Le détroit de Torres situé entre l'Australie et la Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée est un goulet d'étranglement où la navigation y est difficile. L'Australie a pu limiter l'usage de cette route maritime mais la question des peuples autochtones révèle désormais des difficultés avec un accroissement des inégalités, sources de tensions.
Situé sur la route maritime reliant les zones de production pétrolière du golfe Arabo-Persique et les zones de consommation d'Asie orientale, le détroit de Malacca est le second goulet d'étranglement des flux mondiaux d'hydrocarbures après le détroit d'Ormuz. De ce fait, les États riverains du détroit de Malacca, situés sur cette route énergétique d'envergure mondiale, peuvent être qualifiés d'« États transits » : un terme désignant un pays situé sur un corridor énergétique transnational et qui exerce une fonction de lien entre des pays producteurs et des pays consommateurs. À partir d'une typologie des États transits maritimes, cette contribution analyse la stratégie de chaque État riverain pour valoriser sa situation sur un corridor énergétique et s'interroge finalement sur les possibilités d'émergence d'un hub énergétique transfrontalier dans la partie méridionale du détroit de Malacca.
International audience ; The term " connectivity " emerged among Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) member states (AMS) during meetings concerning the building of the ASEAN economic community (AEC). Following numerous discussions of this concept at the fifteenth ASEAN Summit in October 2009, the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) was adopted in 2010, during the seventeenth ASEAN Summit in Vietnam. The MPAC (2011, pp. 1–3) defines connectivity as the physical, institutional, and people-to-people linkages that comprise the foundation support and facilitative means to achieve the economic, political security and sociocultural pillars toward realizing the vision of an integrated ASEAN Community. It therefore relies on three main pillars: the improvement of the institutional environment so as to reduce tariff and nontariff barriers and favor the creation of a single market in the sea and air sectors; the setting up of legislative measures favoring greater mobility of persons within ASEAN; and finally, the development of transnational transport infrastructures whose aim is to favor connectivity within ASEAN. According to ASEAN leaders, improved connectivity, especially through transport links, is an essential condition for economic growth in Southeast Asia. Transport links not only provide physical access to resources, but also enable producers to take advantage of opportunities in domestic and foreign markets, leading to economies of scale and specialization. They also enable consumers to have access to a variety of competitively priced goods, encourage investment, promote social integration, and spur trade and economic growth. Furthermore, enhancing ASEAN's connectivity is not only to reduce business transaction cost, time, and travel costs, but also to connect the " core " and the " periphery " in ASEAN (Basu Das, 2013, p. 3), thus distributing the benefits of multifaceted growth wider in the region and reducing the development divide in ASEAN. ASEAN's connectivity plan therefore takes as its starting point the hypothesis that there exists an obvious link between building infrastructures, the opening up of territories and their inclusion in newly established networks, and economic development. Due to this fact and according to ASEAN leaders, the upgrading of infrastructure, the construction of new infrastructure, and the harmonization of the regulatory framework would significantly narrow the development gap within ASEAN. It is precisely this hypothesis that this chapter is questioning, by focusing especially on the MPAC's development projects for land (road and rail) and sea transport infrastructures. After presenting the main directions taken by the MPAC and the tools used to decrease territorial inequalities regarding provision of infrastructures, this chapter attempts to assess on different scales (regional, subregional, and local) the regions that have gained or lost since the MPAC was implemented and to explain the reasons for these disparities.
