and its impact on the level of self-regulation. We show that the NGO specializes in equilibrium: depending on the size of its budget, it either chooses to cheer the leaders or to boo the laggards. We extend the model to the case with multiple NGOs. We also introduce the possibility of NGO corporate partnerships and derive policy implications.

national audience taking the view of the regulator, we seek to answer the following questions: what is the role of AV today in a context where the authorities are committed to CSR? Are CSR and AV substitutes or supplements from the point of view of public authorities? What is the influence of CSR on the social well-being that can be achieved with an AV? ; Are Corporate Social Responsibility and Voluntary Agreements Complementary ? Voluntary agreements between regulators and firms have been in use for at least two decades. In recent years, however,firms have tended to commit to better environmental or social behavior in a more unilateral fashion. This phenomenon isknown as the rise of "Corporate Social Responsibility" (CSR). In such circumstances, are voluntary agreements stillwelfare-enhancing ? To explore this question, we use a policy game involving a regulator and a firm. We show that theanswer is ambiguous. In particular, it depends on the regulator's bargaining power. ; national audience taking the view of the regulator, we seek to answer the following questions: what is the role of AV today in a context where the authorities are committed to CSR? Are CSR and AV substitutes or supplements from the point of view of public authorities? What is the influence of CSR on the social well-being that can be achieved with an AV? ; National audience En adoptant le point de vue du régulateur, nous cherchons à répondre aux questions suivantes : quel est le rôle des AV aujourd'hui dans un contexte où les firmes s'engagent dans la RSE ? RSE et AV sont-ils des substituts ou des compléments du point de vue de la puissance publique ? Quelle est l'influence de la RSE sur le bien-être social atteignable avec un AV ?