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Working paper
Failures of the State: Theory and Policy
SSRN
Working paper
The state-owned company: "State failure" or "market failure"?
This article will analyze the activity of state-owned companies and their place in the structure of market relations from the standpoint of contemporary approaches to the study of "state failure" and "market failure". It will also consider the implications of the systematic embedding of private property rights. In addition to considering the costs of the functions of state-owned companies, the authors address the actual experience of the Russian economy in the present day, the experience of forming state corporations and the risks associated with their operation. Particular attention will be paid to the inhibition of incentives to improve the general institutional environment and, conversely, to the increasing incidence of direct state intervention in matters that affect economic development. We will examine the various ways in which the growth of the public sector, de jure and de facto, reduces opportunities for implementing private property rights.
BASE
The state-owned company: "State failure" or "market failure"?
In: Russian Journal of Economics, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 55-80
This article will analyze the activity of state-owned companies and their place in the structure of market relations from the standpoint of contemporary approaches to the study of "state failure" and "market failure". It will also consider the implications of the systematic embedding of private property rights. In addition to considering the costs of the functions of state-owned companies, the authors address the actual experience of the Russian economy in the present day, the experience of forming state corporations and the risks associated with their operation. Particular attention will be paid to the inhibition of incentives to improve the general institutional environment and, conversely, to the increasing incidence of direct state intervention in matters that affect economic development. We will examine the various ways in which the growth of the public sector, de jure and de facto, reduces opportunities for implementing private property rights.
SSRN
Working paper
State ownership and efficiency characteristics
This study examines the influence of state participation in the ownership structure of companies on their financial efficiency using a sample of 114 largest companies in Russia. As an indirect indicator of efficiency, we used a variety of financial indicators: revenue per employee (gross margin), return on equity, profit margin and debt burden. The effects of direct and indirect state ownership are considered separately. Using econometric analysis, we conclude that the dominance of the block of shares owned by the state has a negative effect on the performance characteristics, and its increase is associated with an increase in the debt burden of the companies. According to our criteria, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) perform worse on average than private companies. The mechanism of how changes in the "real sector" affect profitability is examined particularly closely. The study shows that a change in the profitability of private companies is characterized by a significant dependence on the movement of labor productivity characteristics. At the same time, for SOEs, a similar correlation was not revealed. These companies demonstrated no visible relationship between their profitability and performance characteristics. The study shows that increases in the size of direct government ownership lead to lower labor productivity and profitability; the impact of indirect ownership is, seemingly, more complicated.
BASE
State ownership and efficiency characteristics
In: Russian Journal of Economics, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 129-157
This study examines the influence of state participation in the ownership structure of companies on their financial efficiency using a sample of 114 largest companies in Russia. As an indirect indicator of efficiency, we used a variety of financial indicators: revenue per employee (gross margin), return on equity, profit margin and debt burden. The effects of direct and indirect state ownership are considered separately. Using econometric analysis, we conclude that the dominance of the block of shares owned by the state has a negative effect on the performance characteristics, and its increase is associated with an increase in the debt burden of the companies. According to our criteria, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) perform worse on average than private companies. The mechanism of how changes in the "real sector" affect profitability is examined particularly closely. The study shows that a change in the profitability of private companies is characterized by a significant dependence on the movement of labor productivity characteristics. At the same time, for SOEs, a similar correlation was not revealed. These companies demonstrated no visible relationship between their profitability and performance characteristics. The study shows that increases in the size of direct government ownership lead to lower labor productivity and profitability; the impact of indirect ownership is, seemingly, more complicated.
The state-owned company: "State failure" or "market failure"?
This article will analyze the activity of state-owned companies and their place in the structure of market relations from the standpoint of contemporary approaches to the study of "state failure" and "market failure". It will also consider the implications of the systematic embedding of private property rights. In addition to considering the costs of the functions of state-owned companies, the authors address the actual experience of the Russian economy in the present day, the experience of forming state corporations and the risks associated with their operation. Particular attention will be paid to the inhibition of incentives to improve the general institutional environment and, conversely, to the increasing incidence of direct state intervention in matters that affect economic development. We will examine the various ways in which the growth of the public sector, de jure and de facto, reduces opportunities for implementing private property rights.
BASE
State ownership and efficiency characteristics
This study examines the influence of state participation in the ownership structure of companies on their financial efficiency using a sample of 114 largest companies in Russia. As an indirect indicator of efficiency, we used a variety of financial indicators: revenue per employee (gross margin), return on equity, profit margin and debt burden. The effects of direct and indirect state ownership are considered separately. Using econometric analysis, we conclude that the dominance of the block of shares owned by the state has a negative effect on the performance characteristics, and its increase is associated with an increase in the debt burden of the companies. According to our criteria, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) perform worse on average than private companies. The mechanism of how changes in the "real sector" affect profitability is examined particularly closely. The study shows that a change in the profitability of private companies is characterized by a significant dependence on the movement of labor productivity characteristics. At the same time, for SOEs, a similar correlation was not revealed. These companies demonstrated no visible relationship between their profitability and performance characteristics. The study shows that increases in the size of direct government ownership lead to lower labor productivity and profitability; the impact of indirect ownership is, seemingly, more complicated.
BASE
Transformation of Ownership Relations and Comparative Analysis of the Russian Regions
In: Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, Moscow, 2001
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
The "dividend puzzle" and the Russian stock market. Part 2
In: Voprosy ėkonomiki: ežemesjačnyj žurnal, Heft 2, S. 59-85
The article analyzes the features of the dividend policy of Russian companies. The first part has contained an overview of academic literature and current trends. In the second part we discuss the results of empirical analysis that is based on a sample of 236 joint-stock companies. The motivation of Russian companies for maintaining the attractiveness of their shares during the period of significant increase of risks and volatility led to the growth of dividend yield. However, the increase of allocated profits observed in the largest state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to a large extent resulted from escalation of the tension in government finances. The threat of budget deficit growth led to partial substitution of tax income for dividend income from SOEs. At the same time some factors of uncertainty for SOEs' operational strategies were increasing, especially those concerning long-term decisions in capital expenditure programs. The results of our analysis reveal that in private companies or SOEs, where the state has a limited influence on the dividend policy, the size of dividend payments to a greater extent depends on their financial performance, cash flows and the availability of promising investment projects. Moreover, the article shows that such companies are more likely to follow dividend smoothing strategies.
The Institution of Bankruptcy: Development, Problems, Areas of Reforming
In: Consortsium for Economic Policy, Research and Advice, 2005
SSRN
Working paper
Panel on Growth and Technology in Perestroyka
In: Post-Soviet affairs, Band 3, Heft 4, S. 332-352
ISSN: 1938-2855