Multi-province comparisons of digital financial inclusion performance in China: A group ranking method with preference analysis
In: China economic review, Band 80, S. 102014
ISSN: 1043-951X
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In: China economic review, Band 80, S. 102014
ISSN: 1043-951X
In: Asia Pacific journal of marketing and logistics, Band 25, Heft 4, S. 695-714
ISSN: 1758-4248
Purpose
– The purpose of this paper is twofold: to investigate performance of both manufacturer-owned channel and traditional retail channel when the manufacturer encroaches upon the traditional channel in different forms (brick-and-mortar and online form) under different market structures (Stackelberg and Bertrand). To examine the effect of acceptance of the online channel and travel cost on profits of two channels.
Design/methodology/approach
– The Hotelling model is employed to depict consumers
'
channel choice behavior, where the consumer surplus captures travel cost, spatial distance and consumer heterogeneity in acceptance of the online channel. A game-theoretical framework is developed to determine the optimal encroachment form and market structure for both manufacturer-owned and traditional retail channels.
Findings
– This paper finds that, in either form of encroachment, Stackelberg market structure always outperforms Bertrand market structure, and channel choice significantly relies on parameters, i.e. consumer acceptance of the online channel and travel cost. Moreover, a Pareto zone is proposed in which both channels consider the strategy that the manufacturer opens bricks-and-mortar channel under Stackelberg market structure as the optimal strategy.
Originality/value
– The present work fills a theoretical and practical gap for a structured analysis of the channel performance when the manufacturer encroaches upon the incumbent retail channel in different forms and under different market structure.
In: Routledge advances in risk management, 12
In: RIBAF-D-24-00155
SSRN
In: CAIE-D-23-02734
SSRN
In: Corporate social responsibility and environmental management, Band 31, Heft 6, S. 6318-6334
ISSN: 1535-3966
AbstractEnvironmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure has drawn much attention from listed companies, investors, and regulators. In response to the increasing demand of investors and regulators for non‐financial information, listed companies have paid attention to publishing ESG reports consisting of environmental, social, and governance information. Listed companies are increasingly required to provide high‐quality information that is clear and comparable. However, the lack of incentive to listed companies makes it hard to improve the quality of ESG disclosure, and the cost of ESG disclosure leads to the uncontrollable quality of ESG reports and may even manipulation by opportunistic behaviors. In this paper, we illustrate the moral hazard problem in ESG disclosure from the perspective of investors and listed companies, in which the effort level for listed companies to provide high‐quality ESG report cannot be observed by investors. Then we propose a blockchain‐based incentive mechanism for ESG disclosure from a principal‐agent perspective to improve the information quality of ESG disclosure, where investors act as principal and listed companies act as agents. Token in blockchain technology is utilized as the rewards to improve the listed companies' reputation, thus increasing their chance of being promoted to investors for preferential investment opportunities in the blockchain platform. We then design the first‐best (FB) and second‐best (SB) optimal contracts based on classic principal‐agent model to overcome the moral hazard problem. Extensive simulations are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness and feasibility of the incentive mechanism.