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David N. Gibbs explores the forces that shaped the turn toward free market economics and wealth concentration and finds their roots in the 1970s. He argues that the political transformations of this period resulted from a "revolt of the rich," whose defense of their class interests came at the expense of the American public.

This book focuses upon the potential to integrate economic and environmental policies at the local and regional scale. Local initiatives are investigated within their wider economic and environmental policy contexts in order to illustrate both the constraints and opportunities for local policy makers. Attention is given to global economic trends, as well as to the specific policy contexts of the European Union and the national contexts of the UK, USA, Australia, Japan and Sweden. The key principles for designing integrative policies and descriptions of initiatives and projects in a variety of

Research on the international relations of the African continent has generally eschewed the phenomenon of rivalry among the advanced capitalist powers for commercial and political influence south of the Sahara. Most studies of Africa's international relations, especially from a critical perspective, have tended to emphasize the unityof the northern, capitalist powers in opposing challenges from third world countries. During the 1970s, research emphasized the efforts of multinational corporations and their home governments to prevent or undermine efforts at economic nationalism in third world countries. While such studies did recognize the potential for somewhat varied responses to rationalistic 'threats', there was a widespread assumption that the rich nations would exhibit a significant degree of unity in preserving international property rights and the free flow of capital. More recently, critical studies have emphasized the salience of the international financial community and the International Monetary Fund in reestablishing political and economic hegemony over peripheral areas, including Africa (Mohan & Zack‐Williams, 1995).
Such approaches tend to overlook the phenomenon of conflict and competition among these powers. This article will examine the historical basis of international rivalries in Zaïre, focusing on the rise of General Mobutu's regime, primarily during the late 1960s. During this period, the United States was seeking to expand its commercial and political influence in Zaïre, generally at the expense of established European interests. The principal protagonist of the US was the former colonial power, Belgium. In essence, it will be argued, inter‐capitalist rivalries in Zaïre were an inevitable outgrowth of decolonization. The European powers had always used colonialism as a method to maintain exclusive or quasi‐exclusive trading and investment opportunities for home country interests and to exclude potential interlopers ‐ such as the United States. During the 1960s, the US viewed the circumstances of decolonization as an opportunity for political and commercial expansion, sometimes at the expense of European interests. European‐US conflicts, some of which continue to the present day, were the result. Historical conflicts such as these are highly relevant to understanding present‐day international relations in Central Africa when once again, rivalries among the western powers ‐ this time between the US and France ‐ are apparent.

Analyzes US & European state department documents & press releases & newspaper reports to examine the historical basis of international rivalries in former Zaire, focusing on the country's copper nationalization under the late-1960s regime of General Mobutu Sese Seko. It is argued that capitalist rivalries in Zaire were an inevitable result of decolonization, as countries such as the US sought to intrude on markets that were unavailable under exclusive European colonial power. US commercial & political opportunism clashed with European interests, creating the highly sensitive & complex international context for present-day Central Africa. 1 Appendix, 27 References. Adapted from the source document.

This essay examines the question of Soviet intervention in the Third World. It begins by discussing recent theories of Soviet strategy, including those which hold that the USSR has a grand strategy of expansion in the Third World, as well as the less alarmist views of George F. Kennan. The influence that these debates have had on American foreign policy, and their significance for the recent revival of the Cold War, is discussed The essay then attempts to test these theories, using the Soviet Union's December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan as a case study. The essay describes, at length, Afghanistan's internal politics and foreign relations from the eighteenth century until the present The historical discussion, which emphasizes the post-World War II period, relies primarily on US government documents. The essay concludes, based on the information presented, that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan reluctantly, and that it did not invade primarily in order to expand its influence. It also concludes that the USSR has not gamed major strategic advantages from its occupation of Afghanistan. Finally, the essay reconsiders the theories of Soviet strategy, and notes that the facts of the Afghan case generally contradict the 'grand strategy' theorists, while they support the views of Kennan.

Recent theories of Soviet strategy in the Third World are discussed, including those which hold that the USSR has a grand strategy of expansion in the Third World, as well as less alarmist views. The influence that these debates have had on US foreign policy, & their significance for the recent revival of the Cold War, are also considered. These theories are tested in an analysis of the Dec 1979 USSR invasion of Afghanistan. The internal politics & foreign relations of Afghanistan from the eighteenth century until the present are described, with particular focus on the post-WWII period, relying primarily on US government documents. It is concluded that the USSR invaded Afghanistan reluctantly, & that it did not do so primarily to expand its influence; moreover, the USSR has not gained major strategic advantages from its occupation of Afghanistan. 96 References. Modified HA