Suchergebnisse

"Es wird gelegentlich behauptet, daß der Kapitalbedarf einer arbeiterverwalteten Unternehmung auf effiziente Weise durch einbehaltene Löhne finanziert werden könne, wenn nur den Mitgliedern des Kollektivs gewisse Eigentumsrechte an der Unternehmung eingeräumt würden. Insbesondere wurde vorgeschlagen, daß jeder Arbeiter-Investor Ansprüche auf den Einkommensstrom der Unternehmung erhält und daß ihm erlaubt wird, diese Ansprüche an Dritte (oder an das Kollektiv) zu verkaufen, wenn er die Unternehmung verläßt. Solche handelbaren Ansprüche werden als Analogon zu handelbaren Unternehmensanteilen angesehen, und es wird erwartet, daß sie bei Arbeiterselbstverwaltung vergleichbare Effizienzvorteile bewirken. Im vorliegenden Artikel wird dagegen argumentiert, daß dieser Plan nicht funktionsfähig ist, wenn die grundlegenden Ziele der Arbeiterselbstverwaltung verwirklicht werden sollen. In der Praxis kann das Hauptziel, eine effiziente Faktorallokation zu fördern, durch handelbare Ansprüche nicht erreicht werden. Insbesondere wird die Verteilung der Investitionen verzerrt sein. Der Ertrag eines eigenfinanzierten Investitionsprojektes einer selbstverwalteten Unternehmung muß höher sein als der Ertrag einer vergleichbaren Investition einer konventionellen kapitalistischen Unternehmung, wenn die beiden Anlagemöglichkeiten gleich attraktiv sein sollen. Eine vollständige Beschränkung auf eigenfinanzierte Investitionen muß daher zu suboptimalen Ergebnissen führen; zu erwarten ist ein relativer Rückgang der Investition und ein langsameres Wachstum der arbeiterverwalteten Unternehmung." (Autorenreferat)

The initial objective of the paper is to describe the way in which the term 'New Institutional Economics' (NIE) emerged in the literature and became the designation for a new field concerned with the study of various analytical techniques designed for the exploration of institutional phenomena. It is then shown how some of the more important of these techniques, transaction‐cost economics, property‐rights analysis and contract theory, have been applied in two central lines of neoinstitutional thought – the Williamsonian and the Northian. Criticisms of these two disparate theoretical positions on the NIE are considered and assessed. Next, a brief review of some of the empirical literature is undertaken so that the explanatory powers of NIE themes can be gauged. Finally, the paper offers a few general remarks on the present state of the NIE and its possible influence on the further development of economics.

An exploration of how two types of groups positively & negatively affect innovation-driven economic growth -- one through coordinated private market activities, & the other through political processes or collusive actions. The reciprocal effects of growth on the groups that affect it are examined to determine if those groups contributing to growth will have stronger or weaker impacts than those that retard economic progress. This question is examined first in context of an isolated economy, & then in a broader competitive context, where innovation is affected by spillover effects on supplies, trade restrictions, & migration opportunities, & where politcal entities vie for mobile resources. In this environment, innovations occurring in one economy can shift economic relationships in others. A global, increasingly positive net effect of the groups impacting economic progress is predicted. In Group Behavior and Economic Growth: Some Questions, Eirik G. Furubotn (U of Texas, Arlington) commends the general discussion of coalitions but criticizes the conclusions drawn. The use of intuitive judgment rather than explicit argument is criticized. The growth phenomena is too selective & implies indefinite acceleration, & no alternative models are presented of how social behaviors affect it. In Group Behavior and Economic Growth: A Reply, Hoenack counters these criticisms, defending his study of institutional constraints on economic growth, & describing the alternative explanations the paper does indeed present. 45 References. C. Grindle

