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"Scott Gehlbach is Professor of Political Science, Lyons Family Faculty Fellow, and Romnes Faculty Fellow at the University of Wisconsin-Madison; Senior Research Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow; and Research Associate of the Centre for Economic and Financial Research at the New Economic School in Moscow. A specialist in Russia, Professor Gehlbach has made fundamental contributions to the study of economic reform, authoritarianism, and accountability in organizations and government. Known for employing a wide range of research methods in his work, Gehlbach is the author of the award-winning Representation through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) and numerous articles in top journals, including the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, and The Journal of Politics. His work has been supported by two Fulbright-Hays Fellowships and many other grants. Professor Gehlbach received his PhD in political science and economics from the University of California, Berkeley"--

Written for political science and economics students who have completed a course in game theory, this text provides a unified and accessible survey of canonical and important new formal models of domestic politics. Now thoroughly updated, it includes a new chapter on nondemocracy alongside expanded material and additional exercises throughout.

I explore the incentives under alternative electoral institutions for national politicians to efficiently provide local public goods. Using a career-concerns model which incorporates voter ideological heterogeneity and thus allows comparison of electoral-college and majoritarian elections at the national level, I show that the aggregation of votes across localities in both electoral-college and majoritarian elections results in a weakening of incentives to efficiently provide local public goods. However, this effect is not unambiguously larger for one electoral institution or the other. Rather, electoral institutions interact with voter preferences to determine incentives. Electoral-college elections provide particularly weak incentives for national politicians to efficiently provide local public goods when there is local ideological bias for the incumbent or challenger, while such bias tends to cancel out in majoritarian elections. Further, electoral-college and majoritarian elections encourage different allocations of effort by national politicians when voters differ across localities in the degree to which they value public-goods provision. When such differences are sharp, electoral-college elections result in better public-goods provision for localities whose voters value public goods less, and majoritarian elections result in better provision for localities whose voters value public goods more. Adapted from the source document.

When state officials care about tax revenue and factors of production are mobile across economic sectors, political economies organize themselves into equilibria where officials promote sectors to which resources are allocated, which in turn encourages that resource allocation. Differences across sectors in the ability of officials to extract revenues may result in a "revenue trap": the persistence of a low‐productivity equilibrium even in the presence of large shocks to resource allocation. I argue that the failure of privatization in part of the postcommunist world to effect a shift toward new private economic activity resulted in part from such a trap.