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"The book explores the impact of manuscript remarks during the year 1929 on the development of Wittgenstein's thought. Although its intention is to put the focus specifically on the manuscripts, the book is not purely exegetical. The contributors generate important new insights for understanding Wittgenstein's philosophy and his place in the history of analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein's writings from the years 1929-1930 are valuable, not simply because they marked Wittgenstein's return to academic philosophy after a seven-year absence, but because these works indicate several changes in his philosophical thinking. The chapters in this volume clarify the significance of Wittgenstein's return to philosophy in 1929. In Part 1, the contributors address different issues in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g. Wittgenstein's understanding of certain aspects of intuitionism and his commitment to verificationism, as well as his idea of "a new system". Part 2 examines Wittgenstein's philosophical development and his understanding of philosophical method. Here the contributors examine particular problems Wittgenstein dealt with in 1929, e.g. the colour-exclusion problem, and the use of thought experiments as well as his relationship to Frank Ramsey and philosophical pragmatism. Part 3 features essays on phenomenological language. These chapters address the role of spatial analogies and the structure of visual space. Finally, Part 4 includes one chapter on Wittgenstein's few manuscript remarks about ethics and religion and relates it to his Lecture on Ethics. Wittgenstein's Philosophy in 1929 will be of great interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein and the history of analytic philosophy"--

"The book explores the impact of manuscript remarks during the year 1929 on the development of Wittgenstein's thought. Although its intention is to put the focus specifically on the manuscripts, the book is not purely exegetical. The contributors generate important new insights for understanding Wittgenstein's philosophy and his place in the history of analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein's writings from the years 1929-1930 are valuable, not simply because they marked Wittgenstein's return to academic philosophy after a seven-year absence, but because these works indicate several changes in his philosophical thinking. The chapters in this volume clarify the significance of Wittgenstein's return to philosophy in 1929. In Part 1, the contributors address different issues in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g. Wittgenstein's understanding of certain aspects of intuitionism and his commitment to verificationism, as well as his idea of "a new system". Part 2 examines Wittgenstein's philosophical development and his understanding of philosophical method. Here the contributors examine particular problems Wittgenstein dealt with in 1929, e.g. the colour-exclusion problem, and the use of thought experiments as well as his relationship to Frank Ramsey and philosophical pragmatism. Part 3 features essays on phenomenological language. These chapters address the role of spatial analogies and the structure of visual space. Finally, Part 4 includes one chapter on Wittgenstein's few manuscript remarks about ethics and religion and relates it to his Lecture on Ethics. Wittgenstein's Philosophy in 1929 will be of great interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein and the history of analytic philosophy"--

Abstract
In the sparse literature that is concerned with Wittgenstein's views regarding children and childhood, in his later work, it is often suggested that Wittgenstein presents, or at least is committed to, a romantic notion of the child according to which children should be conceived of as innocent beings who are ontologically different from adults. In this paper I argue that Wittgenstein's remarks do not support such an interpretation. First, I investigate the arguments for this view presented by Stanley Cavell, Yasushi Maruyama, and Philip Shields. Second, I consider an anti-essentialist understanding of Wittgenstein's concept of childhood that has been suggested in opposition to the treatment of the child as the 'ontological other' and argue that Wittgenstein refers to the child as intermediate link with which to state grammatical facts. In contrast to these various views, I hold, third, that the PI is committed to a strong and substantial concept of childhood. I argue for this claim on the basis of (i) the 'Motto' of the PI; (ii) Wittgenstein's reference to the philosopher Augustine; and (iii) the use of 'primitive'. I conclude that Wittgenstein's concept of childhood in his later works neither romanticises nor dispraises the child as the 'ontological other'.

AbstractLogical Holism and Wittgenstein's 'Practical Turn'. – Logical holism is the idea that each elementary proposition belongs to a system and is logically connected to other propositions of that system. In this paper I explore this idea and draw its connections to the nature of negative propositions and the 'problem of recognition' on the basis of Wittgenstein'sNachlass.In the first section I argue that in January 1930 the idea leads Wittgenstein to a better understanding of how the negative feature is expressed in propositions, thereby raising the problem of recognition to which he is not yet able to find a proper solution. In the second section I explore how the problem still persists during Wittgenstein's 'practical turn'. What he now calls the 'problem of representation' forces him to change again his conception of propositions. In the final section I argue that this change is mainly due to the modification of his conception of hypotheses which urges a solution to the problem of representation, though the problem remains unsolved in January 1930.