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AbstractGovernments and public bodies have been fostering the development of e‐Government services during the last decade, promoting more and better administrative services through digital channels. The impact of this process, however, has not been fully assessed. This article investigates the relative impact of two key factors on the diffusion of e‐Government services; the level of Internet penetration and investment by governments in more and better government services. The aim is to analyze across European countries the impact of e‐Government policies on their adoption, under different levels of Internet penetration, enabling an assessment of how promotion of e‐Government (through investment in more and better services, for example) can have the maximum impact on citizenship adoption. It reports analysis of a cross‐sectional dataset of European countries using a Bayesian linear model. Results show that when Internet users are scarce, policies to foster e‐Government adoption will have little ‐ although not negligible ‐ impact. But at a certain level of Internet penetration, focused e‐Government policies have a substantial impact on citizens' adoption of the technology. The results also highlight the importance of investing in e‐Government in the appropriate moment, that is, when its impact can be greatest. The paper, then, addresses the factors that make eGovernment policy more effective. The Bayesian inference used allows the research to avoid artificial assumptions common in comparative politics research, to design more flexible models and to present the results in a more natural way.

In Latin America, the legalization of drugs—where it occurred—has been driven mainly by elites, although much attention has been placed on public opinion. Considering that efforts toward legalization have been top-down, analysis should concentrate on opinions of the governing elites. To undertake such an analysis, we draw on data from surveys conducted in 18 Latin American parliaments (2012–2018), and we examine elite perspectives on the legalization of all drugs. Results from a Bayesian hierarchical logistic analysis show that in countries where the government is less effective, and where public health problems persist, legislators are less likely to support legalization. We argue that this is due to a lack of trust by MPs in legalization as a solution to trafficking. Wherever those concerned with drug trafficking see the current government as problematic, they will be less likely to support so challenging and complex a policy as drug legalization.

AbstractThis article analyses the role of political parties in policy accumulation. We study this relationship in the area of social policy. Our analysis builds on a large data set covering the size of policy portfolios (policy targets and instruments) in three subfields of social policy for 22 OECD countries over 30 years. We find that the probability of social policy accumulation is not affected by the government's ideological position. Left governments do not produce more extensive social policy portfolios than right ones. Yet, this striking result does not contradict governments' political ideologies, as left and right parties accumulate for different reasons. While left parties address new social policy targets to broaden the scope of the welfare state, right parties adopt new policy instruments to condition social benefits. These findings hold regardless of how we measure governments' ideological position and despite strong endogenous policy growth dynamics, that is, countries with greater policy portfolios also display higher levels of policy accumulation. Our findings indicate that party political considerations can explain the reasons for but not the level of policy accumulation. Changes in government are thus unlikely to stall or slow down the constant accumulation of public policies.

This article is a first attempt to systematically examine policy design and its influence on policy effectiveness in a comparative perspective. We begin by providing a novel concept and measure of policy design. Our Average Instrument Diversity (AID) index captures whether governments tend to reuse the same policy instruments and instrument combinations or produce policy solutions that are carefully tailored to the policy problem at hand. Second, we demonstrate that our AID index is a valid and reliable measure of policy design quality with a strong explanatory power for the outcome variables tested. Analyzing the composition of environmental policy portfolios in 21 OECD countries, we show that higher levels of AID are positively associated with a country's policy effectiveness in environmental matters. Based on this finding, we analyze, in a third step, the factors that lead countries to adopt more or less diverse policy portfolios. We find that the policy design quality is significantly improved when policy makers are not bound by high institutional constraints and, more importantly, are backed by well-equipped bureaucracies.

In this article, we assess the changing role of the European Commission in EU environmental policy. In line with organizational theory, we expect organizational hypocrisy, namely a decoupling of talk, decisions, and actions, to characterize the Commission's behaviour in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis. We analyse the extent to which the Commission (1) promotes environmental matters and concepts in press releases and public statements; (2) proposes new and stricter environmental policy changes; and (3) takes action against member states in cases of non‐compliance between the years 2000 and 2016. Our empirical analysis reveals that the Commission has indeed moved towards a pattern of hypocritical policy entrepreneurship in the post‐crisis period. We argue that the decoupling of talk, decision, and action allows the European Commission to keep up its reputation as an environmental policy entrepreneur while, at the same, satisfying member states' preference for economic recovery and less environmental regulation.

