Suchergebnisse

Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Polytheism and Economics -- Part I The Beginnings -- 2 Greeks and Romans: The Religions Without Professional Priests -- 3 Celts and Germans: The Elusive Religions -- 4 Indians and Iranians: The Priestly Religions -- Part II The Endings -- 5 Extinction: Polytheism Unreformed -- 6 Death and Rebirth: Polytheism Reformed -- Part III The Economics -- 7 Economic Analysis: From Typology to Outcomes -- 8 Economic Models: Gods, Supplicants, and Priests -- 9 Conclusions -- References -- Index.

The participation of women in armed insurgencies calls into question a widespread belief that women are inherently more peace loving than men on account of their hard-wired caring disposition. To explain why women engage in political violence, existing research either ignores the fundamental collective action problem involved because of motivations focused on the value of the cause, or looks for selective incentives in the form of loot and appropriation, which often cannot be found. This paper offers a simple gendered model of the supply of violence that can account for both peaceful and violent choices and make sense of the apparent extremism of some choices as rational, not fanatical behaviour. Crucially, it regards the individual reward for violence as not material gain, but the possibility of women of breaking out of the cage of traditional gender roles and making a statement by their deeds, thereby joining a cult of heroes and martyrs. For evidence, we turn to the extraordinary involvement of women in the Russian revolutionary movement leading up to the 1917 revolution.

AbstractThe prophet Zoroaster founded the first monotheistic religion in history, which once rose to great imperial status and still survives unchanged today despite centuries of Muslim pressure. Unlike the founders of other monotheistic religions after him, he achieved this not through the overthrow of the original Iranian polytheism but through its deep reform—a strategy that made acceptance easier and ensured a continuing role for the priests. Monotheistic reform is thus a third way out of ancient Indo-European polytheism, besides extinction in the Greco-Roman case and mutation into sectarian theism in the Indian case. This paper surveys the Iranian story and offers two economic models to account for the two key factors that made the transition to monotheism possible: the theological structure and the role of the priesthood.

AbstractFor some 25 years in revolutionary Haiti, most of the productive land was nationalized and run as state property. This paper shows that this economic system can be accurately described as agrarian socialism. Its life and death are compared with the experiences of 20th-century socialist regimes and their transition to a market economy, paying special attention to the kindred case of São Tomé. Haitian socialism is interesting because it was the unintended, accidental product of an emergency situation: the killing or flight of all the French landlords, which made their land vacant property and drove the state to run it in the public interest to defend the revolution. Therefore, it can be read as a natural experiment in socialism in the absence of a socialist ideology and of a socialist party that could hold the system together, constrain its income distribution, and control its eventual privatization.

This article models the birth of a new religion from the ashes of apocalyptic prophecy. Christianity started around the imminent expectation of God's Kingdom. Followers forsook worldly opportunities to prepare for the event. As the Kingdom's arrival tarried, they found themselves "trapped" because those sacrifices—like transaction-specific investments—were wasted if they dropped out. This provided incentives to stay and transform the faith. Such effort, enhanced by reaction to the cognitive dissonance caused by prophecy failure, turned an apocalyptic movement into an established church. A survey of other apocalyptic groups confirms that dropout costs are critical to explaining outcomes.

SummaryThis paper sets forth a theory of competition between exclusive religions as an entry deterrence game, in which the incumbent may find it profitable not to accommodate but to deter the competitor's entry by precommitting to sufficient capacity expansion in the event of entry. If entry costs are high enough, deterrence is optimal and the incumbent remains a monopolist, although the entry threat distorts its effort upward. The model is then used to explain the Jews' withdrawal from proselytism in the face of Christian competition in the first century CE. We review the historical evidence on conversion to Judaism before and after the first century and argue that the demise of Jewish proselytism was due not to the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE but to the apostle Paul's strategic decision, in his letter to the Galatians, that Gentiles need not convert to Judaism to become Christians.

AbstractThis article sets forth a theory of competition between exclusive religions as an entry deterrence game, in which the incumbent may find it profitable not to accommodate but to deter the competitor's entry by precommitting to sufficient capacity expansion in the event of entry. If entry costs are high enough, deterrence is optimal and the incumbent remains a monopolist, although the entry threat distorts its effort upward. The model is then applied to the Catholic Church's reaction to the Protestant Reformation. It is argued that the model provides a better fit to the historical data of the Counter‐Reformation than the price‐cutting model proposed by economists Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison (, ).