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Have Democratic and Republican presidents used force more often than members of the other party under some circumstances during the postwar era? This article presents evidence that unemployment and inflation produce differences in the likelihood of a diversionary use of force by presidents from different parties. Because Republicans are more reluctant than Democrats to use potentially inflationary macroeconomic policies to reduce unemployment, they are more likely to use military force than Democratic presidents when unemployment is high. One the other hand, because Democrats are reluctant to employ macroeconomic policies that might control inflation at the cost of increased unemployment, they are more likely to use military force than Republicans when facing high inflation.

"Using a statistical analysis of the economic sources of support and opposition to the Truman administration's foreign policy and a historical account of the crucial period between the summer of 1949 and the winter of 1951, Fordham integrates the political struggle over NSC 68, the decision to intervene in the Korean War, and congressional debates over the Fair Deal, McCarthyism, and military spending. The Truman administration's policy was politically successful not only because it appealed to internationally oriented sectors of the U.S. economy, but also because it was linked to domestic policies favored by domestically oriented, labor-sensitive sectors that would otherwise have opposed it." "This interpretation of Cold War foreign policy will appeal to political scientists and historians concerned with the origins of the Cold War, American social welfare policy, McCarthyism, and the Korean War. The theoretical argument that Fordham advances will be of interest broadly to scholars of U.S. foreign policy, American politics, and international relations theory."--Jacket

This essay examines the relationship between history and the quantitative study of international conflict. The usual distinction between these two pursuits does not hold up to close scrutiny. In fact, both research communities are in the business of using theory to explain social processes that occur within historical bounds. Making these historical bounds explicit is an appropriate response to the nature of our subject matter. Doing so also has some important advantages, including more precise theory, higher quality data, better model specification, and the potential to help explain important historical events.

This essay examines the relationship between history and the quantitative study of international conflict. The usual distinction between these two pursuits does not hold up to close scrutiny. In fact, both research communities are in the business of using theory to explain social processes that occur within historical bounds. Making these historical bounds explicit is an appropriate response to the nature of our subject matter. Doing so also has some important advantages, including more precise theory, higher quality data, better model specification, and the potential to help explain important historical events.

AbstractThe United States' 1890–91 decision to begin building a battleship fleet, an important point in its development as a world power, can illuminate the domestic sources of foreign policy ambition. An analysis of roll-call votes in the House of Representatives indicates that socioeconomic divisions arising from industrialization strongly influenced support and opposition to the battleship fleet. This relationship worked mainly through trade policy interests: members of Congress from import-competing states tended to support the effort, while those from export-oriented states tended to oppose it. The patriotic symbolism of battleships at a time of labor unrest also helped motivate support for the program, though evidence of this pattern is less conclusive. Although party affiliation was crucial, it was also partly a function of economic structure, which shaped the two parties' electoral fortunes. The impact of trade interests during this period is a mirror image of what previous research has found concerning the post-World War II era, when export-oriented interests tended to support American global activism and import-competing interests to oppose it. The reason for the difference is the Republican Party's commitment to trade protection, which strongly influenced both the goals of the policy and the identity of its supporters.

Between 1890 and 1914, the United States acquired overseas colonies, built a battleship fleet, and intervened increasingly often in Latin America and East Asia. This activism is often seen as the precursor to the country's role as a superpower after 1945 but actually served very different goals. In contrast to its pursuit of a relatively liberal international economic order after 1945, the United States remained committed to trade protection before 1914. Protectionism had several important consequences for American foreign policy on both economic and security issues. It led to a focus on less developed areas of the world that would not export manufactured goods to the United States instead of on wealthier European markets. It limited the tactics available for promoting American exports, forcing policymakers to seek exclusive bilateral agreements or unilateral concessions from trading partners instead of multilateral arrangements. It inhibited political cooperation with other major powers and implied an aggressive posture toward these states. The differences between this foreign policy and the one the United States adopted after 1945 underscore the critical importance not just of the search for overseas markets but also of efforts to protect the domestic market.

"More Than Mixed Results: What We Have Learned From Quantitative Research on the Diversionary Hypothesis" published on by Oxford University Press.

Some states define their interests more broadly than others, looking beyond their immediate security and mobilizing their national wealth in pursuit of more ambitious goals. The most successful of these states come to be seen by others as major powers. Though major powers and states aspiring to attain this status are very important in world politics, relatively little explicit attention has been paid to the question of why some states expand their foreign policy ambitions, adopting what can be termed a major-power foreign policy. This article evaluates three explanations for this policy choice. Some international relations theory claims that potential power is itself a sufficient motivation for the adoption of major-power foreign policy. Other theorists suggest that some triggering condition is required, such as increasing international threat or expanding international economic interests. Evidence concerning the construction of military capabilities and diplomatic activism indicates that potential power alone does not offer a sufficient explanation for the adoption of major-power foreign policy. Both international threats and economic interests act as triggers for this choice, though they appear to push states toward different types of mobilization.