Suchergebnisse

Do small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums, ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has, paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy interests whose power it was designed to curb. Elisabeth Gerber, however, challenges that argument. In this first systematic study of how money and interest group power actually affect direct legislation, she reveals that big spending does not necessarily mean big influence. Gerber bases her findings

Do small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums, ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has, paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy interests whose power it was designed to curb. Elisabeth Gerber, however, challenges that argument. In this first systematic study of how money and interest group power actually affect direct legislation, she reveals that big spending does not necessarily mean big influence. Gerber bases her findings.

Presents a model of voting in double-member district elections with one minority and two majority candidates, and how electoral laws and procedures affect minority voters' ability to elect minority candidates; since 1984, chiefly.

In every modern political system, power is shared to a greater or
lesser extent between levels of government. These power sharing
arrangements are perhaps most explicit in formal federal systems
like the United States and Canada, where federal constitutions
define the relative powers of central and subnational governments.
They may be no less important, however, in unitary democracies and
even authoritarian regimes where central governments require local
actors to implement policy on the ground and often delegate
significant authority to them. Indeed, in any large and complex
modern society, effective governance requires some sharing of power
between higher levels of government, capable of coordinating many
disparate actors and interests, and lower levels of government,
capable of responding to local conditions.

Opens a symposium originating from a 2003 research conference devoted to shedding light on the causes & consequences of movements of political authority. Pertinent theoretical, methodological, & practical questions were addressed to develop a unified framework for understanding dynamic power sharing in political systems. Here, preliminary discussion of these causes & consequences of authority migration is offered while introducing the contributions. Four key insights are cited as forming the basis for an emerging unified research program: eg, political actors seek to reallocate authority to achieve their political & policy objectives. 1 Reference. J. Zendejas