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Cover -- Contents -- ABSTRACT -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS -- III. FISCAL CRISES EPISODES -- A. Definition of Fiscal Crises -- B. Examining Behavior of Key Economic Variables Around Fiscal Crises -- C. Advanced and Emerging Economies -- D. Low Income Countries -- IV. ESTIMATION STRATEGY AND DATA -- A. Alternative Approaches to Predict Crises -- B. Data -- V. EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS -- A. Advanced and Emerging Economies -- B. Low Income Countries -- VI. CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- APPENDIX I. DATA -- FIGURES -- 1.1 Probability of Starting a Fiscal Crisis -- 3.1. Event Studies. Advanced and Emerging Economies -- 3.2. Ratio of Budget Grants to Current Expenditure -- 3.3. Event Studies. Low Income Countries -- 5.1. Signals Composite Indicator: Setting the Cut-off Threshold -- 5.2. Average Marginal Effects for AMs and EMs -- TABLES -- 3.1. Number of Identified Fiscal Crisis Episodes (1970-2015) -- 4.1. Occurrence of Crisis-True versus Predicted -- 5.1. Early Warning System for AEs and EMs: Signals Approach -- 5.2. Advanced and Emerging Economies Logit Model -- 5.3. Early Warning System for LICs (all countries): Signals Approach -- 5.4. Low Income Countries Logit Model -- APPENDIX TABLES -- A.1. Sample Countries -- A.2. (1970-2015). Leading Indicators (1 Lag) -- Advanced and Emerging Economies -- A.3. (1970-2015): Leading Indicators (2 Lags) -- Advanced and Emerging Economies -- A.4. Early Warning System for AE and EMs: Signals Approach -- A.5. Pooled Logit. Advanced and Emerging Economies -- A.6. Predictive Performance -- A.7. Leading Indicators of Fiscal Crises (1 Lag) -- Low Income Countries -- A.8. Leading Indicators of Fiscal Crises (2 Lags) -- LIC Countries -- A.9. Early Warning System for LICs (all countries): Signals Approach

Abstract
We analyze under what conditions competitive credit markets are efficient in providing loans to entrepreneurs who can start a new project after failure. An entrepreneur of uncertain talent chooses the riskiness of her project. If banks privately observe the entrepreneur's risk choices, two equilibria coexist: (1) an inefficient equilibrium in which the entrepreneur realizes a low-risk project and has no access to finance after failure and (2) a more efficient equilibrium in which the entrepreneur first realizes high-risk projects and then, after continuous failures, a low-risk project. There is a non-monotonic relationship between bank information and potential credit market inefficiency. We discuss the implications for credit registers and entrepreneurial education.

This is a survey on the recent game theoretic literature on committee decision making. We consider theoretical work on the role of (i) strategic voting, (ii) costly information acquisition, (iii) conflicting interests, & (iv) communication in committees. Moreover, we review recent experimental evidence on these issues. Our analysis focuses on the optimal size, composition, & decision rules of committees. We also finally discuss implications for the design of monetary policy committees. Figures, References. [Copyright 2005 Elsevier B.V.]

Using a comprehensive database on bank credit, covering 135 developing countries over the period 1960-2011, we identify, document, and compare the macro-economic dynamics of credit booms across low- and middle-income countries. The results suggest that while the duration and magnitude of credit booms is similar across country groups, macro-economic dynamics differ somewhat in low-income countries. We further find that surges in capital inflows are associated with credit booms. Moreover, credit booms associated with banking crises exhibit distinct macroeconomic dynamics, while also reflecting a