Suchergebnisse

China's tremendous rise will certainly be one of the major turbulent of the current century. Chinese leadership has already astonished the world with its economic development and active diplomacy. It is apparent that there will be a greater increase in Chinese power, influence, and involvement in regional and global affairs in future decades. We cannot envisage the exact nature of Chinese objectives and intentions in near future, however, we can proclaim that Chinese aims will be more spacious than they now are. Some observers view this increasing Chinese enthusiasm in regional affairs as a step towards regional hegemony, while others regard it as promotion of mutual understandings and economic interdependence. Some regional states are viewing Chinese policies with cautions and concerns have been raised in international community. To discuss and elaborate all these aspects of Chinese foreign policy behavior; the major paradigms like realism, liberalism, and constructivism will be explored respectively.

This paper examines China and India's relationship within. - the ambit of the G20 process and the autonomous BRICS institutional. - architecture. The evolving relationship of each of these two emerging. - powers within these different institutional settings demonstrates a. - degree of agentic commonality and distinction. China's and India's. - approaches to both the G20 and the BRICS summit processes highlight. - a combination of status-seeking and hedging behaviour. While. - China's cautious approach is complemented by assertive leadership in. - matters of national interest, India's leadership has a very specific orientation. - towards developmental issues. Whereas China's approach. - focuses on the United States and the rest of the West, India's approach. - is increasingly positioned as a response to China. (GIGA/J Current Ch Affairs)

This paper examines China and India's relationship within the ambit of the G20 process and the autonomous BRICS institutional architecture. The evolving relationship of each of these two emerging powers within these different institutional settings demonstrates a degree of agentic commonality and distinction. China's and India's approaches to both the G20 and the BRICS summit processes high-light a combination of status-seeking and hedging behaviour. While China's cautious approach is complemented by assertive leadership in matters of national interest, India's leadership has a very specific orientation towards developmental issues. Whereas China's approach focuses on the United States and the rest of the West, India's approach is increasingly positioned as a response to China.

This article examines the patterns of consistency and inconsistency between how India and China advocate democratisation at the global and national levels. Addressing this question through a dualistic framework, we develop a detailed map of the rhetorical promotion of democratic governance by India and China through an analysis of 10 years of foreign affairs speeches, remarks, interviews and statements of political elites of both countries. The article argues that although China has not shied away from declarations on democracy domestically as well as on global governance, the contradictions between the clear and consistent push for democracy and equity at the global level and the highly contingent commitment to democracy at the national level remain highly salient. India's deficiencies, by way of contrast, come not in the domain of legitimacy but effectiveness. India's struggle to translate its domestic democratic credibility into more equitable representation at the global institutional level and into a stellar economic model at the domestic level exposes it to criticism in relationship to China. Yet, even with these gaps, the article concludes that India has some comparative advantages over China precisely because it can play a consistent two-level game in terms of the promotion of democracy both at global and state levels.

O dinamismo social e econômico nos países BRICS, combinado com sua ascensão diplomática e política, tem sustentado a mudança na balança global de poder. Embora a transformação dos BRICS, do conceito para a prática, precise ser tratada com seriedade, com o processo de cúpula estendida, ilustrativo de um novo status encontrado para os países emergentes no sistema internacional, devemos reconhecer que os membros dos BRICS (China, Índia, Brasil, Rússia e África do Sul) têm tantas diferenças quanto pontos em comum em termos de suas perspectivas nacionais. Com tais contradições no pano de fundo, explicamos o desenvolvimento institucional informal dos BRICS. Este artigo argumenta que a chave para o sucesso institucional dos BRICS tem sido seu desenvolvimento de uma diplomacia "de clube". Tal abordagem é testada, entretanto, quando o foco da atenção é deslocado das demandas exteriorizadas para a ação coletiva enquanto grupo. Desenvolvemos um arcabouço conceitual da dinâmica de clube observada nos BRICS, com base em três elementos-chave: status internacional, alianças fracas e tamanho do quadro de membros. Utilizamos a criação recente do Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento para testar ainda mais nosso arcabouço. Em termos de conclusão, o artigo aponta para as tensões entre o estilo de clube que permite aos BRICS projetar confiança a respeito de sua ascensão, e a necessidade de alongar este modelo no próximo estágio da evolução. Ao elevar-se para além de um grupo de lobby para o papel de um fórum, com poder próprio de agência autônoma, a entrega instrumental dos BRICS, com respeito à proposta do Banco de Desenvolvimento, é crucial.

The importance of the regional dimension of health diplomacy is only gaining slow and uneven recognition. This is in many ways surprising. As demonstrated in the work of Deacon on the 'globalization of social policy', global social policy has been animated and debated not only at the multilateral level but at the regional level as well. But at least in the diplomatic literature, the importance of this regional dynamic (with a focus on diverse sites and actors and the pursuit of democratic control) has been missed. The objective of this article is to explore whether health diplomacy is catching up to this larger debate re-shaping the conceptualization and practice of diplomacy more generally. In some ways, the results may be counter-productive in that this shift may encourage an increasingly fragmented process. Yet, it may also point to some breakthroughs, with diplomats, acting as 'go to' personnel on the front lines of operational activity, enabling actors to integrate with one another to produce effective governance. In doing so, the regional dimension is given greater recognition as a component of health diplomacy, albeit in an uneven and sometimes awkward manner. Whereas global diplomacy generally emphasizes problem solving, the regional dimension is animated by a normative orientation.

AbstractThe staging of the Fifth BRICS summit on 26–27 March 2013 consolidated the impression of nuanced club dynamics. Despite considerable differences in strategic perspectives, the BRICS members have been successful in amplifying converging interests while avoiding friction from disagreement by downplaying issues on which there is geopolitical divergence and policy competition. Their 'agency' of cooperation within BRICS is founded on an informal and loose operational style, which has facilitated organizational maintenance. The approach of accenting institutional flexibility is demonstrated by content analysis of BRICS declarations, interviews and media releases, which reveal how the membership of this forum have given greater attention to areas in which they share common interests, and made progress working towards them, while refraining from addressing issues in which there are serious underlying tensions.

AbstractWe examine how the United States' response to the situation in Bahrain can be differentiated from that in Libya and Egypt based on a comparative content analysis of the U.S. administration's press releases, remarks, and interviews during the first three months of the Arab Spring movement. Our findings indicate that although the level and duration of violence were comparable, the U.S. government response was strikingly different with the support given to the Bahraini government, in contrast to the critical stances adopted towards Libya and Egypt. We explain how the United States' lack of political incentive to act and concerted support by its allies were influential factors for the United States' differentiated policy during the Arab Spring.