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This study recapitulates basic developments in the tradition of hermeneutic and phenomenological studies of science. It focuses on the ways in which scientific research is committed to the universe of interpretative phenomena. It treats scientific research by addressing its characteristic hermeneutic situations, and uses the following basic argument in this treatment: By demonstrating that science's epistemological identity is not to be spelled out in terms of objectivism, mathematical essentialism, representationalism, and foundationalism, one undermines scientism without succumbing scientific research to "procedures of normative-democratic control" that threaten science's cognitive autonomy. The study shows that in contrast to social constructivism, hermeneutic phenomenology of scientific research makes the case that overcoming scientism does not imply restrictive policies regarding the constitution of scientific objects

This paper argues that scientific inquiry (1) creates its own cognitive autonomy within the interplay of research practices and possibilities for doing research, and (2) discloses, meaningfully articulates, and procedurally objectifies reality in a unique manner. Taken together, both claims characterize the position of hermeneutic realism which lays foundations for the radically anti-foundationalist hermeneutic philosophy of science. Claim (1) opens a subject of meta-epistemological studies aiming at a complementarity between a hermeneutic theory of the facticity of scientific inquiry as a mode of being and an epistemological theory that works out in its own terms the conditions for having science's cognitive specificity, whereas claim (2) is a necessary presupposition for studying how reality becomes meaningfully articulated within scientific practices. The position of hermeneutic realism is on a par with the thesis of interpretive internalism stating that the cognitive autonomy of scientific inquiry is achieved through the openness of inquiry to its milieus. This openness consists in a selective assimilation of external themes, goals, tasks, and other items. The paper also deals with some socio-political consequences from the thesis of interpretive internalism. It is argued that only scientific inquiry freed from social monitoring and political control is able to serve societal needs, preventing at the same time a politically initiated scientification of societies, i.e. a scientification guided by dubious economic and political interests, and accomplished through sciences that are not able to preserve their cognitive autonomy, thereby becoming exposed to manipulation and misuse. ; This paper argues that scientific inquiry (1) creates its own cognitive autonomy within the interplay of research practices and possibilities for doing research, and (2) discloses, meaningfully articulates, and procedurally objectifies reality in a unique manner. Taken together, both claims characterize the position of hermeneutic realism which lays foundations for the radically anti-foundationalist hermeneutic philosophy of science. Claim (1) opens a subject of meta-epistemological studies aiming at a complementarity between a hermeneutic theory of the facticity of scientific inquiry as a mode of being and an epistemological theory that works out in its own terms the conditions for having science's cognitive specificity, whereas claim (2) is a necessary presupposition for studying how reality becomes meaningfully articulated within scientific practices. The position of hermeneutic realism is on a par with the thesis of interpretive internalism stating that the cognitive autonomy of scientific inquiry is achieved through the openness of inquiry to its milieus. This openness consists in a selective assimilation of external themes, goals, tasks, and other items. The paper also deals with some socio-political consequences from the thesis of interpretive internalism. It is argued that only scientific inquiry freed from social monitoring and political control is able to serve societal needs, preventing at the same time a politically initiated scientification of societies, i.e. a scientification guided by dubious economic and political interests, and accomplished through sciences that are not able to preserve their cognitive autonomy, thereby becoming exposed to manipulation and misuse.

This paper argues that scientific inquiry (1) creates its own cognitive autonomy within the interplay of research practices and possibilities for doing research, and (2) discloses, meaningfully articulates, and procedurally objectifies reality in a unique manner. Taken together, both claims characterize the position of hermeneutic realism which lays foundations for the radically anti-foundationalist hermeneutic philosophy of science. Claim (1) opens a subject of meta-epistemological studies aiming at a complementarity between a hermeneutic theory of the facticity of scientific inquiry as a mode of being and an epistemological theory that works out in its own terms the conditions for having science's cognitive specificity, whereas claim (2) is a necessary presupposition for studying how reality becomes meaningfully articulated within scientific practices. The position of hermeneutic realism is on a par with the thesis of interpretive internalism stating that the cognitive autonomy of scientific inquiry is achieved through the openness of inquiry to its milieus. This openness consists in a selective assimilation of external themes, goals, tasks, and other items. The paper also deals with some socio-political consequences from the thesis of interpretive internalism. It is argued that only scientific inquiry freed from social monitoring and political control is able to serve societal needs, preventing at the same time a politically initiated scientification of societies, i.e. a scientification guided by dubious economic and political interests, and accomplished through sciences that are not able to preserve their cognitive autonomy, thereby becoming exposed to manipulation and misuse.

The problem of how to access and estimate the proliferation of receptions of Ludwik Fleck's work in domains as diverse as social geography, history of clinical medicine, and cognitive sociology has long remained vexing. The approach suggested in this paper combines the hermeneutics of effective-historical reception with a version of epistemic reconstruction of intellectual history. Special emphasis is placed upon the forms of political contextualization of Fleck's comparative sociology of thought styles. The author argues that the heterogeneity of receptions is essentially informed by the specificity of the 'implicit reader' Fleck assigned to his work. Interestingly enough, it is a 'reader' congruent with the post-metaphysical turns in the social sciences. This claim is defended by analyzing particular trajectories of reception of Fleck's work.

The principal aim of this article is to examine the capacity of existential analytic to suggest alternatives to entrenched dichotomies and dilemmas in practice theory, and more generally, in social theory. In this regard, the doctrine of trans-subjective existentialism is developed. The underlying aim is to inform hermeneutic engagement with social practices' potentiality-for-being in order to illuminate a possible existential ontology of practices. It is argued that the concept of chronotope should be central in this ontology. Thus, the possibility of hermeneutic realism about social practices becomes open to scrutiny.

In this volume, the authors seek to analyze the actual influence of Dilthey's philosophy of the human sciences on various contemporary debates. They are convinced that Dilthey's interpretative-holistic epistemology provides a good starting point for engaging with alternative conceptions of the human sciences. Throughout the volume, the authors illustrate the importance of Dilthey's main concepts for constituting the human-scientific objects of inquiry qua historically contextualized objects of inquiry. It is the interpretative reflection on the forms of human beings' self-understanding of their situatedness that requires the implementation of double hermeneutics in the constitution of such objects. In my review, I concentrate chiefly on five versions of double hermeneutics discussed by the authors in different methodological contexts.

I. Marcuse's "New Science": In his celebrated critique of "technological rationality," Herbert Marcuse pleads for a "new science" in which an "erotic" attitude toward nature would permit the entities of the natural world to transform in such a manner that they become free to be what they are. Following this line of reasoning in Eros and Civilization, he reaches the conclusion: "To be what they are they depend on the erotic attitude: they receive their telos only in it." In addition, the erotic attitude will reveal aesthetic qualities inherent in nature. [Excerpt provided by TELOS]. Adapted from the source document.

Introductory: Perspectives on Reality and "The World" in the Realism Debate
One of the "characteristic parameters" dividing up analytical and Continental philosophizing is the interpretation of the concepts of "reality" and "the world". The paper offers an analysis of this characteristic parameter with regard to the relations between epistemologically centred and hermeneutically oriented doctrines of realism.