Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Tables -- List of Figures -- List of Abbreviations -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation in the Southern Cone -- Chapter Three: Systemic Incentives, Domestic Constraints, and Regional Cooperation -- Chapter Four: The Automobile Sector Crisis -- Chapter Five: The Footwear Industry Dispute -- Chapter Six: Failure to Relaunch -- Chapter Seven: A Narrow Escape -- Chapter Eight: Conclusions -- Appendix A -- Appendix B -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index

AbstractOver the last decade, Mexico has gone from being a major source of immigrants to an important transit and destination country for asylum seekers and migrants from Central and South America. When President Andrés Manuel López Obrador took office in December 2018, he pledged to implement a migration policy that prioritized humanitarian protection and honored Mexico's international and national human rights commitments. To what extent have these goals been achieved? In this article, I rely on a variety of sources to document the widening gap between Mexico's legal and stated commitments to the protection of migrants' rights and their implementation. I argue that there are both external and domestic constraints that hinder the implementation of human rights commitments and contribute to the migrant protection gap in Mexico. First, Mexican migration and humanitarian goals are inevitably shaped by the pervasive asymmetry characterizing relations with the United States. Second, capacity problems and domestic political tensions have undermined the Mexican government's ability to protect the safety of migrants. Meanwhile, the Mexican case is useful to highlight the sometimes neglected but important role of transnational nongovernmental and international organizations in filling the protection gap by providing support to host country governments and offering complementary protection to migrants.

What are the consequences of increasing regime complexity and institutional proliferation on global governance? Does the growing density and overlaps among institutions facilitate or hinder the ability of states to manage transnational threats through cooperation? This article argues that the impact of regime complexity on the effectiveness of cooperation depends not only on the nature of spillovers among overlapping regimes, but also on the cross-institutional strategies of states and non-state actors. I distinguish between two types of strategies through which actors can take advantage of institutional overlaps: (1) "opportunistic" or non-cooperative attempts by states to bypass legal commitments, which tend to undermine the goals of cooperation; and (2) "cooperative" strategies by intergovernmental organizations, civil society organizations, and other principled actors. These actors also engage in regime shifting, forum linking, and other cross-forum strategies to promote their institutional mandates and normative agendas. To probe the plausibility of these theoretical claims, I focus on the case of the anti-trafficking in persons regime. The overlaps between anti-trafficking laws and the migration, labor, and human rights regimes illustrate the different ways in which intergovernmental organizations and their allies in society can exploit institutional overlaps to promote greater cooperation and expand the regime complex.

La proliferación de acuerdos de cooperación que se superponen (overlapping) y de organizaciones, y la densidad en los regímenes internacionales que de ahí resulta, conducen a la discusión sobre las consecuencias de la creciente complejidad de régimen sobre la política y la efectividad de la gobernanza global. Este artículo analiza si la superposición y la interacción entre varias instituciones en el área de un solo tema afectan la complejidad de los regímenes o las metas de la cooperación internacional. Se discute evidencia empírica sobre la presencia y relevancia de algunos de estos mecanismos en Latinoamérica. Se observa que la dinámica competitiva entre Estados y regímenes con visiones y objetivos divergentes quebranta la cohesión y la solidaridad regionales.