International audience ; The term " connectivity " emerged among Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) member states (AMS) during meetings concerning the building of the ASEAN economic community (AEC). Following numerous discussions of this concept at the fifteenth ASEAN Summit in October 2009, the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) was adopted in 2010, during the seventeenth ASEAN Summit in Vietnam. The MPAC (2011, pp. 1–3) defines connectivity as the physical, institutional, and people-to-people linkages that comprise the foundation support and facilitative means to achieve the economic, political security and sociocultural pillars toward realizing the vision of an integrated ASEAN Community. It therefore relies on three main pillars: the improvement of the institutional environment so as to reduce tariff and nontariff barriers and favor the creation of a single market in the sea and air sectors; the setting up of legislative measures favoring greater mobility of persons within ASEAN; and finally, the development of transnational transport infrastructures whose aim is to favor connectivity within ASEAN. According to ASEAN leaders, improved connectivity, especially through transport links, is an essential condition for economic growth in Southeast Asia. Transport links not only provide physical access to resources, but also enable producers to take advantage of opportunities in domestic and foreign markets, leading to economies of scale and specialization. They also enable consumers to have access to a variety of competitively priced goods, encourage investment, promote social integration, and spur trade and economic growth. Furthermore, enhancing ASEAN's connectivity is not only to reduce business transaction cost, time, and travel costs, but also to connect the " core " and the " periphery " in ASEAN (Basu Das, 2013, p. 3), thus distributing the benefits of multifaceted growth wider in the region and reducing the development divide in ASEAN. ASEAN's connectivity plan therefore takes as its starting ...
International audience ; The term " connectivity " emerged among Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) member states (AMS) during meetings concerning the building of the ASEAN economic community (AEC). Following numerous discussions of this concept at the fifteenth ASEAN Summit in October 2009, the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) was adopted in 2010, during the seventeenth ASEAN Summit in Vietnam. The MPAC (2011, pp. 1–3) defines connectivity as the physical, institutional, and people-to-people linkages that comprise the foundation support and facilitative means to achieve the economic, political security and sociocultural pillars toward realizing the vision of an integrated ASEAN Community. It therefore relies on three main pillars: the improvement of the institutional environment so as to reduce tariff and nontariff barriers and favor the creation of a single market in the sea and air sectors; the setting up of legislative measures favoring greater mobility of persons within ASEAN; and finally, the development of transnational transport infrastructures whose aim is to favor connectivity within ASEAN. According to ASEAN leaders, improved connectivity, especially through transport links, is an essential condition for economic growth in Southeast Asia. Transport links not only provide physical access to resources, but also enable producers to take advantage of opportunities in domestic and foreign markets, leading to economies of scale and specialization. They also enable consumers to have access to a variety of competitively priced goods, encourage investment, promote social integration, and spur trade and economic growth. Furthermore, enhancing ASEAN's connectivity is not only to reduce business transaction cost, time, and travel costs, but also to connect the " core " and the " periphery " in ASEAN (Basu Das, 2013, p. 3), thus distributing the benefits of multifaceted growth wider in the region and reducing the development divide in ASEAN. ASEAN's connectivity plan therefore takes as its starting point the hypothesis that there exists an obvious link between building infrastructures, the opening up of territories and their inclusion in newly established networks, and economic development. Due to this fact and according to ASEAN leaders, the upgrading of infrastructure, the construction of new infrastructure, and the harmonization of the regulatory framework would significantly narrow the development gap within ASEAN. It is precisely this hypothesis that this chapter is questioning, by focusing especially on the MPAC's development projects for land (road and rail) and sea transport infrastructures. After presenting the main directions taken by the MPAC and the tools used to decrease territorial inequalities regarding provision of infrastructures, this chapter attempts to assess on different scales (regional, subregional, and local) the regions that have gained or lost since the MPAC was implemented and to explain the reasons for these disparities.
