Suchergebnisse

In het maatschappelijke en politiek debat worden etnische concentraties op scholen steevast in verband gebracht met achterstanden. Er is echter ook meermalen vastgesteld dat allochtone leerlingen een aanzienlijke inhaalslag boeken gedurende hun gang door het basisonderwijs. De vraag die Mérove Gijsberts in dit artikel aan de orde stelt, is in hoeverre zwarte scholen een rol hebben gespeeld in het terugdringen van achterstanden.

What attitudes relating to differences in occupational earnings did people in state-socialist societies hold before and after the transformation in 1989, compared with people in market-regulated societies? And, how can differences between and changes within these societies in attitudes towards income inequality be explained? To find out, hypotheses are tested using survey data from the International Social Survey Programme, comparing several state-socialist societies with several market societies both before (1987) and after (1992) the political and economic transformation. Before the transformation, the public in central and eastern Europe was much more egalitarian than in market-regulated societies. The results show that the amount of income inequality that people think legitimate has increased in all countries, but the increase was far more dramatic in former state-socialist than in market-regulated societies. Differences in the class and demographic composition of the population hardly explain variations in inequality attitudes between societies, but differences in perceptions of income inequality do.

De vermeende negatieve gevolgen van etnische concentratie van allochtone bewoners in 'zwarte' wijken kregen tot voor kort ruime beleidsaandacht. In een brief waarschuwt de voormalig minister voor Wonen, Wijken en Integratie dat er in deze wijken sprake is van 'wantrouwen en fricties tussen bevolkingsgroepen en gebrek aan betrokkenheid bij anderen'. Of de directe woonomgeving daadwerkelijk invloed heeft op de interetnische verhoudingen is tot nu toe niet eenduidig vastgesteld. In dit artikel beogen we meer licht te werpen op de kwestie of de etnische samenstelling van de buurt van invloed is op de onderlinge beeldvorming tussen etnische groepen. We bestuderen niet alleen hoe autochtone Nederlanders over migranten denken, maar ook welke opvattingen migranten hebben over autochtone Nederlanders en de opvattingen tussen etnische minderheidsgroepen onderling. Door buurteffecten op zoveel mogelijk verschillende beeldvormingsdimensies te vergelijken, zijn we in staat een systematisch overzicht te geven van de rol van de buurt voor interetnische beeldvorming in Nederland.

This article compares the pre and post migration position in the labour market of recent migrants to the Netherlands from Poland and Bulgaria, regarding the extent to which migrants have a job, what their socioeconomic status is, and how satisfied they are with their income. The prime
question is whether those migrants who found a job in the Netherlands work in a lower socio-economic status job than before migration, with which we test the first part of the U-curve-hypothesis, putting forward that migration results in a loss of job status. We used the dataset 'Social
and Cultural Integration Processes' (SCIP). This dataset collected information from migrants that registered in the Dutch Municipality Population Registers to a maximum of one and a half year before the start of the survey. We find evidence that almost all Poles have a job in the Netherlands,
but, excluding those who were in school in Poland before migration, most had a job in Poland as well. The situation for the Bulgarians is less positive, even though they more often have a job in the Netherlands than they had in Bulgaria. Within both migrant groups the socioeconomic status
of the job in the Netherlands is lower than the status of the last job in the country of origin, but less so for family-motivated migrants and higher educated migrants. Income satisfaction has increased substantially for both groups.

