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Prior CEO succession research has been inconclusive, and studies suffer from threats to external validity from sampling limitations. This study uses 219 succession events over a 2-year period to investigate the antecedents and consequences of CEO successor type. Our findings suggest that institutional ownership interacts with firm performance to influence successor choice. Firm performance subsequent to the succession is not influenced by the successor's origin.

Drawing on regulatory focus and brokerage literatures, we develop new theory that explains individuals' motivation to form and change their relationships in organizational networks. Specifically, we examine how promotion and prevention regulatory foci influence such relational processes as tie formation, maintenance, dissolution, and reconstitution. We further explore the relationship between motivational orientations of regulatory foci and relational orientations to brokerage (i.e., tertius iungens/gaudens) and develop a typology that outlines four major ego-level configurations. Each of the four configurations, labeled dutiful coordinators, aspirational arbitrators, versatile brokers, and indifferent egos, offers distinct predictions on network change and structuring. Overall, our theory contributes to organization theory by elaborating on the important role of ego motivation and strategy in organizational networks, and in so doing, advances research that focuses on individual agency in social networks and complements structuralist approaches to understanding social network dynamics.

AbstractResearch Question/IssueThe increase in executive pay has been attracting attention to the practice of peer benchmarking, which is commonly used to determine CEO compensation. Using a network approach, we construct and analyze the compensation peer network and examine how the structure of the network influences CEO pay.Research Findings/InsightsUsing data on public firms in the period between 2006 and 2020, we find that the peer network exhibits strong community structure and that bridging across communities influences CEO pay. Specifically, CEO pay increases by approximately $10 million as the number of bridging ties increases from 30 to 100, which indicates that obfuscation can result in inflated CEO pay and supports the managerial power perspective.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe empirically distinguish the predicted effect of peer benchmarking on CEO pay as outlined in the market for executive talent and the managerial power perspectives. We show that firms may avoid scrutiny and offer high CEO compensation when they either have a very small number of targeted bridging ties or a very large number of diffused, nontargeted bridging ties in the peer network.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThe intent of peer benchmarking was to make CEO compensation practices more transparent, legitimate, and functional; however, our findings indicate that these intentions have not been fully realized and instead benchmarking can be used to inflate CEO pay while avoiding stakeholder scrutiny through obfuscation. These insights provide an opportunity to policy makers to be more effective in encouraging additional transparency and stronger justification for boards' choice of peers.

This study explores the competing influences of different types of board interlocks on diffusion of a strategic initiative among a population of firms. We examine a broad social network of interlocking directors in U.S. firms over a period of 17 years and consider the likelihood that these firms will adopt a strategy of expansion into China. Results show that ties to adopters that unsuccessfully implement this strategy have a nearly equal and opposing effect on the likelihood of adoption as do ties to those that successfully implement the strategy. Ties to those that do not implement the strategy also have a suppressive effect on the likelihood of adoption. Furthermore, we examine a firm's position in the core-periphery structure of the interlocking directorate, finding that ties to adopters closer to the network core positively affect the likelihood of adoption. We discuss the implications of our study for social network analysis, governance, and internationalization research.

ABSTRACTInspired by recent discussions of the systematic costs that external rankings impose on academic institutions, and the undeniable shifts in the landscape of institutional data, a concerted and pragmatic re‐evaluation of ranking efforts has begun. In this study, multiple administrators and researchers representing both public and private institutions across the United States weigh in on these issues. While reaffirming the social contract we hold with society, we argue that the fundamental methodological shortcomings of existing rankings, and ultimately any ordinal ranking system, limit the value of current rankings. These shortcomings emerge from the conceptualization and the architecture of comparisons, and are evident in survey designs, data collection methods, and data aggregation procedures. Our discussion continues by outlining the minimal requirements that a socially responsible, transparent, flexible, and highly representative rating (vs. ranking) approach should employ. Ultimately, we call on academic institutions and organizing bodies to take a collective stand against existing rankings and to embrace the strategic use of multidimensional alternatives that faithfully serve prospective students, parents, and other key stakeholders. We conclude with a number of suggestions and opportunities for practice‐oriented research in the decision sciences aimed to support this fundamental shift in evaluative framing.