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As the use of digital computers for instrumentation and control of safety‐critical systems has increased, there has been a growing debate over the issue of whether probabilistic risk assessment techniques can be applied to these systems. This debate has centered on the issue of whether software failures can be modeled probabilistically. This paper describes a "context‐based" approach to software risk assessment that explicitly recognizes the fact that the behavior of software is not probabilistic. The source of the perceived uncertainty in its behavior results from both the input to the software as well as the application and environment in which the software is operating. Failures occur as the result of encountering some context for which the software was not properly designed, as opposed to the software simply failing "randomly." The paper elaborates on the concept of "error‐forcing context" as it applies to software. It also illustrates a methodology which utilizes event trees, fault trees, and the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) to identify "error‐forcing contexts" for software in the form of fault tree prime implicants.