Troubling Universalism
In: Polity, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 517-518
ISSN: 1744-1684
47 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Polity, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 517-518
ISSN: 1744-1684
In: Studies in law, politics, and society, Band 59, S. 81-98
This chapter brings together the insights of Stuart Scheingold's work on political criminology and urban social control with subsequent work on the politics of affect or "public feelings." I argue that Scheingold prefigured the turn to affect in his study of crime politics and that his attention to the way affect-driven politicization plays out differently at different political levels (local, national) usefully complicates the current focus on national politics. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]
In: Special Issue: The Legacy of Stuart Scheingold; Studies in Law, Politics and Society, S. 81-98
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 671-673
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 671-673
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: Constellations, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 167-168
In: Constellations: an international journal of critical and democratic theory, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 167-169
ISSN: 1467-8675
In: Perspectives on political science, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 60-61
ISSN: 1045-7097
In: Perspectives on political science, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 245
ISSN: 1045-7097
In: Western Political Science Association 2010 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
Cover -- CITIZENS WITHOUT SHELTER -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- CONTENTS -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- INTRODUCTION State Power and the Polarities of Homeless Politics -- CHAPTER ONE From Vagrancy Law to Contemporary Anti-homeless Policy -- CHAPTER TWO The Legal Construction of the Homeless as Bare Life -- CHAPTER THREE Redistribution, Recognition, and the Sovereign Ban -- CHAPTER FOUR Housing Diversity and Democratic Pluralism -- CONCLUSION The Empty Tent of Citizenship -- NOTES -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- CASES CITED -- INDEX
In: Law, culture & the humanities, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 452-454
ISSN: 1743-9752
In: City & community: C & C, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 87-88
ISSN: 1540-6040
15 pages ; This article brings Carl Schmitt's Political Theology into conversation with John Locke's Second Treatise of Government. Two fundamental issues are considered: the relationship between Locke's theory of prerogative power and Schmitt's sovereign/commissarial distinction, and the place of the theological—in particular the "miraculous" nature of the exception. While some have claimed that Locke's theory of prerogative fits the model of "commissarial dictatorship" I argue that Locke actually complicates the sovereign/commissarial distinction by maintaining the tensions between prerogative, law and popular judgment. Schmitt, on the other hand, dissolves the tension by absorbing popular sovereignty into sovereign exceptionalism. Concerning the miraculous nature of the exception, I argue that Schmitt's claim should be understood as part of a broader effort to render politics serious and so I situate his remarks in light of the complex relationship between the political and the moral in his Concept of the Political. Because Locke's politics is "already" serious in the sense of being firmly situated within natural law, exceptional circumstances do not perform the same redemptive function.
BASE
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 550-577
ISSN: 1552-7476
This article probes the relationship among constitutionalism, extra-legal prerogative power, and citizen judgment. While much has been written about the nature of Lockean prerogative, and while his theory serves as a direct inspiration for contemporary "normative extra-legalists," key participants in the debate over emergency powers, less attention has been paid to how the people judge prerogative. Attention to this issue is useful because an examination of the process of political judgment of extra-legalism in Locke leads to a complication of the current extra-legalist vision of democratic mechanisms of accountability. The author argues that the extra-legal approach is right to consider the role of democratic publics in potentially constraining the exercise of emergency powers but wrong to formulate that role as one extra-constitutional power checking another extra-constitutional power. The author situates both prerogative power and citizen judgment of it at the threshold of the constitutional order.