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Working paper
Immigration and Perceived Social Position. Insights from an Unintended Survey Experiment
In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 547-564
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
Using data from an involuntary survey experiment in Germany, we investigate whether priming people on immigration affects their self-perceived social standing. Our findings suggest that individuals who are administered a module concerning attitudes toward immigration perceive themselves as in a higher social position than would otherwise. Consistently with previous literature, we find that this effect is driven by right-wing-leaning individuals.
Minimum Wage and Tolerance for High Incomes
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 16107
SSRN
Collective negative shocks and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from the COVID-19 crisis in Germany
Using new data from a three-wave panel survey administered in Germany between May 2020 and May 2021, this paper studies the impact of a negative shock affecting every strata of the population, such as the development of COVID-19, on preferences for redistribution. Exploiting the plausibly exogenous change in severity of the infection rate at the county level, we show that, contrary to some theoretical expectations, the worse the crisis, the lower the support for redistribution of our respondents. We provide further suggestive evidence that this is not driven by a decrease in inequality aversion, but this might be the result of a decrease in trust in the institutions who are in charge of redistributive policies.
BASE
Pro-environmental Attitudes, Local Environmental Conditions and Recycling Behavior
In: CEIS Working Paper No. 513
SSRN
The political cost of lockdown's enforcement
We study how the political cost of enforcing a lockdown in response to the COVID- 19 outbreak relates to citizens' propensity for altruistic punishment in Italy, the early epicenter of the pandemic. Approval for the government's management of the crisis decreases with the amount of the penalties that individuals would like to see enforced for lockdown violations. People supporting stronger punishment are more likely to consider the government's reaction to the pandemic as insufficient. However, after the establishment of tougher sanctions for risky behaviors, we observe a sudden flip in support for government. Higher amounts of the desired fines become associated with a higher probability of considering the government's policy response as too extreme, lower trust in government, and lower confidence in the truthfulness of the officially provided information. Lockdowns entail a political cost that helps explain why democracies may adopt epidemiologically suboptimal policies.
BASE
Social Media Charity Campaigns and Pro-Social Behaviour. Evidence from the Ice Bucket Challenge
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 16046
SSRN
The Political Cost of Lockdown's Enforcement
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 14032
SSRN
Working paper
Collective Negative Shocks and Preferences for Redistribution: Evidence from the Covid-19 Crisis in Germany
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 14969
SSRN
The Political Cost of Lockdown's Enforcement
We study how the political cost of enforcing a lockdown in response to the COVID- 19 outbreak relates to citizens' propensity for altruistic punishment in Italy, the early epicenter of the pandemic. Approval for the government's management of the crisis decreases with the amount of the penalties that individuals would like to see enforced for lockdown violations. People supporting stronger punishment are more likely to consider the government's reaction to the pandemic as insufficient. However, after the establishment of tougher sanctions for risky behaviors, we observe a sudden flip in support for government. Higher amounts of the desired fines become associated with a higher probability of considering the government's policy response as too extreme, lower trust in government, and lower confidence in the truthfulness of the officially provided information. Lock-downs entail a political cost that helps explain why democracies may adopt epidemiologically suboptimal policies.
BASE