Suchergebnisse

Proliferation of biological—as well as chemical and nuclear—weapons is a threat to the security of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. The number of states with biological weapons (BW) programs or with a strong interest in having a BW program has increased significantly since the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed in 1972 (Office of Technology Assessment, 1993). BW programs present difficult intelligence targets. Thus, the Soviet Union was a signatory to the BWC at the time of the Sverdlovsk incident in 1979, yet we knew little of the scope of its BW program until 1991 (Meselson et al., 1994). The spread of biotechnology throughout the world in recent years has made even more governments potentially BW capable.

The human and economic toll of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and the unknowns regarding the origins of the virus, with a backdrop of enormous advances in technologies and human understanding of molecular virology, have raised global concerns about the safety of the legitimate infectious disease research enterprise. We acknowledge the safety and security risks resulting from the broad availability of tools and knowledge, tools and knowledge that can be exploited equally for good or harm. The last 2 decades have shown us that the risks are real. They have also shown us that more traditional top-down regulations alone are not the answer. We encourage government to be thoughtful and nuanced in dealing with this significant challenge and to carefully consider human factors and the important role of organizational-level leadership before simply layering an additional bureaucratic burden on the enterprise without understanding value and cost.