In dit artikel staan voor de verandering nu eens niet houdingen van autochtonen ten opzichte van de multiculturele samenleving centraal, maar wordt het omgekeerde belicht. In hoeverre voelen allochtonen zich geaccepteerd in Nederland, wat is hun perceptie van het voorkomen van discriminatie en hoe ervaren zij de beeldvorming ten aanzien van de islam? Voor allochtonen wordt, in tegenstelling tot de gangbare bevindingen in de literatuur over vooroordelen, geen verzachtend opleidingseffect gevonden. Integendeel, in navolging van Buijs et al. (2006) kan gesproken worden van een integratieparadox. Het blijken juist de hoger opgeleide allochtonen te zijn die zich minder geaccepteerd voelen in Nederland. Ook geven zij vaker aan dat discriminatie voorkomt. Bovendien vinden hoger opgeleide moslims dat het respect voor de islamitische cultuur hier vaak ver te zoeken is. Onze bevindingen wijzen uit dat een deel van de verklaring hiervan ligt in het meer in aanraking komen met het politieke debat over de allochtonenproblematiek. Daarnaast spelen gevoelens van relatieve deprivatie een rol. Het feit dat het voltooien van een goede opleiding voor hoger opgeleide allochtonen minder automatisch tot maatschappelijk succes leidt dan voor autochtone hoger opgeleiden, is een belangrijke reden voor de lagere ervaren acceptatie.

Since 1989 the political systems in Eastern European societies have changed radically, from totalitarian regimes towards democratic regimes with free general elections and multi-party systems similar to early democracies. This paper examines whether in these new democracies the same class cleavages have become important as in longstanding Western democracies. The relation between social class, attitudes towards economic justice and voting behavior is investigated in five new democracies and compared with those in nine longstanding democracies. The data used are from various cross-nationally comparable and nationally representative surveys held in the 1990s (total N = 20,270). Results show that social class has clear effects on economic justice attitudes and voting behavior in Western democracies. In the post-communist societies, members of different social classes consistently differ in their attitudes towards income inequality and social security, but hardly differ in their voting behavior. Owing to the politically unstable situation in the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, people in different classes are probably unable to translate their policy preferences into party preferences.

Abstract. In this study we explain extreme right‐wing voting behaviour in the countries of the European Union and Norway from a micro and macro perspective. Using a multidisciplinary multilevel approach, we take into account individual‐level social background characteristics and public opinion alongside country characteristics and characteristics of extreme right‐wing parties themselves. By making use of large‐scale survey data (N = 49,801) together with country‐level statistics and expert survey data, we are able to explain extreme right‐wing voting behaviour from this multilevel perspective. Our results show that cross‐national differences in support of extreme right‐wing parties are particularly due to differences in public opinion on immigration and democracy, the number of non‐Western residents in a country and, above all, to party characteristics of the extreme right‐wing parties themselves.

In this study we explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour in the countries of the European Union and Norway from a micro and macro perspective. Using a multidisciplinary multilevel approach, we take into account individual-level social background characteristics and public opinion alongside country characteristics and characteristics of extreme right-wing parties themselves. By making use of large-scale survey data (N = 49,801) together with country-level statistics and expert survey data, we are able to explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour from this multilevel perspective. Our results show that cross-national differences in support of extreme right-wing parties are particularly due to differences in public opinion on immigration and democracy, the number of non-Western residents in a country and, above all, to party characteristics of the extreme right-wing parties themselves.

In this study we explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour in the countries of the European Union and Norway from a micro and macro perspective. Using a multidisciplinary multilevel approach, we take into account individual-level social background characteristics and public opinion alongside country characteristics and characteristics of extreme right-wing parties themselves. By making use of large-scale survey data (N=49,801) together with country-level statistics and expert survey data, we are able to explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour from this multilevel perspective. Our results show that cross-rational differences in support of extreme right-wing parties are particularly due to differences in public opinion on immigration and democracy, the number of non-Western residents in a country and, above all, to party characteristics of the extreme right-wing parties themselves. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

Education is often found to be a strong determinant of ethnic prejudice. However, there is preliminary evidence that this educational effect varies across countries. Moreover, there are also theoretical arguments to expect cross-national variances in the educational effect on ethnic prejudice. From both a cultural and structural perspective, we set out to explain these cross-national variances in the educational effect. Results of multilevel analyses on data from 11 European countries show that the cultural perspective is more fruitful to explain cross-national variances in the strength of the educational effect on ethnic prejudice than the structural perspective: a country's democratic tradition and degree of religious heterogeneity are important for the strength of the educational effect on ethnic prejudice, whereas a country's ethnic composition and unemployment rate are less relevant.