Eirik Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich — Institutional Structure, Economie Incentives and the Yugoslav Firm.
The Yugoslav economic system of the seventies has evolved as a result of the governement's persistent search for new and more desirable institutional arrangements. While the process of change has gone forward largely by trial and error, the general objective has always been to find organizational forms that permit economic efficiency and incentives for innovation to exist in a socialist environment where private property rights in capital goods are effectively precluded. Particularly after the important reform of 1965, emphasis has been on economic decentralization and the creation of a system in which individual workers and consumers have substantial decision making power.
As the broad trend of economic reform has unfolded in Yugoslavia, there has developed, at another level, a set of concepts and technical tools required for the practical operation of the system. Of these, the notion of Dohodak, or net product, is of special significance to economists. What makes Dohodak important is that the analysis of the firm's net product, including consideration of the rules for its formation and distribution, represents a powerful means for examining the actual functioning of the Yugoslav economy. In general, any alteration in the legal structure under which the Yugoslav firm operates will tend to influence the size and allocation of net product and, hence, the pattern of economic rewards. Then, insofar as individuals are motivated by self-interest, incentives and behavior will be affected in turn. Each act of institutional reorganization implies a set of corresponding changes in the amount and type of output produced by the firm, the rate and direction of the firm's growth, the extend and quality of effort supplied by the labor force, etc.
The central premise of the study is that the regulations surrounding the formation and distribution of the firm's net product serve to define the effective economic choices open to the collective. Specifically, by considering the factors that affect Dohodak, it becomes possible to gain basic understanding of: (i) the nature of the legal and institutionnal constraints imposed on decision makers, (ii) the range of objectives that can be pursued by Yugoslav enterprises, and (iii) the probable causes of economic problems in a labor-managed economy of the Yugoslav type. In developing these themes, the evolution of the concept of Dohodak is traced over a number of historical periods since 1946. The paper then proceds to a discussion of the formation of the net product, of the firm, the analysis of legal and contractual obligations paid from the firms net product, and the consideration of internal distribution of net product between the Wage Fund and other funds. In the final section, some general remarks are made concerning the relation between Yugoslav economic organization and efficiency.

The Soviet Manager and Innovation : A Behavioral Model.
The objective of this paper is to employ the utility approach and formulate an optimization model that is capable of explaining the observed behavior of the Soviet firm. The analysis concentrates on some utility maximizing policy adjustments consistent with the special set of institutional constraints under which the Soviet manager is forced to operate. It points the way to better understanding of the possible patterns of managerial behavior, permits greater insight into the operation of business firms in the Soviet Union and yields some original results.
The model developed in this paper shows that, despite the constraints established by the central production plan, the Soviet manager is able to secure a set of opportunity choices with respect to the firm's output — inventory policy. In fact, the manager's ability to create and then preserve that range of opportunity choices turns out to be his major survival requirement in the Soviet system.
The analysis shows that, under static conditions where the set of institutional and technical parameters is fixed, the range of the Soviet manager's policy options necessarily diminishes over time and choice must ultimately disappear. The utility-maximizing manager has, therefore, strong incentive to change his economic environment and, in the process, renew his set of opportunity choices. A way to achieve such renewal is via cost-saving innovations. 'The paper argues that, contrary to the conclusions of most authors, the Soviet system has a built-in incentive for the manager to search for cost-saving improvements, provided the manager can choose the rate which the effects of these improvements are made known to the state. It is the Soviet manager's ability to innovate and conceal the full effects of the innovations from the state that determines his capacity to survive. The existence of this innovative potential is important, of course, because it helps to explain how the Soviet economy can experience some economic advances in an environment which is ridden with waste and inefficiencies.

Hauptbeschreibung: Die vierte Auflage bringt außer der üblichen Aufdatierung der Literatur und einer Erweiterung in Richtung ""Neue Institutionenökonomik der Finanzwirtschaft"" eine wichtige Klarstellung: Die neue Institutionenökonomik ist etwas grundlegend anderes als eine um Transaktionskosten ergänzte Mikroökonomik. Sie ist ein neuer Denkstil, der außer den vielzitierten Transaktionskosten die Tatsachen unvollständiger Voraussicht und eingeschränkter Rationalität berücksichtigt. Institutionen sind danach soziale Werkzeuge, mit deren Hilfe die Menschen bei der Verfolgung ihrer Ziele unter Ber