AbstractState structures have experienced significant transformation with the spread of globalization. This paper examines how to measure one major change that has occurred in recent decades: the worldwide proliferation of public agencies with regulatory tasks. It remains unclear how their configurations vary across countries and sectors, and what can be learned from these variations. To better identify these agencies worldwide, we introduce a new dataset on the institutional features of 799 agencies in 115 countries and 17 policy sectors. The dataset contains variables from their institutional profiles, covering a broad range of formal characteristics. To examine the diverse faces the regulatory state has adopted along its globalization path in depth, our variables are grouped into four blocs: regulatory responsibilities, managerial autonomy, political independence, and public accountability. As such, we depart from the view that a single dimension does capture the actual diversity of institutional forms regulatory agencies may exhibit. We also use factor and cluster analyses to assess their various forms, and suggest a typology of agency institutional models to facilitate more precise studies on the regulatory state. Results confirm that the regulatory state shows greater variety than usually expected.

AbstractAre the board members of regulatory agencies (regulators), taken as a particular cluster within the public sphere, independent of elected politicians and tenured bureaucrats? How can we assess their independence in practice, beyond formal rules? To address these questions, this paper delves into two key dimensions: board members' social connections and their security of tenure in office. Firstly, we focus on regulators' identity as policy adjudicators and examine their political and administrative relations. In doing so, we expect to understand better how regulators' social and political situations may influence their behavior. Secondly, we assess their political vulnerability through political cycles in order to measure their de facto independence over time. Additionally, variations in these two dimensions are compared with respect to the effect of different de jure appointment rules. We contrast these expectations with the empirical evaluation of board members of regulatory agencies in Spain (1979–2010). Thus, we confirm that regulators who have an administrative profile are more vulnerable to political changes than those with political ties, while appointment rules have an influence on their political vulnerability.

Includes supplemental online material: appendix ; Are the board members of regulatory agencies (regulators), taken as a particular cluster within the public sphere, independent of elected politicians and tenured bureaucrats? How can we assess their independence in practice, beyond formal rules? To address these questions, this paper delves into two key dimensions: board members' social connections and their security of tenure in office. Firstly, we focus on regulators' identity as policy adjudicators and examine their political and administrative relations. In doing so, we expect to understand better how regulators' social and political situations may influence their behavior. Secondly, we assess their political vulnerability through political cycles in order to measure their de facto independence over time. Additionally, variations in these two dimensions are compared with respect to the effect of different de jure appointment rules. We contrast these expectations with the empirical evaluation of board members of regulatory agencies in Spain (1979–2010). Thus, we confirm that regulators who have an administrative profile are more vulnerable to political changes than those with political ties, while appointment rules have an influence on their political vulnerability. ; This study was funded by a research grant of the Escola d'Administració Pública de Catalunya (GAP/2944/2010). Support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (CSO2009/11053) is acknowledged.

Includes supplemental online material: appendix ; State structures have experienced significant transformation with the spread of globalization. This paper examines how to measure one major change that has occurred in recent decades: the worldwide proliferation of public agencies with regulatory tasks. It remains unclear how their configurations vary across countries and sectors, and what can be learned from these variations. To better identify these agencies worldwide, we introduce a new dataset on the institutional features of 799 agencies in 115 countries and 17 policy sectors. The dataset contains variables from their institutional profiles, covering a broad range of formal characteristics. To examine the diverse faces the regulatory state has adopted along its globalization path in depth, our variables are grouped into four blocs: regulatory responsibilities, managerial autonomy, political independence, and public accountability. As such, we depart from the view that a single dimension does capture the actual diversity of institutional forms regulatory agencies may exhibit. We also use factor and cluster analyses to assess their various forms, and suggest a typology of agency institutional models to facilitate more precise studies on the regulatory state. Results confirm that the regulatory state shows greater variety than usually expected.