Suchergebnisse

The United Nations has made a vital contribution to economic intelligence and analysis through the publications of its Bureau of Economic Affairs as well as those of its regional commissions. The prestige of its professional staff is so high that their pronouncements find a respectful audience all over the world. This well-merited recognition, however, burdens the staff with heavy responsibilities. An academic economist may well indulge in political advice or economic forecasting, even though proficiency in economic theory guarantees neither sound political judgment nor the possession of prophetic gifts. It is different with staff members of a public agency, and especially with those of one of the foremost international institutions. Any advice they give should be based on generally accepted theories and values rather than on controversial hypotheses or partisan opinions. And, since they are as unable to foresee the future as other human beings, they should withstand the temptation to make predictions.

The exhausted countries of Western Europe started reconstruction after the Second World War with productive facilities hardly sufficient to provide for current subsistence needs, and with gold and foreign-exchange reserves, foreign investments, and export capacities greatly reduced. Many—though by no means all—of the lacking goods could best be obtained from the United States, and recovery would have been long delayed without United States aid. To the superficial observer the existence of a "dollar problem" was thus proved beyond doubt. Actually, these countries did not just lack dollars, but were short of factors of production and lacked a surplus of goods and services with which to expand those factors.