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In American Exceptionalism in a New Era, editor Thomas W. Gilligan, director of the Hoover Institution, has compiled thirteen essays by Hoover fellows that discuss the unique factors that have historically set America apart from other nations and how these factors shape public policy. The authors show how America and its people have prospered and emerged as global leaders by prizing individuality and economic freedom and explore key factors in America's success, including immigration, education, divided government, light regulation, low taxes, and social mobility. America isn't perfect, they argue, but it is exceptional. Taken together, the essays form a broad exploration of American attitudes on everything from tax rates and property rights to the role of government and rule of law. They examine the beliefs of statesmen including Alexis de Tocqueville, Abraham Lincoln, Herbert Hoover, and Ronald Reagan--each of whom considered America fundamentally different from other nations. Finally they outline the ways American exceptionalism may be in decline, with consequences both at home and abroad. At a time when "the idea of the American dream is not in high repute in our public discourse," the authors collectively argue that the United States must continue to believe in itself as exceptional and indispensable or else face a world where America no longer sets the standard.

Campaign finance reform is the subject of ongoing public policy debates in many modern democratic societies. In the United States, individuals and interest groups from across the ideological spectrum have proposed or embraced a variety of campaign finance reforms in attempts to alter the electoral landscape. At least one recent presidential candidate highlighted the issue of campaign finance reform which appear to resonate with voters, as part of a broader strategy to secure his party's nomination. Many of these reforms propose to alter the sources and uses of financial resources in Congressional elections.

Within the context of a game-theoretic model with incomplete information, three dimensions of performance are defined and used to evaluate and analyze an institutionalized legislature. The performance of an institutionalized legislature is also compared to that of a noninstitutionalized legislature, one without any internal differentiation and in which members are equally uninformed about key parameters of the choice environment. Among the results are that increasing institutionalization (lower member turnover and the application of universal decision criteria) can diminish legislative performance. Additionally, a noninstitutionalized legislature always dominates the institutionalized legislature on at least one performance dimension. Institutionalization is neither necessary nor sufficient for superior legislative performance.