Suchergebnisse

Anhand der Migrationspolitik der EU und der Managementansätze der Internationalen Organisation für Migration (IOM) wird auf ein neues Bündel von zugleich räumlich ausgerichteten wie auch bevölkerungsbezogenen Steuerungstechniken und Managementformen eingegangen. Dabei wird auf die Gouvernementalitätskonzeption nach Foucault zurückgegriffen. So eröffnen sich entscheidende Einblicke in den Umfang, die Komplexität und die Wirkungsweisen der neuen Techniken auf dem Gebiet der Migrationspolitik (Migrationsmanagement als neue Gouvernementalität der Migration). So wird das von der IOM und anderen Akteuren herausgearbeitete "Management der Migration" sichtbar gemacht. (ICE2)

China's monetary policy aims to reach two final targets: a paramount economical target (i.e. price stability) and a less important political target (i.e. economic growth). The main actor of monetary policy is the central bank, the People's Bank of China (PBC). But the PBC is a non-independent central bank. The State Council approves the goals of monetary policy. Very limited instrument independence means that interest rates cannot be set at the PBC's discretion, and in-sufficient personal independence fails to insulate central bank officials from political influence. Monetary policy in China applies to two sets of monetary policy instruments: (i) instruments of the PBC; and (ii) non-central bank policy instruments. The instruments of the PBC include price-based indirect and quantity-based direct instruments. Non-central bank policy instruments include price and wage controls. The simultaneous usage of all these instruments leads to various distortions that ultimately prevent the interest rate channel of monetary transmission from functioning. Moreover, the strong influences of quantity-based direct instruments and non-central bank policy instruments bring into question the approach of indirect monetary policy in general. The PBC officially follows the monetary targeting approach with monetary aggregates as intermediate targets. Domestic loan growth and the exchange rate are defined as additional intermediate targets. In an in-depth analysis of the intermediate targets two main issues are primarily explored: (i) Are the intermediate targets of the Chinese monetary policy controllable? (ii) Is a sufficient relationship between these targets and the inflation rate observable? It is then shown that monetary aggregates are very difficult to control, but they have a satisfactory relationship with the inflation rate. Similarly, domestic loan growth is difficult to control – a fact largely attributed to the interest rate elasticity of loans – while there is a particularly close relationship between credit growth and the inflation rate. The exchange rate as an intermediate target can be controlled through foreign exchange market interventions; at the same time the exchange rate appears to have a significant relationship to the domestic inflation rate. Discussing the special issue of sterilizing foreign exchange inflows, the study concludes that between 2002 and 2008 not only no costs were incurred by sterilization operations, but that the central bank was actually able to realize a profit through foreign exchange market interventions. Based on this, it is concluded that the exchange rate target has not adversely affected the domestic orientation of monetary policy on the whole. The final part of the study examines whether there are any alternative monetary policy approaches that may be able to describe the policy approach in China; special focus is placed on nominal GDP targeting, the Taylor rule, and inflation targeting. A literature review reveals that the concept of nominal GDP targeting may be able to detect inflationary tendencies in the economy and, in combination with other indicators, it could be a suitable concept to assess the overall economic situation. The author calculates a Taylor rule for China from 1994 to 2008 and concludes that there is no close relationship between the PBC lending and the Taylor rate. The author then designs an augmented Taylor rule expanded to include a credit component (credit-augmented Taylor rule). The study shows that the augmented Taylor rule does not perform much better than the original one, but that it maps high inflationary periods relatively well. This is attributed to direct interventions into the credit markets, which have played a major role in combating inflationary cycles over the past decades. The analysis ends with an introduction of the concept of inflation targeting and an examination of whether this could describe monetary policy in China. It is clear that the PBC does not currently follow the inflation targeting approach, although the Chinese authorities could actually be able to influence inflation expectations effectively, not least through direct instruments such as price controls. The author notes that the PBC indeed had a good track record of fighting inflation between 1994 and 2008, and that this may now indicate a good time to think about introducing inflation targeting in China. The central conclusion of the study is that the proven gradual approach to economic and monetary reforms in China is reaching its limit. To break the vicious cycle that relies on the continuous use of quantity-based instruments to compensate for the ineffective price-based instruments – which in turn arises from the simultaneous use of both types of instruments – a complete shift away from quantity-based instruments is needed. Only then the approach of indirect monetary policy, which was officially introduced in 1998, could come into full play. ; Chinas Geldpolitik verfolgt zwei Endziele: Ein alles überragendes wirtschaftliches Ziel (d.h. Preisstabilität) und ein weniger wichtiges politisches Ziel (d.h. Wirtschaftswachstum). Der Hauptakteur der Geldpolitik ist die Zentralbank, die People's Bank of China (PBC). Aber die PBC ist eine nicht-unabhängige Zentralbank. Der Staatsrat genehmigt die Ziele der Geldpolitik, und eine sehr begrenzte Instrumenten-Unabhängigkeit bedeutet, dass die Zinsen nicht vollständig nach dem Ermessen der PBC festgelegt werden können. Die ungenügende personelle Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank schafft es nicht, die Amtsträger dem politischen Einfluss zu entziehen. Der Geldpolitik in China stehen zwei Arten von geldpolitischen Instrumenten zur Verfügung: (i) Instrumente der PBC; und (ii) Politische nicht-Notenbank Instrumente. Die Instrumente der PBC beinhalten preis-basierte indirekte und quantität-basierte direkte Instrumente. Zu den politischen nicht-Notenbank Instrumenten zählen Preis- und Lohnkontrollen. Die gleichzeitige Nutzung dieser Instrumente führt zu vielerei Verzerrungen, die letztlich verhindern, dass der Zinskanal des monetären Transmissionsmechanismus funktionieren kann. Darüber hinaus stellen die starken Einflüsse der quantität-basierten direkten Instrumente und der politischen nicht-Notenbank Instrumente den Ansatz der indirekten Geldpolitik im Allgemeinen in Frage.

