Suchergebnisse

Contents: 1. Economic psychology: selected contributions to an emerging discipline / Katharina Gangl and Erich Kirchler -- 2. Lay people's and children's theories of money / Agata Gasiorowska -- 3. Improving financial capability / Krishane Patel and Ivo Vlaev -- 4. Role of 'owned' money and rational spending / Jashim Khan and Gary Rivers -- 5. Debts and over-indebtedness of private households / Cäzilia Loibl -- 6. Psychology in product design / Sarah Diefenbach and Marc Hassenzahl -- 7. The interplay between intrinsic motivation, financial incentives and nudges in sustainable consumption / Daniel Schwartz, Taciano L. Milfont and Denis Hilton -- 8. Behavioural mechanisms and (un)healthy dietary choices: a research agenda for better evidence / Jan M. Bauer and Lucia A. Reisch -- 9. Preventing wrongdoing and promoting ethical conduct: a regulatory focus approach to corporate ethical culture / Diana Stimmler and Carmen Tanner -- 10. The persistence of gender inequality in the workplace: still a long way to go? / Clara Kulich and Janine Bosak -- 11. Sharing economy / Barbara Hartl and Eva Hofmann -- 12. Basic income: insights from social experiments and simulations / Maximillian Sommer -- 13. Status quo and future research avenues of tax psychology / Katharina Gangl -- 14. Happiness and economic prosperity / Olga Stravrova and Simon Asbach -- Index.

Tax compliance by the wealthy is relevant not only because their contributions are essential to maintain public budgets and social equality, but because their (non)compliance behaviour and the perceived (un)fairness of their contributions can fuel social unrest. In this paper, after giving a brief history of taxing the wealthy, we review the existing theoretical, empirical and policy literature on their tax compliance. We discuss how and why the wealthy differ from less affluent taxpayers because of specific interrelated political, social and psychological conditions. Understanding the psychological mechanisms that determine the tax compliance of the wealthy can provide policy insights on how to better integrate the wealthy in the tax system. Therefore, the present review is also a starting point for new policy approaches to increase tax compliance and tax morale among the wealthy.

AbstractTax compliance by the wealthy is relevant not only because their contributions are essential to maintain public budgets and social equality, but because their (non)compliance behavior and the perceived (un)fairness of their contributions can fuel social unrest. In this article, after giving a brief history of taxing the wealthy, we review the existing theoretical, empirical, and policy literature on their tax compliance. We discuss how and why the wealthy differ from less affluent taxpayers because of specific interrelated political, social, and psychological conditions. Understanding the psychological mechanisms that determine the tax compliance of the wealthy can provide policy insights on how to better integrate the wealthy in the tax system. Therefore, the present review is also a starting point for new policy approaches to increase tax compliance and tax morale among the wealthy.

Tax compliance by the wealthy is relevant not only because their contributions are essential to maintain public budgets and social equality, but because their (non)compliance behavior and the perceived (un)fairness of their contributions can fuel social unrest. In this article, after giving a brief history of taxing the wealthy, we review the existing theoretical, empirical, and policy literature on their tax compliance. We discuss how and why the wealthy differ from less affluent taxpayers because of specific interrelated political, social, and psychological conditions. Understanding the psychological mechanisms that determine the tax compliance of the wealthy can provide policy insights on how to better integrate the wealthy in the tax system. Therefore, the present review is also a starting point for new policy approaches to increase tax compliance and tax morale among the wealthy. ; peerReviewed

Although it seems reasonable to assume that activating patriotism might motivate citizens to cooperate with the state in reaching societal goals, the empirical evidence supporting this contention is based mostly on correlational rather than experimental studies. In addition, little is known on whether patriotism can be manipulated without simultaneously triggering nationalism and on the psychological processes which determine the patriotism‐cooperation relation. This current article reports results of one survey and three experiments that manipulate patriotism by displaying either a national flag or national landscapes or by priming national achievements. The outcomes indicate that reported and manipulated patriotism indirectly increase tax compliance, although the national flag also increases nationalism. National achievements, on the other hand, seemingly increases trust in national public institutions and the voluntary motivation to cooperate, whereas national landscapes only increase the voluntary motivation to cooperate. Hence, it is possible to increase social capital in the form of trust and cooperation through patriotism without fostering nationalism as well.

Tax authorities utilize a wide range of instruments to motivate honest taxpaying ranging from strict audits to fair procedures or personalized support, differing from country to country. However, little is known about how these different instruments and taxpayers' trust influence the generation of interaction climates between tax authorities and taxpayers, motivations to comply, and particularly, tax compliance. The present research examines the extended slippery slope framework (eSSF), which distinguishes tax authorities' instruments into different qualities of power of authority (coercive and legitimate) and trust in authorities (reason-based and implicit), to shed light on the effect of differences between power and trust. We test eSSF assumptions with survey data from taxpayers from three culturally different countries (N = 700) who also vary concerning their perceptions of power, trust, interaction climates, and tax motivations. Results support assumptions of the eSSF. Across all countries, the relation of coercive power and tax compliance was mediated by implicit trust. The connection from legitimate power to tax compliance is partially mediated by reason-based trust. The relationship between implicit trust and tax compliance is mediated by a confidence climate and committed cooperation. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Both coercion, such as strict auditing and the use of fines, and legitimate procedures, such as assistance by tax authorities, are often discussed as means of enhancing tax compliance. However, the psychological mechanisms that determine the effectiveness of each strategy are not clear. Although highly relevant, there is rare empirical literature examining the effects of both strategies applied in combination. It is assumed that coercion decreases implicit trust in tax authorities, leading to the perception of a hostile antagonistic tax climate and enforced tax compliance. Conversely, it is suggested that legitimate power increases reason‐based trust in the tax authorities, leading to the perception of a service climate and eventually to voluntary cooperation. The combination of both strategies is assumed to cause greater levels of intended compliance than each strategy alone. We conducted two experimental studies with convenience samples of 261 taxpayers overall. The studies describe tax authorities as having low or high coercive power (e.g., imposing lenient or severe sanctions) and/or low or high legitimate power (e.g., having nontransparent or transparent procedures). Data analyses provide supportive evidence for the assumptions regarding the impact on intended tax compliance. Coercive power did not reduce implicit trust in tax authorities; however, it had an effect on reason‐based trust, interaction climate, and intended tax compliance if applied solely. When wielded in combination with legitimate power, it had no effect.

Previous research from the United States suggests that having voted for a losing-side candidate in presidential elections is associated with individual feelings of exclusion and social pain, reactions usually observed in interpersonal or small-group instances of exclusion. The current research replicates these findings for voters of losing-side parties in a field study on a real election in a European country (Austria; Study 1), demonstrating that findings hold within a different political system. Moreover, we add experimental support for the causal effect of electoral loss on feelings of exclusion and social pain reactions in a two-party (Study 2) and a multiparty context (Study 3). We further extend previous research by demonstrating that postelectoral need-threat likely translates into behavioral intentions on a societal level (Studies 1–3). The current findings add to an emerging line of research on the importance of individual feelings of exclusion in politics by integrating small-group research with macropolitical behavior.