Après presque une décennie d'accalmies (2000-2008) les tensions en mer de Chine méridionale, ou mer Orientale pour les Vietnamiens, ont repris ces dernières années. La nature et les modalités du conflit ont cependant changé car le Viêt Nam ambitionne désormais de devenir une puissance maritime d'Asie du Sud-Est continentale. Longtemps uniquement perçu comme une faille du système de défense vietnamien, l'espace maritime apparaît depuis le lancement du Doi Moi comme une ressource trop longtemps négligée. Ainsi, alors que jusqu'à la fin des années 1990, le gouvernement vietnamien n'abordait les questions maritimes que sous l'angle de sa politique irrédentiste en mer de Chine méridionale, il développe désormais une stratégie volontariste de valorisation des ressources maritimes de son territoire : passage de la pêche côtière à la pêche hauturière, exploitation de champs pétrolifères au large de ses côtes ou encore politique d'insertion dans le trafic maritime mondial conteneurisé par la création de ports en eaux profondes. Enjeux économiques, nationalistes et stratégiques se rejoignent désormais. De ce fait, pour comprendre la nature des tensions entre le Viêt Nam et la Chine, il est tout autant nécessaire de saisir la spécificité des enjeux économiques maritimes que d'analyser l'évolution de la stratégie militaire maritime vietnamienne. Ce qui n'a pas réellement changé en revanche, c'est l'alternance entre phase de frictions, de négociations et d'avancées diplomatiques dans les relations entre le Viêt Nam et la Chine. Cette ambiguïté des relations entre le Viêt Nam et la Chine est bien visible dans la gestion différente entre d'un côté les espaces maritimes insulaires (Paracels et Spratleys) qui demeurent des lieux des frictions et de l'autre le golfe du Tonkin où la délimitation officielle de la frontière maritime a abouti à la création d'une Zone commune de développement.
Since the 1990s, regional organizations of the United Nations and international financial institutions have adopted a new dynamic of transnational integration, within the framework of the regionalization process of globalization. In place of the growth triangles of the 1970s, a strategy based on transnational economic corridors has changed the scale of regionalization.Thanks to the initiative of the Asian Development Bank, Southeast Asia provides two of the most advanced examples of such a process in East Asia with, on the one hand, the Greater Mekong Subregion, structured by continental corridors, and on the other, the Malacca Straits, combining maritime and land corridors. This book compares, after two decades, the effects of these developing networks on transnational integration in both subregions.After presenting the general issue of economic corridors, the work deals with the characteristics and structures peculiar to these two regions, followed by a study of national strategies mobilizing actors at different levels of state organization. There follows a study of the emergence of new urban nodes on corridors at land and sea borders, and the impact of these corridors on the local societies. This approach makes it possible to compare the effects of transnational integration processes on the spatial and urban organization of the two subregions and on the increasing diversity of the stakeholders involved
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Since the 1990s, regional organizations of the United Nations and international financial institutions have adopted a new dynamic of transnational integration, within the framework of the regionalization process of globalization. In place of the growth triangles of the 1970s, a strategy based on transnational economic corridors has changed the scale of regionalization. Thanks to the initiative of the Asian Development Bank, Southeast Asia provides two of the most advanced examples of such a process in East Asia with, on the one hand, the Greater Mekong Subregion, structured by continental corr
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De una orilla a otra : las migraciones entre Indonesia y Malasia en el estrecho de Malaca. Nathalie Fau. El estrecho de Malaca, además de ser el principal paso entre el Oceano Indico y el Mar de China, es también un mar interior entre Sumatra (Indonesia) y la península malaca (Malasia). Las dos orillas del estrecho han mantenido siempre flujos de intercambios intensos. Un estudio diacronico permite mostrar los cambios en las modalidades y significado de los flujos humanos distinguiendo claramente tres periodos. El primero corresponde con la época precolonial y colonial donde la movilidad era intensa : el mundo malayo es un espacio sin frontera lineal, en el cual las migraciones continuas son la norma ; las potencias coloniales favorecen estos desplazamientos con el objetivo de atraer, hacia Sumatra y la peninsula malaya, la mano de obra necesaria para llevar adelante el desarrollo económico de dichos espacios infrapoblados. El segundo es el de las construcciones nacionales tras las independencias y el de un repliegue sobre el Estado-nación limitando los flujos migratorios que, de todos modos, se desarrollan en la ilegalidad. La costa este de Sumatra ya no es un punto de partida de emigrantes sino un espacio de tránsito para las migraciones entre Indonesia y Malasia. El último periodo es el de la integración de los países ribereños del estrecho en el sistema de la mundialización : la movilidad de capitales tiende a reemplazar, o como mínimo a frenar, a la movilidad de población. Esta nueva estrategia cobra la forma de zonas de cooperacion transfronteriza que re'nen de nuevo las dos orillas reorganizando el espacio en función del coste y de la cualificación de la mano de obra. Se efectúa, así, una reorganización del espacio basada en la división internacional del trabajo.
