Suchergebnisse

This study simulates three income tax scenarios in a Mirrleesian setting for 24 EU countries using data from the 2014 Structure of Earnings Survey. In scenario 1, each country individually maximizes its own welfare (benchmark). In scenarios 2 and 3, total welfare in the EU is maximized over a common budget constraint. Unlike scenario 2, the social planner of scenario 3 differentiates taxes by country of residence. If a common tax and transfer system were implemented in the EU, countries with a relatively higher mean wage rate—particularly those in Western and some of the Northern European countries—would transfer resources to the others. Scenario 2 implies increased labor distortions for almost all countries and, hence, leads to a contraction in total output. Scenario 3 produces higher (lower) marginal taxes for high- (low-) mean countries compared to the benchmark. The change in total output depends on the income effects on labor supply. Overall, total welfare is higher for the scenarios involving a European tax and transfer system despite more than two thirds of all the agents becoming worse off relative to the benchmark. A politically more feasible integrated tax system improves the well-being of almost half of all the EU but considerably reduces the aggregate welfare benefits.

Approximating the skill distribution via observed incomes is a central aspect of estimating the optimal redistributive taxes. Emerging economies may exhibit high minimum wage take-up rates, hiding some of the heterogeneity in skill distribution. This paper shows in the context of Turkey that accounting for the minimum wage policy when approximating skills considerably alters the estimates of optimal redistributive income taxes. Once the mass around the minimum wage is treated as left censored, the optimal tax scheme is significantly more redistributive in comparison to assuming no censoring. This is because allocating some of the mass around the minimum wage towards the lower parts of the skill distribution reduces the total skill stock and increases the standard deviation of the distribution. Consequently, the optimal marginal income taxes become higher, especially for the middle-skill group.

This paper studies the implications of an increase in the price of necessities, which disproportionally hurts the poor, for optimal income taxation. Our analyses show that, when the government is utilitarian and disutility from labor supply is linear, the optimal net nominal tax schedule is unchanged and the government expects households to supply more labor in order to secure their consumption expenditures. Quantitative analyses with convex disutility of labor supply reveal that, because of positive labor supply effects, keeping average tax rates constant suffices to optimally react to the asymmetric price shock. However, the poorest agents are expected to increase their labor supply the most. Thus, optimal income tax policy in response to asymmetric price changes does not prevent the disproportional decline in the indirect utility of poorer households.

Inflation ist ein Konstrukt. Sie wird von unterschiedlichen Akteur*innen unterschiedlich wahrgenommen. Zum Teil passiert dies, weil Warenkörbe differieren, zum Teil weil Erwartungen unterschiedlich gebildet werden. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die Heterogenität der Infl ation und ihrer Wahrnehmung und was dies für die Zielgröße der Zentralbankpolitik bedeutet.

Die EZB plant ebenso wie die US-amerikanische Federal Reserve, ihr Infl ationsziel leicht auf 2 % anzuheben und dies im Durchschnitt mehrerer Jahre zu erreichen. Tatsächlich liegt die Infl ationsrate aber trotz der sehr lockeren Geldpolitik deutlich unter 2 %. Werden die Maßnahmen gegen die Corona-Krise die Preissteigerung erhöhen? Während der Finanzkrise war es nicht dazu gekommen. Auch die derzeit erwartete Wirtschaftsentwicklung spricht nicht für hohe Preissteigerungen. Aber welche Rate sollte als Indikator für die "wahre" Infl ation gemessen werden? Sollten die Vermögenspreise berücksichtigt werden? Was spricht für den BIP-Defl ator, was für den Konsumentenpreisindex? Wie ist eine hedonische Qualitätsbereinigung zu bewerten? Über diese Fragen diskutieren die Teilnehmer*innen des Zeitgesprächs. ; The ECB is discussing how to raise its inflation target slightly to 2 %, just as the US Federal Reserve is raising it slightly and aiming to achieve it over several years on average. In reality, however, the inflation rate is well below 2 % despite the very relaxed monetary policy. Will the measures against the corona crisis increase the inflation rate? This did not happen during the financial crisis despite the increase in the money supply. Even current economic developments do not explain the high price increases. So what rate should be measured as an indicator of "true" inflation? Should asset prices be taken into account? What about the GDP deflator, or the consumer price index? How should a hedonic quality adjustment be assessed? These are the questions that Zeitgespräch participants will discuss.

Inflation ist ein Konstrukt. Sie wird von unterschiedlichen Akteuren unterschiedlich wahrgenommen. Zum Teil passiert dies, weil Warenkörbe differieren, zum Teil weil Erwartungen unterschiedlich gebildet werden. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die Heterogenität der Inflation und ihrer Wahrnehmung und was dies für die Zielgröße der Zentralbankpolitik bedeutet.

Inflation ist ein Konstrukt. Sie wird von unterschiedlichen Akteuren unterschiedlich wahrgenommen. Zum Teil passiert dies, weil Warenkörbe differieren, zum Teil weil Erwartungen unterschiedlich gebildet werden. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die Heterogenität der Inflation und ihrer Wahrnehmung und was dies für die Zielgröße der Zentralbankpolitik bedeutet.

This paper studies the distributional consequences of a systematic variation in expenditure shares and prices. Using European Union Household Budget Surveys and Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices data, we construct household-specific price indices and reveal the existence of a pro-rich inflation in Europe. Particularly, over the period 2001-15, the consumption bundles of the poorest deciles in 25 European countries have, on average, become 10.5 percentage points more expensive than those of the richest decile. We find that ignoring the differential inflation across the distribution underestimates the change in the Gini (based on consumption expenditure) by up to 0.03 points. Cross-country heterogeneity in this change is large enough to alter the inequality ranking of numerous countries. The average inflation effect we detect is almost as large as the change in the standard Gini measure over the period of interest.

This paper studies the distributional consequences of a systematic variation in expenditure shares and prices. Using European Union Household Budget Surveys and Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices data, we construct household-specific price indices and reveal the existence of a pro-rich inflation in Europe. Particularly, over the period 2001-15, the consumption bundles of the poorest deciles in 25 European countries have, on average, become 10.5 percentage points more expensive than those of the richest decile. We find that ignoring the differential inflation across the distribution underestimates the change in the Gini (based on consumption expenditure) by up to 0.03 points. Cross-country heterogeneity in this change is large enough to alter the inequality ranking of numerous countries. The average inflation effect we detect is almost as large as the change in the standard Gini measure over the period of interest.

This paper studies the distributional consequences of a systematic variation in expenditure shares and prices. Using European Union Household Budget Surveys and Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices data, we construct household-specific price indices and reveal the existence of a pro-rich inflation in Europe. Particularly, over the period 2001-15, the consumption bundles of the poorest deciles in 25 European countries have, on average, become 10.5 percentage points more expensive than those of the richest decile. We find that ignoring the differential inflation across the distribution underestimates the change in the Gini (based on consumption expenditure) by up to 0.03 points. Cross-country heterogeneity in this change is large enough to alter the inequality ranking of numerous countries. The average inflation effect we detect is almost as large as the change in the standard Gini measure over the period of interest.