Since 2004 (Ethiopian Fiscal Year (EFY) 1997), Ethiopia has experienced strong and generally broad-based real economic growth of around 10.6 percent on average between then and 2011. Growth over the last nine years was far beyond the growth rates recorded in aggregate terms for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which on average only reached 5.2 percent, less than half of Ethiopia's average real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate during that period. Inspired by the East Asian experiences for a comparison of selected indicators and policies of Ethiopia and China/Korea), growth was induced through a mix of factors including agricultural modernization, the development of new export sectors, strong global commodity demand, and government-led development investments. The initial double digits growth rates have now manifested slightly lower but remain at high single-digit levels. The economy is expected to stabilize at around seven to eight percent in 2012, largely owing to improved performance in the agriculture sector. GDP growth is likely to stay around that margin up until 2016 (EFY 2008) driven by rising foreign investment and exports (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012). High inflation persists, but is on a slightly decreasing trend. Economic growth brought with it positive trends in reducing poverty, in both urban and rural areas. Ethiopia follows a strategy of increasing exports to facilitate growth. This is appropriate given the currently limited size of its domestic market and it is consistent with the development experience of some of the recently successful countries, particularly in East Asia. Export of goods growth is to a good extent driven by volume growth across a variety of product groups, which indicates that this growth is a result of recent efforts to increase and diversify the export base. Overall export and import developments result in a significantly increased trade deficit by 43 percent, up from US$5.5 billion in 2010/11 to US$7.9 billion.

This report offers five policy recommendations that could contribute to the attraction of manufacturing FDI in Africa. To further the benefits of FDI, especially in the manufacturing sector, policymakers in Africa should: First, manage FDI flows and FDI-related policies in a way that maximizes spillovers in host countries. Second, realize the emergence of FDI from newpartners, especially in manufacturing FDI, and establish platforms that help in the attraction ofnew FDI. Third, increase investment on key infrastructure to overcome constraints for manufacturing activities to develop, especially in power supply and transportation and logistics services. Fourth, take better advantage of the currently dominating market-seeking manufacturing FDI to improve the weak industry base in the shortterm. Market-seeking FDI has a sizeable positivecontribution to the host economy. Fifth, strengthen the linkages between domestic material input and foreign manufacturing investment.